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The thesis presents six experiments designed to further understanding of effective
methods of presenting Bayesian problems to a general audience. The first four
experiments (Part I) focus on general Bayesian reasoning. The final two experiments
(Part II) focus specifically on the legal domain.
Experiment one compares two leading theories for Bayesian presentation: Mac-
chi’s (2000) ‘nested sets’ approach, and Krynski and Tenenbaum’s (2007) ‘causal’
approach. It also uses a think aloud protocol, requiring thought-process recording
during solution. A nested sets framing effect is found, but no causal framing effect.
From the think aloud data, a five-stage solution process (the ‘nested sets’ process),
modal among successful individuals, is found. In experiment two, Macchi’s approach
is tested on a problem with greater ecological validity. An increase in accuracy is
still seen. Experiment two also finds that conversion of the problem to integers by
participants is highly associated with accuracy. Experiment three confirms the null
causal finding of experiment one and finds that the think aloud protocol itself in-
creases accuracy. Experiment four experimentally tests whether prompting problem
conversion to integers, and prompting individuals to follow the nested sets process
improve accuracy. No effect is found for conversion, but an effect is found for the
nested sets process prompt.
Experiment five tested whether statistically untrained individuals can undertake
accurate Bayesian reasoning of a legal case including necessary forensic error rates
(Fenton et al., 2014). No single individual is found to provide the normative answer.
Instead a range of heuristics are found. Building upon this, experiment six compares
two approaches to presenting the Bayesian output of a legal case: the popular event
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tree diagram, and the Bayesian network diagram recommended by (Fenton et al.,
2014). Without inclusion of false positives and negatives the event-tree diagram
was rated more trust worthy and easy to understand than the Bayesian network
diagram. However, including these error types, this pattern reversed.
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The work presented herein represents an attempt to build upon and improve current
methods for presenting Bayesian statistics to the general public to increase the
proportion of individuals accurately solving such problems and reduce fallacious
reasoning. The thesis begins with a general introduction to the area, tracing the
history of Bayesian statistics as well as attempts to reconcile Bayesian principles
with human reasoning. Following this, the thesis has a two part structure.
Part one presents four experiments aimed at improving the presentation of
Bayesian statistics in a general sense, and the recommendations which arise from
the findings of these four experiments apply to the vast majority of situations in
which the general public encounter Bayesian statistics. In general, part one finds
little evidence for an approach based upon enhancing the causal framing of such
problems, and instead across several experiments find evidence for an approach in-
volving a shift in perspective / presentation from a single individual (the ’inside’
view) to a group focus (the ’outside’ view). It also proposes a 5-stage process model
by which individuals are thought to solve such Bayesian problems, regardless of spe-
cific framing. This model is found through exploratory analysis in experiments on to
three, and tested experimentally in experiment four, showing a successful increase
in accuracy. In experiment three, a clear increase in accuracy is also found for the
mere use of a protocol which requires participants to type their reasoning process
while solving the problem.
Across two experiments, part two attempts to provide a solution to an anomalous
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situation (the legal trial), in which the approaches advocated in part one are not
applicable. This is due, firstly, to the impossibility of framing such a situation from
the ’outside’ view, and secondly, due to the high complexity of the typical legal case.
In this situation, it is confirmed in the first experiment that untrained individuals
cannot successfully solve the Bayesian statistics involved in a legal trial. Given
this inability, it is argued that computational methods such as Bayesian Networks
should be employed to undertake the calculations, and legal professionals / jurors
should focus instead on defining the input to these programs, and on interpreting
the output. Two methods for presenting the output (Event Trees and Bayesian
Networks) are compared in the final experiment, with the conclusion that when the
necessary complexity of the legal trial is taken into account, the Bayesian network
is more trusted and understood than the event tree.
In a final concluding section, the findings of the two parts are drawn together and
ramifications for theory and recommendations for practise are provided. An overall
analysis of common errors on Bayesian problems from both parts are analysed,
finding evidence for a theory which proposes that semantic confusion of the text
of Bayesian problems is a major source of error in such problems and against a
long-held theory that certain information is simply ignored / under-weighted.
1.2 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian Inference is a statistical approach to updating the probabilistic belief of a
hypothesis being true in the light of new data (Sedlmeier, 1997). Through a tur-
bulent history with fluctuating popularity, it has now emerged as a cornerstone of
modern probability theory (Box and Tiao, 2011) and has been described by Jef-
freys (1973) as “to the theory of probability what the Pythagorean Theorem is to
geometry”. The approach has now found application in genetics (Beaumont and
Rannala, 2004), linguistics (Frank and Goodman, 2012), image processing (Geman
and Geman, 1993), cosmology (Hobson, 2010), machine learning (Bishop, 2006),
epidemiology (Lawson, 2013), forensic science (Taroni and Aitken, 2006), ecology
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(Parent and Rivot, 2012) and many more fields of enquiry.
With the increasing presentation of risk communication in numerical form, the
ability to make simple Bayesian inferences from given statistics is rapidly becom-
ing a necessary skill even for individuals with no statistical training (Meder and
Gigerenzer, 2014; Gigerenzer, 2015). Two key areas where the general public fre-
quently encounter statistical problems requiring Bayesian inference include medicine
and law (Forrest, 2003; Gigerenzer and Edwards, 2003; Meder et al., 2009; Barrett
and McKenna, 2011; Fenton et al., 2014). In medicine, both doctors and patients
need Bayesian inference to make accurate assessments of the risk of the patient
having a specific condition following diagnostic testing (Meder et al., 2009; Barrett
and McKenna, 2011; Wegwarth et al., 2012). In law, the increasing use of statis-
tical forensic evidence combined with the discouragement of forensic experts from
presenting Bayesian analyses (Donnelly, 2005; Redmayne et al., 2011) has left both
lawyers and jurors to make the necessary calculations for themselves ((Donnelly,
2005; Fenton et al., 2014). Ineffective presentations of such statistics greatly in-
crease error rates in comprehension. The consequences have been shown to include
poor patient decisions (Gigerenzer and Edwards, 2003; Navarrete et al., 2014) and
miscarriages of justice (e.g. Forrest, 2003; Mehlum, 2009).
The actual process of Bayesian inference was first described and formalised by
Thomas Bayes and was submitted posthumously in a paper to the Royal Society by
Richard Price (Bayes and Price, 1763). In this paper, Bayes and Price provided the
first formulation of how to mathematically incorporate new data into pre-existing
beliefs to arrive at new belief levels. The same process was independently rediscov-
ered by Pierre-Simon LaPlace (see Laplace and Simon, 1951) who was the first to
publish the general modern formulation of what is now known as Bayes‘ rule:
Fig. 1.1: Bayes‘ formula (1763), developed by LaPlace (1814 / 1951)
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The output of the formula, P(H|D), commonly known as the ‘posterior‘ belief
level, is the probability of the hypothesis under question (H) being true, given the
new piece of data observed (D). P(D|H) is the probability of that data occurring if
H were true, and P(D|-H) is the probability of that data occurring if H were not
true. P(H) is the probability that the hypothesis was true before the new data was
observed, and P(-H) is the probability the hypothesis was not true before that data
was observed.
1.3 Rational Man
1.3.1 The Enlightenment View of Human Rationality
In a similar pattern to the varying popularity of the Bayesian approach to statistical
inference itself, the degree to which human reasoning on probability-updating tasks
has been believed to conform to Bayes’ rule has risen and fallen on several occasions.
Classical probability theorists of the enlightenment such as Laplace as well as Poisson
and Condorcet saw probability theories like Bayes’ rule as being embedded in the
common sense of educated persons and as an accurate representation of human
judgement (Daston, 1995). Laplace stated that “the theory of probability is at
bottom nothing more than good sense reduced to a calculus which evaluates that
which good minds know by a sort of instinct, without being able to explain how
with precision” (Laplace and Simon, 1951, pp. 196).
1.3.2 1944: The Economic Model
This view of the human faculties persisted for over two centuries, and was even
further entrenched within the field of economics following the publication of the
‘Expected Utility Theory’ of Neumann et al. (1944). This model treated human
agents as entirely rational decision-makers who would follow the laws of probability
precisely when reasoning or making decisions. While initially theoretical, the theory




1.4 Base Rate Neglect
1.4.1 Early Findings
1955: Meehl and Rosen
Criticism of Expected Utility Theory (Neumann et al., 1944) as a predictor of human
behaviour came swiftly following its publication. After a decade of growing discon-
tent, two seminal papers by Edwards (1954) and Simon (1956) demonstrated the
failure of this theory to account for actual human behaviour in a range of situations.
Simon in particular criticised the implicit assumptions of the model that when faced
with a decision or problem humans have unlimited time and processing power with
which to make the decision, two ideas that Simon demonstrated to be clearly impos-
sible. Simon’s ideas later came to be known as ’Bounded Rationality’ (Simon, 1972)
and have been hugely influential in the decision making field (Gigerenzer, 1996).
In regards to Bayes’ rule in particular, a major blow to the entirely-rational view
of the human faculties arrived when Meehl and Rosen (1955) wrote a paper to the
Psychological Bulletin expressing concern over the diagnostic tests being used by
fellow psychologists. They also expressed reservations as to the theoretical accounts
being put forward in the literature on how these tests should be interpreted. Meehl
and Rosen believed that, when determining whether a patient had a given disorder,
these psychologists were relying entirely on the outcome of their diagnostic test as
well as the ‘true positive rate’ (the frequency with which that test correctly identifies
the illness), and were overlooking other key information, such as the incidence of
the diagnosis in the population.
An assessment of whether an individual has a given clinical diagnosis is one
which requires inference in accordance with Bayes’ rule: the diagnostician’s prior
belief (P[H]) in the probability of the patient having the disease before the diagnostic
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test must be combined with the test result itself (P[D|H]) to arrive at a posterior, or
updated belief in the likelihood that the patient has that disease (P[H|D]). However,
the psychologists that Meehl and Rosen (1955) observed, in focusing entirely on the
true positive rate of their tests, were entirely ignoring other information known
prior to conducting the test such as the frequency of the illness in the population
(otherwise known as the base rate). This was a violation of normative rationality
and of probability and Bayesian theory, and stood in stark contrast to the picture
of human faculties previously adhered to.
1966: Edwards and colleagues
The earliest empirical attempts to test whether human reasoning conformed to
Bayes’ rule were undertaken by Rouanet (1961), Phillips and Edwards (1966) and
Edwards (1968). In a typical problem, Phillips and Edwards (1966) presented par-
ticipants with a problem in which 10 bags each contained 100 red and blue poker
chips and were told that the experimenter would soon choose one of the bags ran-
domly. In a certain number of bags (the figure varied between conditions and was
provided to the participant), red chips were more common, and in the remaining
bags, blue were more common. This figure served as the Bayesian ‘prior’ (P[H]) and
participants were asked to judge the probability that a predominantly red bag or
blue bag was chosen on this data alone. They were then told that in the predom-
inantly red bag the ratio of red to blue chips was 70:30, and the inverse ratio held
for the blue bags (P[D|H]).
Participants were then shown a sequence of twenty chips (with replacement) from
a randomly chosen bag and were asked to estimate the probability that each sequence
of chips came from a predominantly red, or blue, bag (P[H|D]). This estimate was
made by the participants by distributing 100 metal washers over two pegs, one
indicating a red bag, one blue. With this design, Phillips and Edwards (1966)
as well as Rouanet (1961) and Edwards (1968) found what they called ’Bayesian
Conservatism’. By this they meant that participants’ estimates, on the whole, were
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lower, or less extreme, than was afforded by the data when calculated via Bayes’ rule.
However, it was also noted that all participants integrated the two pieces of data to
some extent, providing an answer somewhere between the two values representing
the distribution of bags, and the distribution of chips.
1972: Kahneman and Tversky
Several years later, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) presented participants with the
now-classic Bayesian ‘taxi-cab’ problem:
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab compa-
nies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city.
You are given the following data: 85% of the cabs in the city are Green
[P(-H)] and 15% are Blue [P(H)].
A witness identified the cab as Blue [Data]. The court tested the relia-
bility of the witness under the circumstances that existed on the night
of the accident and concluded that the witness correctly identified each
of the two colours 80% [P(D|H)] of the time and failed 20% of the time
[P(-D|H)].
What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue
rather than Green [P(H|D)]?
In this problem participants are provided with the prior (P[H]) and it’s com-
pliment (P[-H]), as well as a single piece of diagnostic data which serves both as
P(D|-H) and P(D|-H). Their task is to give the Bayesian posterior, P(H|D). This
requires integration of all of these figures. However, the authors found that the ma-
jority of their participants’ estimations of P(H|D) relied entirely on the eye witness
accuracy rate [P(D|H)] - the modal answer was ‘80%’ These participants, they noted,
were entirely neglecting the distributional, or ‘base rate’ data of the proportions of
cabs in the city (P[H]), which ultimately led to an over-estimation compared to the
Bayesian norm. This pattern of responses was entirely unlike Phillips and Edwards
(1966) finding of under-estimation relative to the Bayesian norm but highly analo-
gous to the narrow focus of Meehls and Rosen’s (1955) colleagues on their diagnostic
tests to the exclusion of disorder prevalence base rates.
The problem used by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) has similarities to that
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used by Phillips and Edwards (1966): a ‘prior’ distribution of green and blue cabs
is given (equivalent to the red-predominant and blue-predominant bags distribution
(and which both serve as P[H])), as well as further information of the reliability of the
witness observing those cabs (equivalent to the distribution of chips within the bags
(and which both serve as P[D|H])). There are however substantial differences in the
presentation of these variables. These two pieces of information in Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1972) paper were quite dissimilar (the distributional data of the cabs in a
city vs the reliability of an eye witness) whereas those of Phillips and Edwards were
highly similar (distributional data of bags vs distributional data of chips within those
bags). This may provide some explanation as to the greater amount of ‘integration’
of the two pieces of data in Phillips and Edwards study: perhaps it was much
clearer to participants that the two pieces of data in that experiment could in fact
be integrated mathematically. Another substantial difference in methodology is the
way in which the data was presented to, and the responses were requested from,
participants. While participants in Phillips and Edwards’ study directly sampled
the chip distributions and responded via “intuitive estimates” (Phillips and Edwards,
1966, pp.3) by placing metal washers on a peg, Kahneman and Tversky’s participants
received the data via word-based statistics and responded precisely and formally by
writing down a numerical percentage. Given the greater realism of Phillips and
Edwards approach, this might suggest that Kahneman and Tversky’s finding was
an artefact of abstract word problems only.
However, the extreme similarity of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) findings
to those observed naturalistically by Meehl (1955) make this simple interpretation
less tenable. The form of the problem presented by Kahneman and Tversky was
highly similar to the real-life problem investigated by Meehl. Both involved the
combination of distributional data (the cab company proportions / the base rate
of disorders in a population (P[H])) with diagnostic data (eye witness reliability
/ diagnostic test reliability (P[D|H])). In both cases, the subjects of the analysis
were found to entirely ignore the distributional data and to focus entirely upon the
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diagnostic data. The fact that this was observed by Meehl under natural conditions
suggested that Kahneman and Tversky’s finding was not a mere artefact of study
design and may reflect a deeper psychological principle. Indeed, the phenomenon
discovered by Meehl and Kahneman and Tversky has come to be known as ‘Base
Rate Neglect’, and questions of when, under what circumstances, for whom, and
why, it occurs, have formed the core of a large field of enquiry which persists to
this day (Fischhoff et al., 1979; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Casscells et al., 1978; Eddy, 1982;
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Macchi, 2000; Evans
et al., 2000; Sloman et al., 2003; Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007; Welsh and Navarro,
2012; Johnson and Tubau, 2013; McNair and Feeney, 2014a).
1.4.2 1973 - 1980: Replications and Extensions
Many replications followed Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) finding. In the fol-
lowing year, Hammerton (1973), in a similar design to the original, but using a
Bayesian ‘Medical’ problem in which the probability of a person having a disease
[P(H|D)] was estimated from an imperfect diagnostic test with a given true positive
rate [P(D|H)]. Hammerton found that when participants were asked to estimate
the Bayesian posterior but weren’t provided the prior (P[H]) informaion at all, no
participants showed an awareness that a vital piece of information for solving the
problem was missing.
Liu (1975) furthered Hammerton’s work, presenting the same medical problem
but including a prior and with a range of different values for the true positive rate
[P(D|H)] and the prior [P(H)]. In two departures from previous designs, Liu first
presented the base rate value after the diagnostic information (in all previous ex-
periments the prior had always been given first), and secondly removed participants
who had indicated they were ‘just guessing’ on the problem. Liu still found the
modal answer in 11/12 conditions to be equal to P(D|H), indicating complete ’base
rate neglect’ as the most common response. Further, on additional questioning, al-
most one third of participants indicated the sentence containing P(D|H) as the most
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important for answering the question.
Building more directly upon Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) work, Lyon and
Slovic (1976) gave participants the same taxi-cab problem and then presented them
with three reasoned arguments for the ‘correct answer’ which amounted to the state-
ments that (a) only the base rate (P[H]) was needed , (b) only the diagnostic infor-
mation (P[D|H]) was needed and (c) both pieces of information were needed. Fifty
percent of their subjects chose (b), despite (c) being the correct argument.
Six years after Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) work, in another study which
has since become a classic, Casscells et al. (1978) provided a worrying empirical
demonstration of the ‘base rate neglect’ effect within medical experts. They gave
the following ‘disease problem’ to 95 students and staff at Harvard Medical School:
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive
rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a positive
result actually has the disease, assuming that you know nothing about
the person’s symptoms or signs? %
This problem provided an even closer analogy to Meehl and Rosen’s (1955) ob-
servations of psychologists’ diagnoses. The problem provides as the base rate or
prior the prevalence of the disease (P[H]: 1/1000) and the ‘diagnostic’ or ‘new’ in-
formation is presented via the positive test result and its false positive rate (P[D|-H]:
5%). Despite the relative simplicity in terms of number of variables, the authors
found that only 18% of participants were able to give the correct answer of ‘2%’
[P(H|D)]. Forty five percent of participants however, provided the answer ‘95%’
which is generated by subtracting the 5% false positive rate from 100% [1-P(D|-H)].
This was the modal answer in the study, and again, relies entirely on the ‘diagnostic
information’, completely neglecting the base rate information.
This problem introduced to the literature a new form of ’base rate neglect’.
While all previous work had found that the majority of these responses involved
giving P(D|H) as the answer, Casscells et al (1978) found the modal response to be
1-P(D|-H). A possible reason for this is that previous work provided problem solvers
with P(D|H), while Casscells et al provided P(D|-H).
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In a theoretical development, Ajzen (1977) proposed that a causal link between
the base rate and the event of interest (e.g. the car accident) was necessary to avoid
base rate neglect. This theory was later validated using two versions of the taxi-
cab problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). In the original version (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1972), the base rate was based on the distribution of taxi cabs in the
city. This, Tversky and Kahneman claimed, was not perceived by problem solvers
as being ‘causally related’ to the accident, and was instead seen as ‘mere statistical
data’. In this new version (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980), the size of the two taxi-
cab companies were made equal but a causal element was added: it was stated that
85% of accidents were caused by the green taxi company, while only 15% were caused
by the blue (P[H]). This new framing, the authors thought, provided a strong causal
schema: green taxi drivers were ‘dangerous’ drivers and were causing accidents much
more often than blue taxi cabs. In this version only 18% of participants neglected
the base rate entirely, and a full 60% of participants provided an answer which in
some way combined both base rate and diagnostic information.
Bar-Hillel (1980) added to Ajzen’s (1977) and Tversky and Kahneman’s (1980)
‘causal’ necessity for base rates to be incorporated by problem solves with a further
necessity: that of ‘specificity’. Specificity was defined as the degree to which the
reference class of the base rate was specific to the event of interest (e.g. the car
accident). If the base-rate concerned an entire population it would be deemed as
less-relevant to the event of interest. However if it concerned a sub-group of the
population, and the target was within that sub-group it would be deemed more
relevant. The more specific the sub-group, the more relevant the data would be
considered to be, and less likely it would be to be neglected by problem solvers. To
demonstrate the importance of this principle independent of the causality principle,
Bar-Hillel presented a new version of the taxi-cab problem, where the ‘diagnostic’
witness information (P[D|H]) was replaced with non-causal distributional data sim-
ilar to the base rate (P[H]). While both pieces of information were now equally
’causally’ related to the accident, the diagnostic information was altered to be more
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‘specific’ to the estimation requested. It was stated that in the neighbourhood in
which the accident occurred “80% of all taxis are blue and 20% are green”. In this
situation, where both base-rate and diagnostic data were equally non-causal and
‘distributional’, but the diagnostic information was more ‘specific’ to the situation
being judged (because it was ‘in the area of the accident’ rather than for the city as a
whole) high levels of base rate neglect were again seen. This demonstrated, accord-
ing to the author, that specificity was another important determinant in predicting
whether problem solvers would neglect the base rate or not.
Bar-Hillel (1980) combined ‘causality’ and ‘specificity’ into the concept of ‘rele-
vance’. If people thought the base rate was both causally and specifically ‘relevant’
to the problem at hand, they would use it, and if they did not, they would neglect it.
Bar-Hillel also went further: she proposed that more relevant information tended
to ‘dominate’ less relevant information to an extent that was not justifiable: in-
stead of simply down-weighting less-relevant information, as the Bayesian approach
would advocate, many problem solvers simply disregarded it entirely. Bar-Hillel
demonstrated this in another modification of the original taxi-cab problem where
the diagnostic information was made both equally causal and equally specific to the
base rate data. The base rate statement itself was not changed from Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1972) original. However, by downgrading the ‘relevance’ of the diagnostic
information, Bar-Hillel (1980) found a dramatic drop in base rate neglect (12% of
participants): now that the two pieces of information were equally ‘relevant’ neither
dominated the other and both were integrated by the majority of participants to
arrive at the final answer.
1.5 1981: New Paradigms
1.5.1 Paradigm Criticisms
Shortly after Bar-Hillel’s work, the first in a long line of criticisms of the paradigm
being used following Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) work began. The first came
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from Cohen (1981), who claimed that the reasoning behind the development of
the normative standards (the answer considered to be ’correct’) for such problems
was questionable. He stated that the problems being used in fact offered many
interpretations, some of which produced answers in line with responses commonly
being classed as fallacies, such as base rate neglect. One key issue Cohen focused
on, echoing Bar-Hillel (1980) was the degree to which the reference class of the
base rate was specific enough to apply to the problem at hand. Bar-Hillel had
demonstrated that people were sensitive to this, which Cohen stated showed a good
level of understanding in the majority of solvers. Cohen argued that depending
on the level of non-specificity, and on the circumstances, a weighting of zero (and
therefore base rate neglect) may in fact be an appropriate and rational approach,
in line with Bayes’ rule. Another issue raised by Cohen was that solvers may be
using moral principles as a reason to avoid the base rate. For example, in the taxi
cab problem, the solver is effectively in the place of a juror, and should therefore
assume that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. This may provide a
moral imperative to ignore the distributional information, as is common in law. If
this were the case Cohen pointed out, it would not be reasonable to conclude this
person was succumbing to a fallacy: instead they may be well aware of what the
mathematically ’correct’ answer is, but be choosing to provide a different answer
on ethical grounds. Continuing Cohen’s line of thought, Niiniluoto (1981) claimed
that if participants did deem the base rate to be non-relevant, for whatever reason,
a non-informative Bayesian prior of .50 would yield .80 (equal to the most common
answer in the taxi-cab problem), and equal to P[E|H]) as the normative answer.
A further criticism came two years later from Birnbaum and Mellers (1983).
Birnbaum also questioned whether the normative values being used for the problems
in the field were appropriate. The simplistic norms typically used in the taxi-cab
problem relied, Birnbaum stated, upon the questionable assumption that the ac-
curacy rate of the witness in the scenario would be entirely independent from the
distribution of the cabs in the city. There are many reasons to suppose this may be
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a faulty assumption. For example, the witness is likely to have been exposed to this
distribution of cabs by being a resident of the city, which will have some impact on
their accuracy in detecting both colours. The wide range of possible dependency
values for these two factors according to ’signal detection theory’ (e.g. Swets, 1964)
is not stated in the problem, and is therefore, according to Birnbaum, free for prob-
lem solvers to infer. This range of ’dependency’ values produces a similarly wide
range of potential ‘normative’ posteriors, which, Birnbaum claimed, included the
‘.80’ answer typically classified as base rate neglect.
Criticisms of the early paradigm continue to the present day. Over a decade after
Cohen (1981) and Birnbaum’s (1983) challenges, Koehler (1996), and even later,
Welsh and Navarro (2012) offered fresh criticism. Koehler firstly agreed with Cohen
and Birnbaum that the normative standards used to provide the ‘correct answer’
were asserted with far greater confidence than was warranted by established theory -
many legitimate interpretations of the problems were possible other than the single
’acceptable’ standard assumed by experiments. Further, echoing Cohen, Koehler
criticized this blind focus on numerical normative answers without acknowledging
or attempting to investigate potential individual differences in solvers’ task goals,
values and assumptions. He also criticized the ambiguity and lack of clarity of much
of the language used in several of the classic problems, in particular Casscells et al.
(1978). Concluding, Koehler lamented the lack of ecological validity or ’realism’ in
the field, and called for a paradigmatic change.
McKenzie (2003) echoed the discontent surrounding the ecological validity of
the word problems being used in the field and the use of certain concrete language
such as ’rational’, ’irrational’ and ’fallacy’. McKenzie proposed that the supposed
‘correct’ answers to the problems being used should be considered mere ‘norms’ and
should cease to be used as hard ‘standards’ next to which people’s rationality or
irrationality should be judged.
Later, Welsh and Navarro (2012) developed these ideas, drawing attention to
the fact that all problem solvers will bring some ’prior knowledge’ of the problem
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they are being asked to solve into the laboratory with them. Each problem solvers’
prior may be different, and importantly, may also be different to the experimenter’s
prior. Bayesian inference allows for this, the authors noted, and it was perfectly
’rational’ for participants to do this. Welsh and Navarro went on to experimentally
investigate one area of ‘prior experience’: that any data source is never perfectly
reliable and should never be entirely trusted. In the taxi-cab problem, for example,
participants might justifiably wonder how recently the data regarding the taxi-cab-
colour proportions was taken, and whether it is still accurate, as well as the extent
to which the testing conditions for the witness were really “similar” enough to the
night of the crash. It is exceedingly unlikely in fact that either of these pieces of data
is perfectly valid, and so it is in fact more ‘rational’ for participants to distrust this
data to some extent than to trust it entirely. Thus, on this view, the experimenter’s
‘correct’ answer is in fact erroneous to some unknown extent as it assumes the
data is perfectly accurate. Welsh and Navarro believed that data distrust might
partly explain base rate neglect. The authors looked at four possible sources of data
distrust and measured their effect on participants’ answers to a Bayesian problem.
They looked at age, location, source and the sample size of the data and found that
participants’ answers were closer to the Bayesian norm when data was stated as being
recent, from a local location, from a trustworthy source and when the sample size
was large. Clearly then, participants appeared to have a fairly strong understanding
of principles of data validity, further calling into question assumptions that they are
acting ’irrationally’ in the taxi-cab and disease problems.
Interestingly however, while Welsh and Navarro found that ‘high trust’ data
increased the frequency of normative responses over ‘low trust’ data, a third ’no
statement’ scenario, in which the authors did not even state any of the ’trust’ de-
tails regarding the age, location, source or sample size of the data, in fact produced
an even higher frequency of normative Bayesian responses than the ’high trust’ sce-
nario. The authors believed this was due to Gricean (Grice, 1975) principles of
conversation: participants appeared to assume that the data is trustworthy unless
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stated otherwise. Even the scenario in which the data is stated as being highly
trustworthy may inherently imply that there is some reason to think the data might
not be trustworthy. Therefore, while illuminating an important point that all future
experiments should keep in mind, Welsh and Navarro’s findings in this regard actu-
ally suggested that data distrust is unlikely to be a component of the reason for base
rate neglect in the early studies. The original taxi-cab and disease problems had
inadvertently in fact left unstated the trustworthiness of the data, which according
to Welsh and Navarro’s findings, should have in fact ensured higher trust in the data
than if they had attempted to state how trustworthy it was.
A further note of interest in Welsh and Navarro’s (2012) findings is the indirect
evidence it provides for Bar-Hillel’s (1980) ’dominance’ theory. Welsh and Navarro
gave participants ‘prior’ and ‘new information’ on the prevalence of various animals
and plants on a fictional ‘alien’ planet. Both prior and new information were the
same type of data (surveys of the area), however they varied on sample age, location,
source and size. In Bar-Hillel’s language, each of these factors alters the ’relevance’
of the data. Participants were then asked to estimate the frequency of the given
plant or animal in a given location at the present time.
On average, participants’ answers were found to vary in a ’reasonable’ way in
response to each of these variables. As stated above, older samples from further
away which were taken by a less trust-worthy source and with a smaller sample size
were all weighted less in calculations. When examining the averages, these changes
in estimates appeared to respond ’smoothly’ to changes in the trustworthiness of
the data, suggesting that participants were slowly ’down-weighting’ the data in
an appropriate manner. However, when examining participants’ responses on an
individual level, a completely different picture emerged. At the individual level it
became clear that when data was ’low trust’ a large number of participants were
entirely neglecting the base rate information. Further, as the data moved from
’low trust’ to ’high trust’, participants were ’flipping’ from providing complete base
rate neglect to complete base rate conservatism (providing only the base rate as
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the answer). This is precisely what was predicted by Bar-Hillel’s (1980) dominance
theory: it appeared that the ’less relevant’ information, on an individual level,
instead of simply being down-weighted, was, at a certain threshold, being entirely
neglected.
1.5.2 The Confusion Hypothesis
From the 1980’s a group of researchers also became increasingly focused on under-
standing the psychological mechanisms behind base rate neglect.
Eddy (1982), in a highly comparable paper to Meehl and Rosen’s (1955) paper
on psychological diagnostic tests, expressed concern both with the discussion of
medical diagnostic tests in the literature as well as the actual practice of interpreting
those tests by medical professionals. In contrast to Meehl and Rosen’s assessment
however, Eddy believed that many medical professionals may be confusing P(D|H)
with P(H|D) and quoted one author in a 1972 issue of Surgery, Gynaecology and
Obstetrics stating that:
“In women with proved carcinoma of the breast, in whom mammograms
are performed, there is no X-ray evidence of malignant disease in ap-
proximately one out of five patients examined [P(-E|H)]. If then on the
basis of a negative mammogram, we are to defer biopsy of a solid lesion
of the breast, there is a one in five chance that we are deferring biopsy
of a malignant lesion [P(H|-E)].” (Eddy, 1982 pp.254)
The author here clearly indicates that the value for P(H|-D) should be equal to
the value for P(-D|H. In a further study, reported informally in Eddy, doctors were
presented with a ‘medical diagnosis’ problem based on this example, which provided
participants with the incidence of the disease in the population (the prior, (P[H]),
and the true positive rate of the mammogram test [P(D|H)]. They were told a woman
had got a positive result on this test, and were asked to estimate the likelihood she
actually had cancer [P(H|D)]. Ninety five out of 100 doctors were stated to confuse
the false positive rate [P(D|H)] with this answer. Dawes (1986) suggested that this
confusion may be the cause behind much of the base rate neglect phenomenon.
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Pollatsek et al. (1987) demonstrated that the majority of people do in fact have
the capacity to distinguish between two inverse conditionals e.g. ‘the probability
that a person who has a fever is sick’ (P[F|S]) and ‘the probability that a person
who is sick has fever’ (P[S|F]). However, Hamm (1988) later suggested that the way
in which these were presented in Pollatsek et al made the distinction much clearer
than in the paradigmatic presentation of Bayesian word problems in the field at
large, such as in the taxi-cab and disease problems. Dawes (1986) echoed this
view that verbal misunderstanding might be the issue, stating that “words are poor
vehicles for discussing inverse probabilities” (Dawes, 1986, pp.80). Later, Macchi
(1995) concurred with this, stating that other work (Bar-Hillel, 1990; Thüring and
Jungermann, 1990) had also demonstrated that people could distinguish between
conditional probabilities in other contexts. Macchi’s conclusion, similar to Dawes,
was that “this confusion may not rest so much on a natural tendency to err but,
rather, on an ambiguous transmission of information produced by the structure of
the text problem” (Macchi, 1990, pp.198).
Hamm (1988) also reiterated and expanded the ‘Confusion Hypothesis’ from
Dawes (1986), stating that the data so far collected in the field suggests that the
‘integrative’ base rate neglect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1972) and Bar-
Hillel (1980), is wrong. In this theory, solvers recognise the problem as one in which
two pieces of information need integration, but see the base rate as irrelevant to
the problem at hand. The confusion hypothesis on the other hand, hypothesises
that solvers first confuse the true positive rate (P[E|H]) or the inverse of the false
positive rate (1-P[E|-H]) with the requested answer (P[H|E]), and then, (correctly,
allowing for the initial confusion), conclude that this is the only piece of informa-
tion necessary, and ignore the redundant ‘base rate’. A series of additional studies
(Hamm, 1988; Hamm and Miller, 1990) using various process-trace and verbalising
protocols seemed to confirm this view: participants did not appear to immediately
consider the base rate irrelevant, but did frequently appear to confuse the two con-
ditional probabilities. This general picture has been advocated by several other
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authors (Braine and Connell, 1990; Hamm, 1994; Wolfe, 1995; Lewis and Keren,
1999; Mellers and McGraw, 1999; Fiedler et al., 2000; Macchi, 2000).
Wolfe (1995) developed the confusion hypothesis further by drawing on fuzzy
trace theory (Brainerd and Reyna, 1990; Reyna and Brainerd, 1991). Fuzzy trace
theory states that when faced with problems such as Bayesian word problems, solvers
maintain multiple representations of the variables involved, at varying levels of pre-
cision. At the lowest levels of precision, the conditional probability P(H|E) will
be encoded as a simple ‘gist’ representation where the solver merely has awareness
that ‘H’s and ‘E’s tend to be related, or co-occur. If solvers’ are operating at this
level of ‘gist’ processing when attempting to solve the problem, P(H|E) and P(E|H)
will both be encoded identically (the co-occurrence of H’s and E’s), and may be
psychologically indistinguishable.
To test this theory, Wolfe (1995) devised an experiment in which one group of
participants were provided training on the ’Transposed Conditional Fallacy’, another
name for the confusion of P(E|H) with P(H|E). In a paradigm where participants
’requested’ the numbers for the variables they wanted to use in their calculations,
Wolfe found that participants in the training group showed greater interest in the
base rate number (83% versus 50%) and the group showed a mean estimate sig-
nificantly closer to the Bayesian norm than the non-training group. Frequencies of
answers correct were not given however.
1.5.3 1995: Natural Frequencies and Nested Sets
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
From a historical perspective, one of the most key and pivotal moments in the field
examining Bayesian word problems came in 1995 with the publication of a paper by
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage. This paper and its successors drew attention initially away
from the confusion hypothesis and focused instead on the format of the numerical
values being used in the problems.
All previous work up to this point had used percentages and probabilities to
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describe the likelihood of both the base rate and the diagnostic information in the
Bayesian problems presented. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) argued that this us-
age may in fact lie behind the low accuracy and high base rate neglect being seen.
While Bar-Hillel’s (1980) work had succeeded in reducing complete base rate ne-
glect, the normative answer was still being seen in less than 20% of participant
answers. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage produced an argument from evolution to explain
why success rates were so low in that previous work: if people did possess a mental
capacity for Bayesian inference, they stated, it would be very unlikely to be designed
to operate on probabilities or percentages, which were invented extremely recently in
human history. The type of data humans would have experienced in their past, and
therefore should be adapted to process, would have been in the form of the counting
of instances over time (i.e. direct sampling experience of frequencies). Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage called this process ‘natural sampling’ ’and the figures that come out
of this process ’natural frequencies’. They presented a new version of the medical
diagnosis problem (Eddy, 1982) as an example:
10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine
screening have breast cancer.
8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive mammography.
95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a positive
mammography.
Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who got a
positive mammography in routine screening. How many of these women
do you expect to actually have breast cancer?
out of
Unlike in Casscells et al’s (1978) similar disease problem, where the base rate of
the disease and the diagnostic information are presented as probabilities, percent-
ages or normalized frequencies, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) scenario presents
‘natural frequencies’. These are the data you arrive at if you naturally sample the
population, one by one, counting whether each individual possesses the hypothesis
(H) of interest (e.g. the disease) and the effect (D) of interest (e.g. the symptom).
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) converted several of the previous problems used,
including the above medical diagnosis and also the taxi-cab problems, into natural
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frequency formats, and found a large increase in success rates from around 16%
with probability formats (typical of previous work) to around 46% with natural
frequency formats. This success rate was far greater than any previously seen either
though Bar-Hillel’s (1980) ’relevance’ changes or Wolfe’s (1995) ’confusion’ changes.
Furthermore, ’base rate neglect’ dropped dramatically, to around 13%.
Cosmides and Tooby
Much controversy followed this work, particularly surrounding the psychological
mechanisms and causes behind the increased accuracy with natural frequency for-
mats. In the following year, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) focused even more acutely
on the evolutionary argument, claiming that humans possessed a ‘mental module’
designed for processing Bayesian problems but which only worked on frequencies.
They produced a large number of experiments demonstrating the benefit of fre-
quency formats on Bayesian inference. Cosmides and Tooby’s methods however
caused great confusion in the following decade due the fact that, in contrast to
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), they in fact used normalised frequencies (with a
fixed or ’normalized’ denominator: natural frequencies have a denominator which
is determined by the natural sampling process and thus conveys additional base
rate information), but still achieved high accuracy. This was a surprising result as
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) had in fact predicted that normalised frequencies
would not enhance accuracy. However, subsequent work (Evans et al., 2000) showed
that the particular numbers and format used in Cosmides and Tooby’s paper allowed
participants to interpret the problem as natural frequencies. The two answers pro-
duced, depending on whether the problem was interpreted as natural, or normalised
frequencies were extremely similar, and Tooby and Cosmides’ (1996) analysis failed
to distinguish between these two interpretations.
When this confound was removed, Evans et al. (2000) found that normalised
frequencies did not outperform percentage formats. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)
had in fact also already demonstrated in their rarely-cited second experiment in
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that paper, that normalised frequencies did not improve accuracy above probability
and percentage formats. The impact of this confusion in the field lingers to the
present day. Hoffrage et al. (2002) were forced to issue a clarification letter detailing
studies which had confused natural frequencies with normalised frequencies (e.g.
Evans et al., 2000; Macchi, 2000; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999; Girotto and Gonzalez,
2001; Macchi and Mosconi, 1998). However the confusion was not fully abated by
this, and later, Sloman et al. (2003) also committed the same error.
Fortuitously, this confusion may in fact have had a beneficial outcome. Many of
the authors mentioned above, in determining that normalised frequencies, outside of
the confounded design used by Cosmides and Tooby (1996), did not in fact improve
accuracy, began to search for what factor, if not frequency, was the cause of the
facilitation. One clear answer, already expressed in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995)
paper, was that natural frequency Bayesian problems (and the ’pseudo-natural’
frequencies used in Cosmides and Tooby (1996) were computationally simpler to
solve than probability or percentage-based problems. This was due to the fact that
natural frequencies provide the conjunctions of the hypothesis (e.g. cancer or no
cancer) with the effect of interest (e.g. positive result or no positive result), which
are a necessary step in calculating the final product and which need to be calculated
from first principles in probability formats. This difference however does not explain
the entire effect, as demonstrated by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) own ‘short
menu’ experiment which provided the same conjunctions for the probability format
also, making each computationally identical. Natural frequency formats, even with
this control, still outperformed probability formats.
The remaining capacity of natural frequency formats to increase accuracy on
Bayesian problems has come to be regarded by many authors in the field (e.g. Evans
et al., 2000; Macchi, 2000; Sloman et al., 2003; Barbey and Sloman, 2007) as due to
the fact that they reveal the ‘nested sets structure’ of the problem (See Figure 1.2
below). This again was expressed in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) paper, but was
not considered to be separable or independent from the natural frequency format
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itself. The nested sets structure of a Bayesian problem is demonstrated effectively
with a parent / child node diagram. The diagram below is based upon the medical
diagnosis problem and adapted from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). It depicts the
total population in the problem as the parent node, which is subdivided into child
nodes corresponding to those women with and without breast cancer. These are
each further sub-divided into those women with and without a positive test result.
It is the revelation of this sub-divided structure which the above authors believe is
the largest factor in the success of natural frequencies rather than the particular
unit (e.g. frequencies) used.
Fig. 1.2: A depiction of a natural frequencies, or nested sets representation of the mam-
mogram problem, adapted from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). The model
contains the information that women with and without breast cancer are sub-
groups of all women and that these two sub-groups can be further subdivided
into those women with positive and negative test results
Macchi
Despite Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) belief that the nested-sets-revelation fea-
ture of natural frequency formats was inseparable from the format itself, Macchi
(2000), developing on previous work by Macchi (1995) and Macchi and Mosconi
(1998) found an approach which succeeded in separating them experimentally. The
method relied upon expressing both of the statistics in the problem (the base rate
and the diagnostic information) as well as the question from an ‘outside’ or ‘group’
perspective rather than from an ‘inside’ or ‘individual’ perspective, as was typical in
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previous work. Importantly, this could be achieved with percentages as equally as it
could for frequencies. For example, with this paradigm, the false positive rate in the
medical diagnosis problem would be expressed from the group perspective as ‘Out
of those women who do not have cancer, 15% would still receive a positive result’
rather than from the individual perspective as ‘A woman who does not have cancer
still has a 15% chance of receiving a positive result’. Such an approach was in fact
proposed for various other problems prior to Macchi’s work. For example, Tversky
and Kahneman (1983) found that the ‘outside perspective’ focused on a group of
individuals reduced the number of participants committing the conjunction fallacy
compared to the ‘inside perspective’ focused on an individual. The outside perspec-
tive had also previously been adopted to reduce the planning fallacy (Griffin and
Buehler, 1999) and overconfidence (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). However Macchi was
the first to apply it to a Bayesian problem.
Macchi (2000) compared these two percentage formats to each other and also
to a natural frequency format. Outside-framed percentages and natural frequencies
were found to be non-significantly different from each other in terms of participant
accuracy, while both formats significantly outperformed inside-framed percentages.
In the same year, Fiedler et al. (2000) also compared ‘outside / group’ percent-
ages to natural frequencies, but unlike Macchi presented the question in the same,
inside-view / probability format in both conditions. Fiedler et al. (2000) used the
mean-deviation method (average distance of answers from the normative answer)
of comparing the two formats, as opposed to a simple count of accurate answers,
and also found no significant difference. A significant difference however was found
between both formats and a normalized frequency format.
Two years after Macchi’s study, Hoffrage et al. (2002) claimed that Macchi’s
(2000) and Fiedler et al’s (2000) participants may actually have solved the problem
in those studies by constructing a natural frequency version of the problem for
themselves. It may be, the authors claimed, that the ‘outside-framed’ percentage
view simply encourages solvers to construct natural frequency versions to a greater
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extent than the ‘inside view’ and that the difference between these two conditions can
be fully accounted for by an increase in construction of natural frequency formats
by participants during solution. This was thought all the more likely as Macchi
(2000) in fact provided the base rate figures as integers rather than percentages.
The question of whether participants solve the problem this way can be most easily
answered by a process-tracing method. Unfortunately, while Macchi (2000) did
in fact record participants solution processes and analysed these, they were only
used to provide counts of different types of responses and no analysis of the process
individuals undertook was provided. This interpretation of her work by Hoffrage et
al therefore cannot be ruled out. However, the work does incontrovertibly provide
evidence that the computational simplicity feature of natural frequencies does not
play a major role in increased accuracy.
Girotto and Gonzalez
While the nested sets approach to assisting Bayesian reasoning flourished in the new
millennium, subsequent work did not in fact build upon Macchi’s (2000) approach,
despite it’s success in separating the nested sets format from the natural frequency
format. Instead, in the following year, Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) took a dras-
tically different approach. The authors wished to demonstrate that the assistive
effect of natural frequencies was due in majority to two features: the fact that the
body of the text in the problem possessed a ‘partitioned structure’ (similar to Mac-
chi’s proposal) and the fact that the question structure, for example in the medical
diagnosis problem, encourages individuals to firstly calculate the total number of
positive results, and to then divide this by the conjunction of cancer with positive
results, which provides the correct answer. They claimed that these two features
were not in fact unique to natural frequencies and could be replicated in other for-
mats. The format they chose to demonstrate this was ‘chances’ expressed as natural




A screening test of an infection is being studied. Here is the information
about the infection and the test results. A person who was tested had 4
chances out of 100 of having the infection.
3 of the 4 chances of having the infection were associated with a positive
reaction to the test.
12 of the remaining 96 chances of not having the infection were also
associated with a positive reaction to the test.
Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) compared this version to a natural frequencies ver-
sion using individual ‘people’ instead of ’chances’. They also crossed this design with
‘1-step’ versus ‘2-step’ question formats. In the 1-step question format, individuals
were asked (in the chance version) ‘If Pierre has a positive reaction, there will be
chance(s) out of that the infection is associated with his positive reaction’ while
in the 2-step version they were asked ‘Imagine that Pierre is tested now. Out of a
total of 100 chances, Pierre has chances of having a positive reaction, of which
will be associated with having the infection.’
The authors firstly found no difference between the chances format and the natu-
ral frequency format. Both elicited similar levels of accuracy. This was a surprising
result, as the chances version of the problem was in fact focused on the ‘inside
view’, which was found to be inferior in Macchi’s (2000) work. It concerns only
one individual (Pierre) and his abstract ‘chance’ of having the disease. However the
information format is still ‘partitive’ or possessing a ‘nested sets’ or ‘class inclusion’
structure. This study therefore gave evidence firstly that natural frequencies are not
a privileged format and secondly that the target of the task does not even need to
be presented from the ‘outside view’ in order to increase accuracy. The results sug-
gest it is simply a partitive or nested information structure that is required to elicit
high levels of reasoning accuracy on Bayesian problems. However, there may be an
issue with this final interpretation. While the ‘chances’ task did take the ‘inside
view’ in regards to ‘Pierre’ in that it focused on him as an individual rather than
focusing on a group of individuals similar to Pierre as in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s
(1995) and Macchi’s (2000) work, it may be argued that the format still provides an
outside view, but simply using the units of ‘chance’, instead of people. The reader
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is effectively encouraged to imagine a ‘population’ or ’group’ of 100 chances and in
the end is asked to calculate the number of chances with a positive result which also
relate to having cancer. In effect, the wording of the problem shifts the perspective
from the subject Pierre entirely to the abstract concept of ‘chance’. Pierre is indeed
being considered as an individual, unlike in Macchi’s approach, but he is no longer
the subject of analysis. The object of analysis is the unit of chance, and these are
being presented from the outside view. Therefore, while this result may not have
completely overturned previous work, it did provide a novel new way of presenting
Bayesian problems without having to focus on a group of individuals.
Girotto and Gonzalez’s (2001) comparison of 1-step to 2-step questions also con-
tributed an important finding to the field. Their 2-step question forced participants
to compute the total number of positive results, D (in the medical diagnosis prob-
lem) prior to computing the final product. This change hugely increased accuracy
from 18% to around 50% of participants and suggested that this ‘computation of
total positive results’ might be an important step in the process by which individuals
complete Bayesian problems.
Following the results of Macchi (2000); Fiedler et al. (2000); Girotto and Gon-
zalez (2001),, debate continued within the field as to whether the natural frequency
effect was, or was not, any more than the ‘nested sets revelation’ effect plus the
‘computational simplicity’ effect. Hoffrage et al (2002) maintained that there was
a difference. Those authors’ opinion was that the revelation of the nested sets
structure was just one inseparable element of the natural frequency format. They
claimed that Girotto and Gonzalez’s (2001) chances-format was just “natural fre-
quencies disguised as probabilities” (Hoffrage et al, 2002, pp.350). This criticism
however missed the point. Girotto and Gonzalez’s chance format did take elements
from Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) natural frequency format, but it also left be-
hind an important feature: the focus on concrete, non-divisible units (e.g. people)
as opposed to abstract ‘chances’. Their work showed that this feature which many
authors within the frequentist approach (in particular Cosmides and Tooby, 1996;
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and later, Brase (2007)) claimed was a necessary component for assisting Bayesian
reasoning, was in fact superfluous.
Some later work by Brase (2008) also called into question the distinction between
Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) ’chances’ format and the natural frequency format.
Brase was interested in how participants were interpreting the ’chances’ format,
and presented his participants, in a series of experiments, with a range of different
’chances’ and ’natural frequency’ formats. Brase then also gave his participants
two definitions, one for natural numbers (i.e. frequencies) and one for probability.
Participants were asked to choose which of these definitions most closely resembled
their interpretation of the problem. Brase stated his experimental reasoning as “If
the crucial aspect is only the existence of non-normalized set relations, single-event
probability interpretations of chances should not affect performance on tasks, so long
as that non-normalised set structure is in place.” (Brase, 2008, pp.285). Brase found
that those participants who interpreted the chances format as natural numbers out-
performed those who interpreted them in a probabilistic sense. Brase concluded that
this provided evidence that, similar to Hoffrage et al’s (2002) complaint regarding
other ’nested sets’ approaches, that natural frequencies was also the true underlying
reason for the increased accuracy in Girotto and Gonzalez’s study. In a clear and
important communication of the modern frequentist position, Brase concluded his
paper with the claim that natural frequencies should still be considered a ’privileged
format’, and stating that:
“This claim does not imply that the human mind is incapable of utilis-
ing other information formats, either in other settings or even within a
particular setting; that would be an exclusive, rather than a privileged
representational format. This type of privileged, nonexclusive situation
has been descried by Sperber (1994) in terms of a proper domain (the
content with which a cognitive system was actually designed to work)
and a larger actual domain (the content with which a cognitive system
can be persuaded to work). In the assessment of natural frequencies as
a cognitively privileged representational format, there have been some
confusions across these proper and actual domains. Some tasks claimed
to be within the envelope of the proper domain conditions have, in fact,
violated those bounds (e.g. by rote conversion of numbers into frequen-
cies, rather than using natural frequencies [Here Brase refers to studies
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such as Macchi (2000) and Fiedler et al (2000)]). Conversely, other tasks
claimed to be outside the envelope of the proper domain conditions (e.g.
using chances as purported non-frequencies [Here Brase refers to Girotto
and Gonzalez, 2001]) have, in fact, actually been within those bounds.”
(Brase, 2008, pp.288)
Diagrammatic Approaches
In the subsequent years, several studies continued to attempt to demonstrate that
methods other than natural frequencies could reveal the nested sets structure of
a Bayesian problem. Many used diagrammatic approaches to do this. A range
of diagrams were used including the Euler diagram(Sloman et al., 2003), a novel
’roulette-wheel’ diagram (Yamagishi, 2003), and later the Venn diagram (Micallef
et al., 2012), all of which ultimately reveal the ’nested sets’ or ’sub-divided’ nature
of the problem. Each of these generally showed increased accuracy on Bayesian
problems. Again much debate surrounded the degree to which these studies effec-
tively ruled out natural frequencies as the cause of increased accuracy. Brase (2009)
demonstrated that diagrams based on the natural frequencies concept (such as fre-
quency grid diagrams) significantly outperformed other diagram types such as the
Venn diagram, and in fact also found no difference between providing the problem
with a Venn diagram and no diagram. One potential issue with this finding however
is that in the frequency grid diagram it was possible for participants to literally
’count’ the number of individuals on the diagram, potentially allowing them to an-
swer the question through a secondary means. This was not possible in the Venn
diagram condition and must therefore be considered a potential confound.
Furthermore, diagram-based studies are limited in their value for resolving this
issue. While they do demonstrate methods that can be used to help people under-
stand Bayesian inference, they contribute little to any theoretical attempt to isolate
the nested sets effect. A visual diagram must always be considered potentially more
engaging to a participant than a block of text, and this greater engagement will act
as a potential confound on any diagram vs text study. It is also in general difficult
to be certain what other factors a diagram is introducing other than the nested
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sets revelation. More intriguing however, are text-diagram-cross studies such as
Garcia-Retamero and Hoffrage (2013), who crossed text format (inside-percentage
vs natural frequency) with diagram type (no diagram vs frequency grid). They
found that frequency grids were assistive to Bayesian accuracy when compared to
inside-percentage-text but showed no significant increase when compared to natural
frequency texts. This results suggests that such diagrams may be ’working’ via the
same mechanism as the natural frequency text format. This finding is not exclusive
to the natural frequency realm. In a similar approach but using a ’nested sets ap-
proach’, Sloman et al. (2003) found in another crossed design, that a Euler diagram
produced a greater increase in accuracy compared to their non-nested-sets ‘inside’
percentage text than their nested-sets ‘outside’ percentage text.
1.5.4 2007: The Causal Approach
In 2007, in a third major directional-shift in the field, Krynski and Tenenbaum
introduced a drastically new approach to presenting Bayesian problems. Their ap-
proach built upon developments in computer science that drew upon the role of
causal models in probabilistic representations (Pearl, 2000; Sloman and Lagnado,
2005). Krynski and Tenenbaum argued that purely statistical models, such as those
employed by the early work in the field (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Casscells
et al., 1978; Bar-Hillel, 1980) as well as the natural frequencies and nested sets (e.g.
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Fiedler et al, 2000; Macchi, 2000; Girotto & Gonzalez,
2001) approaches, had been proven ineffective by computer models in more realistic,
everyday reasoning scenarios due to the complexity and low levels of information-
certainty in those situations. Since humans also operate and evolved in these noisy
environments, they claimed that purely statistical models were unlikely to be good
descriptive models of human reasoning. They therefore theorised that people in fact
normally approach Bayesian reasoning problems by constructing a causal model of
the scenario. This causal model is then populated with the appropriate statistics
and the answer is computed via Bayesian inference.
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Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) noted that much previous work, especially on the
medical diagnosis problem, had failed to consider the causal structure of the problem
they were presenting to participants. In particular they had failed to provide the
solver with a cause for the ‘diagnostic’ or ‘new’ data (the hit rate of the test). This,
Krynski and Tenenbaum argued, prevented solvers from constructing a causal model
and thus from solving the problem in their normal way, resulting in the low accuracy
seen and the high levels of base rate neglect. An adapted version of Krynski and
Tenenbaum’s core model for the medical diagnosis problem can be seen below in
1.3, which embodies the information that both breast cancer and harmless cysts
(the ‘cause’ which they added) are possible causes of positive mammogram test
results.
Fig. 1.3: A simple representation of Krynski and Tenenbaum’s causal model of the mam-
mogram problem. The model contains the information that both breast cancer
and harmless cysts are possible causes of positive mammogram test results
The authors found in two separate experiments that by simply adding a single
sentence providing this cause, accuracy increased from around 20% to around 40%.
Two further experiments drawing on the Taxi-Cab problem (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1972) and one with a novel 2x2 design, both also showed a beneficial effect for
providing a clear causal structure. Some replicative success has followed this paper
in subsequent years, with one study finding an improvement with the causal format
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for forced-choice but not open-ended answers (Hayes et al., 2013), one providing a
null finding (McNair and Feeney, 2014a) and one providing support in two separate
experiments, but only in the high-numerate sub-group (McNair and Feeney, 2014b).
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REASONING ON BAYESIAN WORD PROBLEMS
2 The Need for Reform
In the previous few years a growing discontent with the lack of progress being made
in the cognitive science field of Bayesian reasoning has emerged. In a recent appeal,
McNair (2015) expressed concern that despite a long history and a large amount
of experimental data, recent work with both the ‘nested sets‘, ‘natural frequency‘
and ‘causal‘ approaches were still showing high variability in accuracy rates across
experiments even with similar methodologies. This, McNair claimed, demonstrated
a lack of fundamental understanding of why some individuals succeed and others fail.
For this reason McNair advocated greater use of the ‘think aloud‘ protocol (Ericsson
and Simon, 1980; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) and individual differences measures
in order to understand the thought processes that both successful, and unsuccessful
individuals go through when attempting to solve Bayesian problems.
This general view of the need to improve a stagnating field was expressed in
another recent review by Johnson and Tubau (2015). They believed that even
the best methods in use had not achieved particularly impressive accuracy levels,
demonstrating a lack of fundamental understanding of the psychological mechanisms
underpinning Bayesian reasoning. They also lamented the field for being too focused
on purely numerical outcome measures. The authors stated that “Moving forward,
we believe there is a need to shift perspective from the facilitators of Bayesian reason-
ing to more process-oriented measures aimed at uncovering the strategies evoked by
successful and unsuccessful reasoners, and the stages in the problem solving process
at which these differences emerge.“ (Johnson and Tubau, 2015, pp.14).
A further issue in the field, but by no means limited to it, and not touched upon
by either of the above authors is the widespread use of undergraduate populations as
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participants. This latter issue is important because other work has suggested that
young undergraduates are not necessarily representative of the wider population
in their capacity to solve Bayesian problems. Salthouse (1996) showed that human
ability to process information declines with age, peaking in the early 20‘s. Moreover,
even within this age group, Brase, Fiddick, and Harries (2006) showed that students
from higher-ranking universities perform at a higher level on Bayesian problems. If
this association between education and Bayesian reasoning ability extends outside
of universities it is very unlikely that a wider age group with a greater variation in
education level will perform at the same level as those who have principally been
studied so far. McNair and Feeney (2014b) made a similar argument in regards to
the causal approach of Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007), and suspected that the likely
high-numerate sample used by Krynski and Tenenbaum (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology students) may have contributed to their finding of a causal effect within
their entire sample. McNair and Feeney found in their sample that the causal
approach only produced increased accuracy on Bayesian problems within the high-
numerate sub-group of their sample. In further support of this argument, Micallef
et al. (2012), who did study the general population, found only 6% accuracy on
a natural frequency phrasing of the medical diagnosis problem, which is far below
previously-found levels (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Johnson and Tubau,
2013).
It is clear therefore that the field as it stands suffers from a range of issues. On
the whole, it lacks information on which individuals fail to solve Bayesian problems,
why those individuals fail, and at what point in the solution process. Even within
undergraduate populations, accuracy remains relatively low (40% or less). Further,
these low accuracy rates are likely to still be an overestimate compared to the
general population. As it is the general population, and not just undergraduate
students who must face Bayesian problems in real life situations such as in medical
decision-making situations, future research must firstly ensure that the success of
current approaches such as the nested sets and causal approaches also apply to the
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general population. Further, it must be determined whether those individuals with
lower numeracy also benefit from these approaches, or whether new approaches are
needed. Finally the underlying cause of the increased accuracy of these approaches
must be understood more deeply than currently, and this must be determined on an
individual basis, in order to find ways to improve these methods in order to achieve
the maximum possible number of individuals, across the numerical ability spectrum,




The first aim of the present study is to replicate the natural frequency / nested sets
and causal approaches to improving Bayesian accuracy in large general population
samples. Macchi’s (2000) ‘outside-framed’ approach (which presents percentages
framed as proportions of groups, rather than as the abstract concept of chance) to
revealing nested sets structure will be used to represent the former as it has achieved
a greater reduction in interpretative confounds than other approaches such as natural
frequencies themselves (computational confound), Girotto and Gonzalez’s (2001)
chances approach (according to Brase [2007] there is debate over whether these
are distinct from natural frequencies or not) or diagrams (potential engagement
confound). This approach will be compared to Krynski and Tenenbaum’s (2007)
causal approach. Within this aim it is hypothesised that a significant main effect of
the nested sets framing will be found. It is further hypothesised, based on McNair
and Feeney (2014b) and the fact that the present sample is likely to have lower
numeracy levels than previous, that in this sample no significant main effect of the
causal framing will be found in the sample as a whole. However, it is hypothesised
that the high-numerate sub-group, split at the median, will show a significant main
effect of causal framing.
The second aim is to combine the nested sets and causal approaches in one
condition and to compare all four conditions to determine if the two effects are
additive. It is again hypothesised that no significant interactive effect between the
two conditions will be seen in the sample as a whole, but a significant and positive
Part I Section 3.2
interactive effect will be seen in the high-numerate sub-group.
The third aim of this study is to heed McNair (2015) and Johnson and Tubau’s
(2015) appeal to examine problem-solving processes and individual differences by
using a ‘think aloud’ methodology alongside a numeracy measure to gain greater
insight into the processes that participants undertake when solving Bayesian prob-
lems. This analysis will be exploratory but will aim to uncover both the ’normal’
processes people undertake when approaching these problems as well as how the
nested sets and causal framings affect these.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
The final sample size for the experiment was 113. From an original sample of
124, nine participants were removed due to a clear lack of engagement with the
experiment as evident in their numerical and think aloud data. Demographic data
for this experiment as well as experiments 2, 3 and 4 can be found in Table 1.
Participants for all three experiments were recruited through the Amazon MTurk
service and were required to be in the United States and to have a greater than 95%
HIT approval rating. Participants were paid an average of $6.40 per hour for taking
part.
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Part I Section 3.2
Ethical approval for all the studies described in this thesis was provided by the
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee (REF: QMREC1328) and was deemed to
be extremely low risk.
3.2.2 Design
The study employed a fully crossed 2 (nested vs non-nested) x 2 (causal vs non-
causal) within-participants design resulting in four ‘conditions’ which all 113 par-
ticipants undertook: ‘basic’, ‘nested’, ‘causal’ and ‘nested-causal’. Four different
‘scenarios’ were also created: ’Mammogram’, ‘College’, ‘Library’ and ‘Gotham’, to-
talling sixteen possible condition-scenario combinations. Each participant only saw
four of these: each participant responded to every condition, and saw every scenario,
but exactly which four combinations of these they saw was randomly determined.
A within-participants design was chosen principally in order to ensure interpre-
tative clarity of the combined nested-causal condition. If a between-participants de-
sign was used, and the nested-causal condition outperformed the nested and causal
conditions separately, it still could not be concluded that the combination of the
two was beneficial on the individual level: if there were individual differences as to
which of the two framings people find helpful, an alternative explanation could be
that some of the participants in the combined condition found the nested aspect
helpful, while a different set found the causal aspect helpful, creating a higher aver-
age. With a within-participants design, however, if the nested-causal condition was
higher than either nested or causal conditions, it would be possible to infer, and to
confirm on an individual level, that the combination of nested and causal prompts
is more assistive than either alone.
The study also employed a mixed quantitative-qualitative ‘think aloud’ method,
drawing on Ericsson and Simon (1998) and Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) ap-
proach. In that study’s design, participants wrote on paper as they worked out the
problem, and these workings-out were analysed. In the present study, this method
was adapted for computer-based experiments by asking participants to write their
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thought process while working out the problem in an open-ended text box. They
undertook this before having access to the next page where they could then enter
their numerical answer.
3.2.3 Materials
The study was an online-survey conducted through Amazon MTurk, and which par-
ticipants therefore accessed through their own computers. Colour-blind safe colours
were used where colour was necessary, which were sampled from www.colourbrewer.org.
We used a version of the mammogram problem which was an amalgam of Gigeren-
zer & Hoffrage (1995), Krynski & Tenenbaum (2007) and Macchi (2000). A modi-
fied version of the college entrance exam problem (e.g. Brase, 2008) was also used.
Two further problems were created for the study, one based on a ‘Macedonian Li-
brary’ and another based on crime rates in ‘Gotham city’. The basic-Mammogram,
nested-College, causal-Library and nested-causal-Gotham problems can be seen in
Appendix A and the basic mammogram problem can also be seen below:
Every year the government advises women to take part in routine mam-
mography screening using an X-ray machine to determine if they have
breast cancer. 200 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who partici-
pate in this routine screening have breast cancer, while 800 do not. If a
woman has breast cancer, she will always get a positive mammography.
If a woman does not have breast cancer, there is still a 10
A woman in this age group had a positive mammography in routine
screening. What is the percentage chance that she actually has breast
cancer?
Each scenario had the same mathematical / logical structure but was otherwise
designed to be as different as possible. This was done in order to reduce the likelihood
of framing effects confounding the experiment and in combination with the use of
multiple scenarios should therefore have made the study design more robust and the
results more generalisable to other Bayesian problems. The scenarios varied in word-
length and while ’Mammogram’ and ’College’ were both problems about humans,
’Library’ and ’Gotham’ were about objects (books and crime reports, respectively).
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Finally the actual numbers and population values used differed considerably across
the scenarios.
The design of the conditions was based on Macchi (2000) and Krynski & Tenen-
baum (2007). In all conditions, the population and two base rates were given as
frequencies e.g. ‘200 out of every 1,000 women at forty who participate in this
routine screening have breast cancer, while 800 do not.’ As can be seen in this
statement, the frequency of ‘no-cancer’ (and equivalents in other scenarios) was also
given, which is a departure from Macchi’s design. This was done to reduce difficulty
in order to ensure that no floor effect was seen in the basic condition. This was
considered a possibility as Macchi found 6% accuracy in the basic condition in un-
dergraduate students, and the present experiment was conducted within the general
population, which may have lower numeracy (Salthouse, 1996; Brase et al., 2006).
This difference also departs from Krynski and Tenenbaum who gave the base rate
of the first cause (e.g. cancer) as a percentage.
The nested sets manipulation (nested and nested-causal conditions) was pro-
duced as follows: in the basic and causal conditions, the ’100% true positive’ state-
ment for the first cause was given from the perspective of an individual e.g. ‘If a
woman has breast cancer, she will always get a positive mammography’, while in
the nested and nested-causal conditions, this was given from the perspective of a
group e.g. ‘All of the women who have breast cancer will get a positive result on the
mammography.’ This was also the case for the false positive rate: in the basic and
causal conditions this was given as ‘If a women does not have cancer, there is still
a 10% chance that she will get a positive mammography’, while in the nested and
nested-causal conditions this was given as ‘Out of all those women who do not have
breast cancer, 10% will also get a positive mammography.’ Finally, in the basic and
causal conditions, the question was also framed from an individual point of view
e.g. ‘A woman in this age group had a positive mammography in routine screening.
What is the percentage chance that she actually has breast cancer?’ whereas in the
nested conditions it was framed from a group perspective e.g. ‘What percentage of
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women who get a positive mammography in routine screening actually have breast
cancer?’
The causal manipulation (causal and nested-causal conditions) change was more
subtle. In the basic and nested conditions, no explanation was given for why the
effect was still observed (e.g. a positive result) even when the first cause (cancer) was
not present. This was in line with Krynski and Tenenbaum’s (2007) original design,
who proposed that in such cases, readers were not able to form a complete causal
mental model. While Krynski and Tenenbaum used the mammogram problem they
did not use the other three scenarios presented in this paper. The scenarios were
therefore designed to ensure that in the basic and nested conditions the second
‘hidden cause’ would not be obvious to the reader (see Appendix A for all four
scenarios). In the causal and nested-causal conditions, an additional statement was
given in order to provide this cause. In the mammogram problem the ‘data’ was a
positive test result and the hidden cause was ‘harmless cysts’. In the college scenario
the data was entrance into the college and the hidden cause was that students with
exceptional high school grades were also admitted even if they failed the exam. In
the Library scenario the data was the presence of the book in the library and the
hidden cause was the similarity of the Greek and Macedonian languages. Finally, in
the Gotham scenario, the data was the presence of a crime in the ‘other’ folder and
the hidden cause was a ‘cover-up’ of murder rates. There were no other differences
between the conditions in the study.
Participants also completed the 7-item Berlin Numeracy Test, which has been
shown to have good reliability and validity, and to be less subject to ceiling effects
than some other numeracy tests used in the field (Cokely et al., 2012).
3.2.4 Procedure
Participants were recruited through the Amazon MTurk outsourcing service. Partic-
ipants were presented with the consent form, and then the instructions for the study,
which included an extensive section on the ‘think aloud’ instructions, including an
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example. See Appendix B. Participants then were assigned sequentially to four of
the sixteen problems such that they saw each scenario and each condition only once.
For each problem they were presented with the problem text and question itself and
were asked to write their thought processes while they worked out the problem in a
‘think aloud’ open-ended text-box. Once this was complete they were able to give
their actual numerical answer on the next page. Once participants had completed all
four of their problems they were presented with the Berlin Numeracy test. Finally
they answered the demographic questions and a final question regarding whether
they had undertaken any of the problems before.
3.2.5 Data Analysis
In line with Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995) a dual criteria was used when determining
if participants had given the correct answer. The correct numerical answer was not
enough to get a point for each problem: participants think aloud protocol was also
analysed in order to detect whether they had used an ’unacceptable process’. An
unacceptable process was one which coincidentally lead to the normative numerical
answer on this one particular problem but would not have if the numbers in the
problem were different. In each problem there was at least one common error which
gave the same numerical answer as the normative Bayesian answer, making this dis-
tinction important. Confusion between correct answers and numerically coincident
but incorrect answers has blighted many previous papers in the field (e.g. see Evans
et al. (2000) for a discussion of a similar issue with the classic paper by Cosmides
and Tooby (1996)). Finally this method avoids the issue that many previous stud-
ies have faced of having to decide whether to accept only precise answers (McNair
& Feeney, 2014a), accept those within a certain percentage of the correct answer
(Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007), or conduct a distance-from-correct calculation (Mi-
callef et al., 2012), 2012), all of which will face issues with false positives or false
negatives. A mixed method has greater power to detect effects as it is able to re-
duce statistical noise by reducing false positives and false negatives in categorising
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answers as correct or incorrect.
Additionally, certain answers which did not give the correct numerical answer
were also accepted. This was the case when their think aloud data indicated that
they had undertaken an acceptable process, but had made an ’uninteresting error’.
Uninteresting errors came in two types in the present study. Firstly, when partic-
ipants had clearly done everything correct except for an arithmetical error, their
answer was accepted as correct. In fact only 5 cases out of 452 included an arith-
metic error. Secondly, when participants gave the wrong ’cause’ as the answer (e.g.
percentage of women without cancer, instead of percentage with cancer) but had
again undertaken the correct Bayesian process, their answer was also accepted as
correct. This also occurred in 5 cases. These were both accepted because this study
was not interested in improving these types of mistakes, but in whether participants
could undertake accurate Bayesian reasoning.
All qualitative analysis of the think aloud protocol was undertaken blind to the
participant’s condition. Analysis was first undertaken by the author. In the first
analysis phase the author began by reading all transcripts looking for potential
common themes between participants’ approaches to the problem. Once a set of
common approaches to the problem were outlined, the second phase of analysis be-
gan wherein the author re-read all answers, coding them as to which approach the
participant had used, and which of the steps in those processes they demonstrated.
No new approaches were discovered in the second phase. In the third phase, a vol-
unteer coder with prior qualitative analysis experience was provided definitions of
each of the codes by the author and was asked to assign all participants’ answers
to whichever codes they deemed appropriate while blind to both participant condi-
tion and to the authors’ original coding. Inter-rater reliability between the author
and this volunteer coder was ninety percent. In the fourth stage of analysis, any
discrepancies between author and first volunteer coding assignments were resolved
by an additional volunteer, also with previous qualitative analysis experience. This
second volunteer was given the discrepant participants’ think aloud answers and the
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coding categories. The second volunteer’s decision was taken as the final result for
each of these participants.
Quantitative analysis was undertaken in IBM SPSS for Windows, Version 22. For
the main analyses, regression modelling was used. To implement this, the ’gener-
alised linear model’ function of SPSS was employed, which uses regression modelling
but allows for binary outcome data (correct vs incorrect answer to the problem) and
for simultaneous analysis of both between-subject and within-subject variables.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Quantitative
Combining all four conditions, 31.9% of all cases gave the Bayesian normative an-
swer. No significant differences in accuracy were found between any two demographic
sub-groups (gender, education and occupation). Below, in figure 3.1 the percent-
age of participants giving the Bayesian normative answer can be seen for all four
conditions. It is immediately apparent that both the basic and causal conditions
performed at a similar, but lower level, than the nested and nested-causal condi-
tions. Confirming this difference, a repeated-measures generalised linear model with
binomial distribution and logit function found a significant main effect of nested sets
framing (χ2 = 7.358, p=.007), but no significant main effect of causal framing (χ2
= .834, p=.361) and no significant interaction (χ2 =.237, p=.626).
To test the two hypotheses that a main effect of the causal framing and an in-
teractive effect between nested sets and causal framings would be seen in the high-
numerate sub-group, two different high-numerate sub-groups were created. Overall
Berlin Numeracy Test scores showed a mean of 3.89 (SD = 1.85) and a median of
4. The first sub-group was created by splitting the sample at the median (as the
median was also modal, these participants were included in the high numerate group
to increase sample size (n = 70)). Mean numeracy score was 5.10 (SD = 1.10) for
this group. The second sub-group was made by following the same method used by
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Fig. 3.1: Percentage of participants giving the Bayesian normative answer for basic,
nested, causal and nested-causal conditions. Error bars represent one standard
error.
McNair and Feeney (2014b) to allow for direct comparison. McNair and Feeney had
to remove question 7 on the numeracy test due to a printing error. Replicating this
removal, scores were then split at the median from McNair and Feeney’s experiment
(5), creating a high numerate group (n = 35) with similar numeracy levels to theirs
(M = 5.97, SD = 0.78). A non-significant effect was seen for the causal framing in
the high numerate sub-group (χ2 = 3.246, p=.072), with the causal group actually
performing below the non-causal group (causal accuracy = 23.6%, non-causal accu-
racy = 31.4%). No significant effect was seen in the low numerate sub-group (χ2
= 2.843, p=.098). Further, no interaction between nested and causal was seen (χ2
=.974, p=.324). Further no main effect was seen in the ‘McNair and Feeney’ high
numerate sub-group (χ2 =1.567, p=.211) and no interaction was seen here either
(χ2 =.167, p=.682).
The effect of the nested sets framing was also examined within the high (n = 70,
M = 5.10, SD = 1.10) and low numerate sub-groups (N = 43, M = 1.95, SD = 0.97).
Numeracy was split at the median (4), and these were included in the high numerate
sub-group, in line with the analysis for the causal framing. A significant effect of the
nested sets framing was still seen within the low numerate sub-group (χ2 = 5.359,
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p=.021) and a borderline significant effect was seen within the high numerate sub-
group (χ2 = 3.159, p=.076). Overall, low numerates were accurate 13.95% of the
time, while high numerates were accurate 42.87% of the time, a significant difference
(χ2 = 26.03, p<.001).
To determine whether this lack of a difference for the causal manipulation was
due to an issue with the problems created for this study, accuracy across all 16
scenario-condition combinations was analysed. Overall causal and basic conditions
were consistently similar across all four problems and there was no clear evidence of
a bias in any direction. While there was a difference on the original mammogram
problem between causal (37.0%) and basic (25.0%), and this difference was larger
than any of the other three problems, this difference was far from significant (2
= 0.93, p = .33). Furthermore, on the same problem, the nested-causal condition
(51.6%) in fact produced lower accuracy than the nested condition (57.7%).
3.3.2 Qualitative
Key to section
The following analysis applies to all four experimental conditions. The variables in
the problems are assigned the code below for this analysis:
1. H: The number or proportion of all units corresponding to the base rate for
the first hypothesis presented (e.g. cancer).
2. -H: The number or proportion of all units corresponding to the base rate for
the second hypothesis presented (e.g. no cancer).
3. D: The number or proportion of all units corresponding to the ‘data’ type
requested in the question (e.g. a positive test result).
4. -D: The number or proportion of all units corresponding to the data type not
requested (e.g. a negative test result). This variable was generally not used
but is included for completeness.
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5. (H&D) / (-H&D): The number or proportion of all units (e.g. women) with
the given hypothesis (e.g. cancer / no cancer) and the requested data (e.g. a
positive test result).
6. P(D|H) / P(D|-H): The number of units who have the requested data (e.g. a
positive test result) P(D|H) as a proportion of all those units who correspond
to a given hypothesis (e.g. cancer / no-cancer). P(D|H) was 1 in all four
problems, while P(D|-H) varied between problems.
Successful Participants
Qualitative analysis of the think aloud data for successful participants revealed a
5-step process which comprised two representations of the problem and three com-
putational steps. This was, except for 9 cases out of 452 (discussed below), the only
process identified for successful individuals, and furthermore was identified in all
four experimental conditions.
Step One / Representation One: The Hypothesis-focused Representation
The first step in this process entailed the presentation of what is here called the un-
populated ‘Hypothesis-focused Representation’, which can be seen below in Figure
3.2. This representation of the problem should be highly familiar from illustrations
given in previous work (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995). It begins by sub-
dividing a sample of units into the hypotheses (e.g. cancer / no cancer) and then
further sub-dividing these by the data (e.g. positive / negative). Notably, it does not
include actual values in the lower-most nodes but instead represents the conceptual
structure only.
The requirement for this classification was a word-based subdivision of the two
hypotheses (e.g. cancer / no cancer) into the data requested (e.g. positive results).
A mathematical formula did not suffice for this classification. An example of this
representation classification can be seen in P40 who said in the ‘nested sets’ condi-
tion: ‘So 200 women will definitely have a positive. 800 do not, but 10% of them
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Fig. 3.2: An event-tree depiction of the un-populated Hypothesis-focused Representation.
will still get a positive.’ A further example comes from P5 who said in the ‘basic’
condition: ‘10% of the 800 women without breast cancer get a positive mammog-
raphy result.’ In the basic and causal conditions, 9 cases were also detected where
an ‘Individual’ or ‘Chance’ structure was portrayed. For example, P26 said, on the
Gotham problem ‘150 murders with a 40% chance of being filed as other means
60 murders were filed as others.’ Even within those conditions, however, a greater
number (36) of cases presented the Hypothesis-focused Representation in their think
aloud data than chance structure.
Step Two / Computation One: Populating the Hypothesis-focused Rep-
resentation
Following the construction of the Hypothesis-focused Representation, successful par-
ticipants subsequently undertook the calculations necessary to compute the bottom
‘D’ nodes representing the conjunctions H&D and -H&D, in the Hypothesis-focused
Representation diagram. H&D was calculated by multiplying H by P(D|H). No
single participant calculated the ‘-D’ nodes (H&-D and -H&-D) as these were not
necessary to solve the problem.
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Step Three / Representation Two: The Data-focused Representation
Following the computation of the two positive conjunctions H&D and -H&D, the
next step in the process entailed laying out what is here called the un-populated
‘Data-focused Representation’. A diagram depicting this can be seen below. This
representation, instead of using the hypotheses as the mid-level nodes (e.g. cancer
/ no cancer), uses the data (e.g. positive / negative result). Again, as the problem
is inherently focused on ‘D’ (e.g. positive results) the ‘-D’ of this diagram was
neglected (not mentioned by participants) and the original sample (top node) was
also neglected as neither were required to solve the problem from this point.
Fig. 3.3: An event-tree depiction of the un-populated Data-focused Representation.
The requirement for the Data-focused Representation classification was a word-
based indication that H&D and -H&D are subsets of D (see Figure 3.3). Again,
a mathematical formula did not suffice for this classification. Two broad sub-
categories of this classification were identified:
Bottom up: i.e. by first defining the subsets H&D and -H&D and then demon-
strating that they are in fact subsets of D e.g. P36 who said ‘98000 fail and 1%
of them get in - so that is 980 students [H&D] add that to the 2000 [-H&D] who
passed the test means 2980 [D] students total got in.’
Top down: i.e. by first defining D and then demonstrating the subsets e.g. P15
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in response to the medical scenario: ‘So 280 [D] women will get a positive test. 200
[H&D] actually have the cancer.’ Typically this sub-category only mentioned H&D
as -H&D was no longer needed to solve the problem.
Step 4 / Computation Two: Populating the Data-focused Representation
Either simultaneously with, or immediately following, the laying out of the Data-
focused Representation, participants mathematically summed H&D and -H&D to
obtain the total D (e.g. total positive results).
Step 5 / Computation 3: The Computation of the Final Product, P(H—D)
Following the laying out and population of the Data-focused Representation, success-
ful participants then divided the conjunction H&D by the total number of positive
results (D) to compute the normative Bayesian answer, P(H|D).
The Think Aloud Protocol and the Representations
It is likely that the two representations are under-detected in the present study
(more participants may have mentally formed these representations than was de-
tected by the methodology). This is because many participants simply used mathe-
matical formulae in their think aloud protocol and so could not be assigned either the
Hypothesis-focused Representation or Data-focused Representation classifications,
which used the stricter criterion of a word-based explanation.
The Nested Sets Process Model
In line with the majority of recent work (e.g. Johnson & Tubau, 2015), this process
model is named the ‘Nested Sets Process Model’ as both representation of the prob-
lem (both Hypothesis, and Data) are inherently based upon the identification of
certain sets of units in the problem being nested within others. This identification
of the nested sets structure of the problem is indeed the key requirement for the
classification of both of these representations. The remainder of the process model
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consists of populating each of these representations (C1 and C2), and then calculat-
ing the final Bayesian product (C3). A depiction of this entire model can be seen
below in Figure 3.4. Apart from 9 cases, the Nested Sets Process Model was the
only approach taken to solving the problem by successful participants, even in the
non-nested sets conditions. The entire process model, including each representation
and computational step, was found in 11.5% of cases in the basic condition, 24.8%
of cases in the nested condition, 15.9% of cases in the causal condition and 21.2% of
cases in the nested-causal condition. In regards to those participants who did not
follow the process model, this thesis will wait to present an analysis of the causes
behind the most common erroneous approaches until experiment 2, where a greater
range of problem types, and therefore a richer analysis, is available.
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The Relationship Between the Proposed Process Model and Previous
Work
The present model clearly draws heavily on previous theoretical work (e.g. Evans
et al., 2000; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-
Laird et al., 1999; Lewis and Keren, 1999; Macchi and Mosconi, 1998; Macchi, 1995;
Mellers and McGraw, 1999; Sloman et al., 2003). However, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, it is the first time that the entire process has been presented. Further,
much previous work presenting either nested sets / partitive / subsets / natural
frequency formats has attributed the value of the format to either the revelation of
the Hypothesis-focused Representation alone (e.g. Macchi, 2000) or to the Data-
focused Representation alone (e.g. Johnson and Tubau, 2015; Johnson-Laird et al.,
1999; Mellers and McGraw, 1999; Sloman et al., 2003) and even when both have
been referenced in a single paper (Evans et al., 2000; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001) no
formal distinction between the two has been made. It is hoped that this explicitness
will bring greater clarity to the theoretical underpinnings of the field, and allow it
to progress more swiftly.
Nested Sets Framing and the Process Model
As stated above, the nested sets framing taken from Macchi (2000) consists of two
changes to the problem: those to the text body and those to the question form. Typi-
cal of Bayesian word problems, the body of the text contains the information relating
to the Hypothesis-focused Representation (H, -H, P(H|D), P(H|-D)), whereas the
question contains the information relating to the Data-focused Representation (D,
H&D). It would therefore be expected that the nested sets framing format would
impact on both of these. An effect of the nested sets framing was seen on the
frequency of Hypothesis-focused Representations produced (nested sets 26.7% vs
non-nested sets 22.1%: χ2 = 14.115, p<.001). An effect was also seen on frequency
of Data-focused Representations (nested sets 27.4% vs non-nested sets 16.4%: χ2 =
7.957, p=.005. However, when examining only those individuals who constructed
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the Hypothesis-focused Representation, no effect of the nested sets framing was seen
on frequency of Data-focused Representations (χ2 = 0.193, p=.661).
Further, an effect of the nested sets framing was seen on computational step one
(nested sets 54.8% vs non-nested sets 42.0%: χ2 =8.625, p=.003), step two (nested
sets 35.0% vs non-nested sets 25.2%:χ2 = 5.154, p=.023) and step three (nested sets
35.4% vs non-nested sets 24.3%:χ2 = 6.593, p=.010). However, when examining
only those participants who correctly completed step one, no effect of the nested
sets framing was seen on step two (χ2 = .501, p=.479) or step three (χ2 = 1.270,
p=.260).
Causal Framing and the Process Model
The causal framing (Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007) in fact only made a single change
to the problem: the addition of a single sentence in the body of the text provid-
ing a ‘cause’ for the false positive rate. No effect was detected on frequency of
the Hypothesis-focused Representation (χ2 = 0.367, p=0.547) or the Data-focused
Representation (χ2 = .020, p=.889). Further, no effect of the causal framing was
detected on Computational step one (χ2 = 0.013, p=.908), step two (χ2 = .069,
p=.793) or step three (χ2 = 0.778, p=.378). Finally, no single causal representation
was detected in the think aloud protocol in any condition.
Drop off Rates and Numeracy
The drop-off rates of the percentage of people giving each successive stage in the pro-
cess for both the computational steps and the representations, can be found below,
in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 , respectively. In each figure, the average numeracy levels for
the computational steps and the representations can also be seen. These graphs are
cumulative: each successive step in the graph gives the percentage of participants
achieving both that step as well as all previous steps. Using this method drop off
can be estimated more precisely. The computational steps and the representations
are presented on separate figures due to the fact that, as mentioned previously, the
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think aloud process is very likely to under-detect the representations in comparison
to the computational steps. A combined graph would therefore give the unjustified
conclusion that the majority of ’drop off’ occurs at the representations, when this
may in fact just be due to the methodology used.
In regards to the computation drop-off diagram (Figure 3.5a below), highly sim-
ilar drop-off curves for both nested and non-nested conditions can be seen, while
the nested condition shows higher overall rates at each step. Further, it is clear
that the vast majority of drop off occurs at C1 and further substantial drop off
occurs between C1 and C2. Drop off is very slight between C2 and C3, and 100%
of individuals presenting C3 also give the correct answer.
The average numeracy level diagram (Figure 3.5b) shows a similar, but inverse,
pattern. Individuals who achieve step one have considerably higher average nu-
meracy than those who achieve no steps, and this is the case for both nested and
non-nested conditions. A further, but smaller increase in average numeracy is seen
between steps 1 and 2, and no further increase is seen either at step three, or in
terms of those who also provided the correct answer.
A highly similar pattern to the computational steps diagrams is seen for the rep-
resentation diagrams in Figures 3.6a and 3.6b below. In terms of the drop-off graph,
highly similar curves are again seen for nested and non-nested conditions. Again,
the vast majority of drop-off occurs at Representation one, with further substantial
drop off between one and two, and only very slight drop off after this, with the vast
majority of individuals who construct representation two, also providing the correct
answer.
In terms of the numeracy graph, the biggest increase in average numeracy is
again seen from ‘No Representations’ to ‘Representation One’, and a further, but
smaller increase is seen from one to two. No substantial change is seen when looking
additionally at those who got the answer correct.
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Fig. 3.5: The ‘drop off’ rates (top) and average numeracy levels (bottom) for the three
computational steps. Percentage values are given as a proportion of the number
of cases for the nested (n = 226) and non-nested (n = 226) condition
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Aims and Hypotheses
The aims of this experiment were three-fold. First, to verify in the general popula-
tion the work of Macchi (2000) and Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007), which investi-
gated student-population performance on Bayesian problems using nested sets and
causal framings, respectively. Second, to examine whether simultaneous presenta-
tion of both nested sets and causal framings would produce higher accuracy than
either alone. Third, to supplement the experimental paradigm with think aloud and
numeracy data to gain a greater understanding of the processes that individuals
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Fig. 3.6: The ‘drop off’ rates (top) and average numeracy levels (bottom) for the two
representational steps. Percentage values are given as a proportion of the number
of cases for the nested (n = 226) and non-nested (n = 226) conditions
undertake when solving simple Bayesian problems.
Within the first aim, the hypothesis that a significant main effect of the nested
sets framing would be found has been confirmed, providing evidence of the student-
population findings of Macchi (2000) in the general population. It was also hypoth-
esised that no main effect of the causal framing would be found in the whole sample
but a main effect would be seen in the higher numerate sub-group, in line with
McNair and Feeney’s (2014b) findings. However, no main causal effect was found
in either the whole sample or in any high numerate sub-group. This finding stands
in contrast to Krynski and Tenenbaum’s (2007) original work, as well as subsequent
replications by Hayes et al. (2013) who found a whole-sample effect, and McNair
and Feeney (2014b) who found a causal effect in high numerates. The finding may
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however be in line with McNair and Feeney (2014a) who found no causal effect in a
whole sample analysis.
Within the second aim, it was hypothesised that no significant interaction would
be found between nested sets and causal framings in the whole sample, but that
such an effect would be found in the high-numerate sub-group. In fact again no
significant interaction was found in either the whole sample or any sub-groups. This
result again stands in contrast to Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) and subsequent
replications with the exception of McNair and Feeney (2014a) who also did not find
an effect of the causal framing.
Within the third aim, the results provide a more cohesive and systematic model
of the processes people use to solve simple Bayesian problems than has been pre-
sented previously within the nested sets literature, providing particular emphasis on
the separation of the Hypothesis and Data-focused Representations. Further, the
qualitative data has made it possible to determine that this process model is followed
by the vast majority of successful individuals in three major framing types explored
in the literature (‘inside percentages’, ‘nested/partitive/subset format’ and ‘causal
format’), suggesting that this may be the preferred method of solution for individ-
uals even in the absence of a specific attempt to encourage it (the basic condition)
and even in the presence of a specific attempt to encourage a different process (the
causal condition). This also suggests that the model is not simply a regurgitation
of the nested sets framing, but is spontaneously produced by solvers in the absence
of any prompt. This stands in contrast to comments made by both Tversky and
Kahneman (1983) and Sloman et al. (2003) who claimed that the ‘default’ problem-
solving perspective was the ‘inside’ point of view unless an explicit cue was given to
adopt the ‘outside’ perspective. In the present paper, a large number of participants
adopted this outside perspective, and succeeded in solving the problem, even in the
absence of any such cue (i.e. in the basic and causal conditions).
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3.4.2 Nested Sets versus Natural Frequencies
There has been much previous debate in the literature in regards to the relative
distinctiveness of the nested sets / partitive / subset / outside-framed approach
to improving Bayesian reasoning from the natural frequencies approach. Hoffrage
et al. (2002) claimed that Macchi’s (2000) outside-framed approach to improving
Bayesian reasoning, as used in the present paper, works by encouraging individuals
to construct a natural frequencies version of the problem for themselves, which
is then thought to be the true cause of the increase in accuracy. This possibility
continues to plague modern work such as Sirota et al. (2015) and can only be resolved
by a protocol such as a think aloud analysis which can record solver processes. It
is also given some evidential backing by the present experiment, as ‘populating the
Hypothesis-focused Representation’, as it is termed in this experiment, could also
be considered a ‘conversion’ to natural frequencies. However, as noted by Hoffrage
et al. (2002), Macchi (2000) and the present paper used real-number values for the
whole sample (e.g. 1000 women) as well as for the two base rates (e.g. 800 women
have cancer, 200 women do not have cancer). This may also have encouraged them
to convert the problem into integers (or natural frequencies), and it is possible
that without this feature, individuals may work through the process model without
converting from percentages to frequencies.
3.4.3 Nested Sets Effect: Text Body change versus Question
Format
In the present paper an overall effect of the nested sets framing was found on accu-
racy rate. The nested sets framing used in this experiment and taken from Macchi
(2000) contains changes to the body of the text and the question form. The body of
the text contains the information related to the Hypothesis-focused Representation
and computational step one, and any changes here may be expected to affect these
primarily. The question contains the information related to the Data Hypothesis
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and computations 2 and 3, and any changes here may be expected to affect these
primarily.
When the steps of the process model were examined independently, it was found
that there was an effect of the nested sets framing on the frequency of both the
Hypothesis-focused Representation and the Data-focused Representation. However,
when examining only those who successfully constructed the Hypothesis-focused
Representation, no effect of the nested sets framing was seen on the Data-focused
Representation. This can be seen in Figure 3.6 wherein a substantially larger amount
of participants achieve the Hypothesis-focused Representation in the nested sets
framing (36.7%) than the non-nested framing (22.1%), but subsequently, a very
similar percentage of those participants (66.2% in the nested condition vs 62.0% in
the basic condition) go on to construct the Data-focused Representation.
When examining only those individuals who completed computational step one,
there was also no effect of the nested sets framing on computational steps 2 or 3.
This can be seen clearly in Figure 3.5. A substantially larger number of nested sets
cases achieved C1 (55.3% vs 42.0%) but out of these individuals a highly similar
proportion of individuals (63.3% in the nested condition vs 59.0% in the non-nested
conditions) achieved computational step two and step three.
Overall, this analysis suggests that Macchi’s outside-framed approach to im-
proving Bayesian reasoning succeeds in improving the frequency of the Hypothesis-
focused Representation and step one but does not succeed in improving the fre-
quency of the Data-focused Representation and step two other than indirectly via
that increase in the Hypothesis-focused Representation and step one.
3.4.4 Numeracy and the Process
This experiment also demonstrated that the average numeracy levels of those in-
dividuals completing each computational and representational step in the process
increases largely from no steps to both computational step one, and also to the
Hypothesis-focused Representation. A further, smaller increase is seen between
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these and step two, and the Data-focused Representation. No further increase in
numeracy is seen for individuals achieving further steps after these. This progres-
sion is not, it should be noted, due to a cumulative effect of arithmetic errors, as
only 5 of these were detected in the entire study, and they were also removed for
the analysis. It is speculated therefore that this may indicate that the second step,
and second representation of the solution process may be more difficult to achieve
than the first step, or representation. By this it is meant that individuals may need
greater numerical ability to achieve the middle steps of the process than the first
steps. In contrast, the final computational step three, appears to be trivial once one
has achieved step two.
3.4.5 Causal Null Finding Explanation
In regards to the null finding for the causal framing, several methodological issues
must be considered in regards to the present experiment and some of which may
require further experimentation to rule out. Firstly, given that McNair and Feeney
(2014b) only found a causal effect in their high-numerate sub-group, it was consid-
ered possible that the numeracy level of the present sample might be the reason for
the null finding. Indeed, the present sample did, in fact, have a lower median nu-
meracy level than McNair and Feeney (when correcting for their ‘missing’ question
the present study had a median of 4 while McNair and Feeney had a median of 5).
While no high-numerate sub-group, including one constructed to have the same pa-
rameters as McNair and Feeney’s high numerate group showed a causal effect either,
this sub-group was quite small in size (n = 35) and so may have lacked power to
detect the effect.
Another potential limitation could be that the three scenarios which were in-
vented for the study (College, Library and Gotham) may not have been designed
adequately to test the causal framing. The causal manipulation assumes that in the
basic condition the ‘cause’ of the false positive rate is not only not stated (which
is simple to ensure), but further, not ‘easily inventible’ for the solver either. If an
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obvious second cause springs to mind for the solver then they would be able to cre-
ate a causal mental model equally well in both conditions and no difference would
be predicted between the two conditions. The three new scenarios were therefore
all carefully designed to ensure that in the basic version the cause would not be
obvious. However, it is possible that the cause was more obvious than in the origi-
nal mammogram problem used by Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) which may have
weakened the overall effect of the causal framing in this study. Some evidence for
this comes from the fact that the causal condition outperformed the basic condi-
tion in the mammogram scenario to a greater extent than in the other scenarios.
However, even this difference was very far from significant and the nested-causal
condition in fact under-performed in comparison to the nested condition even in the
mammogram scenario. Further, the fact that no single participant even referenced
a causal structure in their think aloud data, even in the causal condition, makes this
explanation less likely.
A further possibility is that the fact that the Total Population and H and -H were
given as sub-divided frequencies, rather than the percentages used in Krynski and
Tenenbaum’s (2007) study may have ‘got participants started’ with constructing a
nested sets representation, precluding them from taking a causal approach. This
fact is also an alternative explanation for why the nested sets representation was
modal in all four conditions. In effect, it is possible that all conditions contained a
nested sets prompt to some extent.
A further possibility is that the repeated measures nature of the study may
have led to practise effects, which, if present, would have the effect of making the
accuracy of all conditions more similar to each other, and thus reducing the effect
size of both the nested sets and causal framings. However, the causal condition
actually produced slightly lower accuracy than the basic framing and the nested-
causal framing also produced slightly lower accuracy than the nested sets framing
alone. Practise effects could only reduce effect sizes and could not reverse their
direction, suggesting that this is not a good explanatory candidate for the null
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finding.
One final possibility is that the introduction of the ‘think aloud’ process reduced
the effect of the causal prompt. Given that participants were asked to write down
their thought processes prior to giving a numerical answer, it is plausible that this
also encouraged them to think more deeply and for longer about the problem than in
previous experiments not containing this feature (such as Krynski and Tenenbaum,
2007). This has been suggested previously by Ericsson and Simon (1998). Depending
on the mode by which the causal framing facilitates reasoning on the problem,





In experiment one, Macchi’s ’outside-framed percentage’ approach to increasing ac-
curacy on Bayesian problems was replicated and further, found to be efficacious
in the general population. Second, the nested sets process model outlined in that
paper, and hypothesised by previous nested sets authors, was found to be modal in
all conditions, regardless of specific framing. Third, the increase in accuracy pro-
vided by the nested sets framing was found to coincide with a greater number of
individuals following the nested sets process model than with other framing types.
These findings suggest that Macchi’s approach could have widespread social value
in situations such as medicine and law, where the general public are frequently
exposed to Bayesian problems. However, the problems used in that study were
relatively simple in a number of ways and may have suffered from a lack of realism, or
ecological validity. If the nested sets approach is to be used and recommended for real
situations, it must be tested without these fictitious simplifications. Further, as the
process model was found within the data using exploratory analysis in experiment
one, the present experiment will serve to verify the existence of the model. It will also
serve as a test for whether the model is present in more ecologically valid contexts.
First, the problems used had a 0% false negative rate (e.g. ‘All women who have
cancer receive a positive result’), which simplified the problem but is impossible
with any real test. The present study will add a non-zero false negative rate (e.g.
’Out of all the women who have cancer, 80% receive a positive result’). While
Macchi (2000) in fact did include this complication , that paper did not publish the
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solution processes of their participants. This added complication will necessarily
make the nested sets process itself more complex and could therefore feasibly deter
participants from perceiving, or following it. This may result in a weakening of the
nested sets effect, and potentially in participants using a different process to solve
the problem.
Second, experiment one, Macchi (2000) and Fiedler et al. (2000) all used inte-
gers for the total population and / or the base rates e.g. ’200 out of 1000 women
have cancer’. This again may not be the case in all real settings and much previous
work (e.g. (Casscells et al., 1978; Eddy, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Krynski
& Tenenbaum, 2007) has generally used percentage base rates and not explicitly
included a population figure at all (e.g. ‘20% of women have cancer’). Hoffrage
et al (2002) also theorised that the integer format might encourage individuals to
construct a ‘natural frequency’ version of the problem for themselves, which may
be the cause of the facilitation in Macchi (2000) and Fiedler et al (2000). It was
similarly theorised in experiment one that this use of integers may have ‘got partici-
pants started’ in following the nested sets process particularly as that process begins
with the simulation of a target population which is then sub-divided. Without the
provision of this, it is therefore again possible that the nested sets framing effect
may be reduced and it may also be possible that participants will use a different
process to solve the problem.
Third, the particular numbers used in experiment one and in Macchi (2000)
also allowed participants to work solely with whole numbers throughout the entire
solution procedure, until the final product. This would also be very uncommon in a
real setting. The nested sets process relies upon mental simulation of units and their
sub-divisions and previous work (Brase, 2007; Cosmides & Tooby, 1998; Cosmides &
Tooby, 1996) has suggested that individuals may have difficulty mentally simulating
fractions of units. Therefore, fractional values may deter individuals from following
the nested sets process model. While this fraction-effect may be weaker with the
percentage values used in the present experiment, previous work (experiment one;
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Hoffrage et al, 2002) has suggested that a large proportion of individuals are likely
to convert the problem in to integers, or ’natural frequencies’. If this is the case
in the present experiment, it may be possible to simultaneously test whether these
fractional values impact on the nested sets framing effect, and the percentage of
people following the nested sets process with both percentages and integers.
Finally, the simplicity of problems used in the first experiment (due to the above
discussed absence of false negatives) made the analysis of errors of limited value. Due
to the potential lack of ecological validity of the problem used, it is quite possible
that entirely different errors may be made in more realistic situations. The present
experiment, with a greater range of problem formats, will expand the examination
of think aloud protocols to unsuccessful individuals in an to attempt to elucidate
any themes in underlying cognitive reasoning patterns that lead to errors. This will
be examined through think aloud data to build on previous work by Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage (1995) on the causes of common errors on Bayesian problems. Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage promoted the use of methods which could elucidate solver processes in
order to understand the cause of various errors, most notably that type previously
named ‘base rate neglect’. They noted that the entirety of work at the time had
focused only on the numerical outcome of solvers’ answers to determine the type of
error and stated that “No comprehensive theory of why and when people neglect
base rate information has yet been found.” (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995, pp.29)
This issue remains to this day. In previous work only one study (Macchi, 2000) has
used a ‘think aloud’ method to elucidate the processes behind errors. While Macchi
produced descriptive statistics for the most common error types she did not attempt
to examine the processes which lead to these errors. The processes participants
undertake when they arrive at these erroneous answers will therefore be examined
and analysed for common themes to determine if one or several underlying causes
can be determined.
It is hypothesised that a positive significant overall effect of the nested sets
framing on both accuracy and completion of the nested sets process will be seen
85
Part I Section 4.2
in comparison to the non-nested condition both in the sample as a whole, and
separately within both the decimal and complex conditions. Further, based on
the findings of experiment one, a mediation analysis will be conducted with the
hypothesis that the hypothesis centred and data centred representations will mediate
the relationship between the nested sets framing and accuracy.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
The final sample for the experiment was 521. From an original sample of 528, 7
individuals were removed because they stated that they had undertaken the problem
presented in the experiment previously. Demographic data can be found in Table 1.
Participants were paid an average of $6.00 per hour for taking part.
4.2.2 Design
The study was a between-subjects 2 (non-nested vs nested sets framing) x 2 (whole
numbers vs decimals) x 2 (simple problem vs complex) design resulting in eight
groups. It also employed the same mixed-methods design using the ‘think aloud’
procedure developed by Ericsson and Simon (1998) and used in experiment one.
4.2.3 Materials
The mammogram problem, used in experiment one, was again employed.
The simple conditions used a true positive rate of 100%, identical to experiment
one (e.g. ‘All women who have cancer receive a positive result’). This allowed
participants to use a calculation shortcut in which they substituted H (the number
of women with cancer) for (H&D: the number of women with cancer and a positive
result) because the former simply needed to be multiplied by 100% (the true positive
rate) to obtain the latter, making no change. In the complex condition however,
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the true positive rate was set at less than 100%, introducing the possibility for false
negatives and requiring participants to calculate both conjunctions and therefore
increasing solution and representational complexity.
The whole-number conditions used figures which produced whole number prod-
ucts at every stage (i.e. in this condition, the conjunctions were whole numbers)
in the process except the final product, which was a decimal in all conditions. The
decimal-condition importantly resulted in decimal values for the two ‘conjunctions’
of (H&D: women with cancer and a positive result) and (-H&D: women without can-
cer and a positive result), the calculation of which were a necessary step to solution
of the problem. The nested-decimal-complex condition can be seen below.
Every year the government advises women to take part in routine mammography
screening using an X-ray machine to determine if they have breast cancer. Among
women at age forty who participate in this routine screening 10% have breast cancer,
while 90% do not. However the screening test is not always accurate. Specifically,
out of those women who have breast cancer, only 76% will actually get a positive
mammography. Furthermore, out of all of those women who do not have breast
cancer, 15% will also get a positive mammography. What percentage of women at
age forty who get a positive mammography in routine screening actually have breast
cancer?
4.2.4 Procedure
Participants were recruited through the Amazon MTurk outsourcing service. Partic-
ipants were presented with the consent form, and then the instructions for the study,
which included an extensive section on the ‘think aloud’ instructions, including an
example (See Appendix B). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the
eight conditions. For each problem they were presented with the problem text and
question itself and were asked to write their thought processes while they worked
out the problem in a ‘think aloud’ open-ended text-box. They were also provided
with a link to an online calculator wherever required. Once this was complete they
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were able to give their actual numerical answer on the next page. Finally they an-
swered the demographic questions and a final question regarding whether they had
undertaken the problem in the study before.
4.2.5 Data Analysis
The same dual criteria to determine correct answers used in experiment one was
again employed in experiment two.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Quantitative
Overall accuracy for the experiment was 13.5% with an average accuracy of 9.0%
for the non-nested conditions and 18.1% for the nested conditions. In Figure 4.1
below, accuracy for all eight conditions can be seen.
Fig. 4.1: The percentage of correct answers across all eight conditions
A binary logistic regression, using ‘score’ as the dependent variable and the
three condition-comparisons (non-nested vs nested; whole vs decimal; simple vs
complex) as independent variables found a highly significant main effect for the
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non-nested-nested comparison (χ2 = 8.984, p=.003), no main effect for the whole-
decimal comparison (χ2 = 0.184, p=.668) and no main effect for the simple-complex
comparison (χ2 = 1.350, p=.245).
To determine if the effect of the nested sets framing was significantly present
within the four ‘decimal’ conditions, a generalised linear model was run on this
group only. A main effect of the non-nested-nested comparison was found (χ2 =
4.821, p=.028). Similarly, to determine if the nested sets effect was present within
the four ‘complex’ conditions, a generalised linear model was run on this group only




In Figure 4.2 below, the percentage of individuals achieving every step of the process
model can be seen for all eight conditions. A highly similar pattern to overall success
is immediately apparent, with the nested sets conditions producing more process
models in every instance.
Fig. 4.2: The percentage of individuals achieving all steps of the nested sets process model
for all eight conditions
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A binary logistic regression was run using ’All Steps’ (a variable which was coded
to be ’1’ if participants completed all steps in the process, and 0 otherwise) and the
dependent variable and the nested sets vs non-nested, simple vs complex and whole
vs decimal variables as independent variables. A highly significant effect of the
nested vs non-nested variable was seen (χ2 = 9.728, p=.002), while no significant
effect was seen for the simple vs complex (p=.161) or for the whole vs decimal
condition (p=.816).
In Figure 4.3 below, a similar drop-off graph to experiment one for both com-
putational steps and representations can be seen. A similar pattern in both cases
is once again apparent, wherein the vast majority of drop off occurs prior to Rep-
resentation one / Step one, with further substantial but smaller drop off between
these and Representation two / Step two, and no substantial subsequent drop off
between these and step three or accurate completion of the problem. Further, highly
similar curves were once again seen for both the nested and non-nested conditions.
The major difference between the two conditions was the amount of drop off at
Representation one / Step one. After this, and identically to experiment one, highly
similar subsequent proportional attrition in both conditions was seen.
Confirming the results of Figure 4.3, a further analysis was conducted to test
the finding from experiment one that the nested sets framing effect on the Data-
focused Representation, and computational step two, while significantly predictive
alone was non-significant when controlling for the presence of the Hypothesis-focused
Representation, and computational step one, respectively. When examining only
those who produced the Hypothesis-focused Representation, the nested sets framing
did not predict the frequency of Data-focused Representations in this experiment
(χ2 = 0.04, p=.841). When examining only those who produced computational step
one, the nested sets framing also did not predict the frequency of computational
step two (χ2 = 0.019, p=.891).
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Conversion to integers
Eighty eight participants (16.9%) converted the problem from percentages into inte-
gers before attempting to solve. For this classification, a ‘sample’ or ‘population’ of
women with a integer rather than a percentage or probability had to be expressed.
For example P105 said ‘To make my math easier, I am going to assume there are
100 women.’ and P186 began ‘Out of 100 women, 10 have breast cancer, while 90
do not.’ Out of the 88 participants who converted the problem to whole numbers,
73 converted into a population of 100 women, and 9 converted to a population of
1000.
Conversion of the problem into integers was highly associated with success on
the problem. Out of the 434 participants who did not convert the problem, 6.5%
provided the normative answer, while out of the 87 individuals who did convert
the problem, 48.3% provided the normative answer. This relationship was highly
significant (χ2 = 980.6, p<.001).
Conversion of the problem was also associated with a greater frequency of nested
sets and data centred representations. Binary logistic regressions showed a signifi-
cant main effect of conversion on the hypothesis centred representation (χ2 = 93.1,
p<.001) and on the data centred representation (χ2 = 75.4, p<.001).
A general linear model using logit function examined the prevalence of conversion
between conditions. A significant main effect of the nested sets condition was found
(χ2 = 7.233, p=.007) with 12.4% converting in the non-nested condition and 21.3%
converting in the nested condition. However no main effect of the whole-decimal
comparison (χ2 = 0.7, p=.412) or the simple-complex comparison (χ2 = 0.3, p=.615)
was found on conversion rate.
Finally, it should be stressed that this conversion was not unanimous amongst
successful participants, nor amongst those who followed the nested sets process. Of
successful individuals, 40.0% did not convert from percentages. For example, P245
completely the problem and followed the nested sets process while entirely using
percentages:
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‘10% have breast cancer, 90% do not - Participants / 76% of the 10%
test positive / 15% of 90% test positive / / 76% of 10% is 7.6%. 15% of
90% is 13.5% / / 13.5% + 7.6% = 21.1% / / 13.55%/21.1 = 63.981%’
Dealing with decimals
Eight out of the nine individuals who converted the problem to a sample of 1000
were in one of the decimal conditions. Converting to a sample of 1000 turned the
decimal problem into whole numbers, suggesting this was one strategy that some in-
dividuals used to deal with the problem of decimals. However, out of the 34 (13.7%)
individuals who achieved step two in the decimal conditions, only 2 converted to a
base of 1000. One more individual converted to a base of 110 which also provided
whole numbers in that particular condition. The remaining 31 individuals (91.2%)
dealt with the decimal values in a precisely analogous way to the equivalent figures
in the whole-number conditions and no single individual attempted to round the
decimal values up or down. Further it has already been shown above that an equal
amount of nested sets and data centred representations were found in the decimal
conditions as the whole-number conditions. These results suggest that apart from 3
individuals, successful participants in the decimal conditions dealt with the figures
in the precisely same way as individuals in the whole-number conditions. This was
not only the case when participants dealt directly with percentages either. Fifteen
participants out of the 34 who achieved step two in the decimal conditions converted
to a sample of 100 and these individuals frequently mentioned fractions of women.
For example, P109 said ‘Out of 100 women, 23.5 women will have test results show
positive for cancer’, P482 said ‘so 13.5 women who don’t have breast cancer will also
get a positive mammography’ and P480 said ‘This would mean that 7.6 women out
of 10 women who have breast cancer would have a positive mammogram.’
Errors
In order to ensure that the results of the analysis of errors is valuable for future
research, the analysis will look only at the most ecologically valid conditions: the
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complex-decimal conditions. Given that the present work has shown accuracy is
equal in these conditions, future research should be looking to employ these more
complex problems , rather than the more simple problems often used in order to
ensure any improvements can be implemented in real situations. Brief comparisons
to the overall rates will also be given.
Non-Nested Sets The most common answer within the non-nested complex-
decimal condition was one which did not achieve either mathematical step. This
was to provide the complement of the false positive rate, (1-P[D|H]). This answer
was given by 25.8% of all participants in that condition. It was also the most
common in the non-nested conditions overall.
The think aloud data was coded by the candidate and second coded by inde-
pendent researchers with no knowledge of study hypotheses for further insight into
common reasoning that lead to this mistake and a single piece of reasoning was
found to be highly prominent (45.8% of cases). This was the confusion of the false
positive rate (the rate at which women without cancer still get a positive test result)
with the percentage of all positives that were in fact false. Following this confusion,
the subsequent accurate deduction was made that 100% minus this value would give
the percentage of positives which were correct, which is the answer to the question.
This is a confusion of P(D|-H) with P(-H|D). For example, P228 said ‘The fact that
15% of positive mammographies are invalid means that 85% are valid. She therefore
has an 85% chance of actually having breast cancer’, P20 who said ‘I guess since
10% of positive tests are inaccurate, that means there’s a 90% chance of her having
cancer’ and P133 who said ‘Also of all the women who get a positive mammogram,
15% will not have breast cancer, so I think it is 85%.’. In each of these cases, the
first value given (15% or 10%) is P(D|-H) in the problem text. However, the value is
being expressed in the place of P(-H|D). This faulty leap in reasoning can perhaps
be most clearly seen in P177 who said ‘But there is a 10 percent chance that a
woman without breast cancer will get a positive mammogram [true, P(D|-H)], so
10 percent of the positive mammograms are not accurate [false, P(-H|D)]’. In the
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remainder of participants’ think aloud data, the reasoning could not be extracted
from the data for example, many participants just gave mathematical notation.
Nested Sets The 1-P(D|-H) answer, while the most common in the non-nested
conditions, was in fact only given by 6.7% of all participants in the nested sets
decimal-complex condition, making it the second most common answer. The two
most common answers in this condition were the correct answer, and the conjunction
(H&D): the percentage, or number, of women with both breast cancer and a positive
test result. Each of these was given by 16.7% of participants in this condition. Again
these results were mirrored in the overall nested sets conditions. The (H&D) answer
is obtained by multiplying the base rate for cancer with the true positive rate. Its
calculation is part of the first step to answering the question correctly. The error is
to provide this as the final product instead of dividing it by the sum of itself, (H&D)
with the opposite conjunction (-H&D), which provides the correct answer.
A single reasoning process behind this error proved more difficult to extract by
the coders. However, out of the total 31 individuals who made this error, six clearly
stated that they were aiming to find the ‘percentage of women with a positive result
and breast cancer’, suggesting a potential confusion in the reading of the question.
For example, P420 concluded by saying ‘so it would be 8% that have positive screens
and actual breast cancer.’ Similarly, a further 18 people simply stated that 10% of
women had breast cancer and X% would get a positive result, then provided the
product of these as the answer. This suggests a similar misunderstanding of the
question to the six people who articulated this more explicitly. For example, P418
said ‘So if 10% of women actually have breast cancer and only 80% of those will
actually have received a positive result. So 10% of 100 is 10 and 80% of 10 is 8.’
From the remaining seven individuals, no process could be divined.
Mediation Analysis
A mediation analysis was carried out to test if the effect of the nested-sets framing
on the ‘score’ variable was mediated firstly by conversion to integers and secondly
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by the nested sets and data centred representations of the process model proposed
in experiment one.
In the first model, the non-nested-nested comparison variable and the conversion
variable were used as independent factors in a binary logistic model with score as
the dependent variable. A borderline significant effect of the nested sets condition
variable was found (χ2 = 4.1, p=.042) and a large significant effect of conversion
was found (χ2 = 76.4, p<.001).
In the second model, the nested condition variable and the hypothesis centred
and data centred representations were included as independent variables. In this
model, the nested sets condition variable was a non-significant predictor of accuracy
(χ2 = 0.0, p=.933) while both hypothesis centred (χ2 = 32.6, p=<.001) and data
centred (χ2 = 19.9, p=<.001) representations were large significant predictors.
In the third model, all four factors were included as independent variables. In
this model, the nested condition variable was not a significant predictor (χ2 = 0.0,
p=.922) and the conversion variable was much reduced in predictive power (χ2 =
3.1, p=.079). The hypothesis centred representation (χ2 = 28.1, p=<.001) and the
data centred representation (χ2 = 16.9, p=<.001) representations remained highly
significant predictors and were little-reduced in predictive power.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Aims and Hypotheses
The present study aimed to determine if the nested sets framing effect (Macchi,
2000) on accuracy would remain with three methodological departures experiment
one; using a percentage base rate instead of frequency, using decimal values instead
of whole numbers, and using a more complex problem than previous, which included
false negatives. All three of these departures were intended to increase ecological
validity of the problem.
Overall, a main effect of the nested sets condition variable on accuracy was found.
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No main effect of the whole-decimal comparison or the simple-complex comparison
was found. The nested sets framing effect was also found separately within the
four ‘decimal’ conditions and within the four ‘complex’ conditions. A significant
relationship between the nested sets condition and completion of the nested sets
process was also observed while no main effect of the whole-decimal comparison or
simple-complex comparison was observed. This confirms the first hypothesis.
4.4.2 Mediation Analysis
A mediation analysis compiling all conditions found, in two separate analyses, found
partial mediation of the nested sets effect on accuracy by conversion from percent-
ages to integers, and full mediation of the nested sets effect on accuracy by the
hypothesis centred and data centred representations of the process model. This
latter finding confirms the second hypotheses of the study. Further, a mediation
analysis including all four variables showed a mediation of the effect of conversion
on accuracy by the hypothesis and data centred representations. These results sug-
gest the following solution narrative: Individuals in the nested sets conditions are
more likely than those in the non-nested sets conditions to convert the problem from
percentages to integers. The individuals who convert are more likely to follow the
nested sets process, and the individuals who follow the process are more likely to
succeed on the problem.
4.4.3 Nested Sets versus Natural Frequencies
The present results suggest that a nested sets format increases accuracy on Bayesian
problems even with percentage base rates. In regards to whether this increase is
equal in power, a direct comparison cannot be made as percentage and integer
base rates were not directly compared in the present experiment. However, some
comparisons may be informative. Overall accuracy in the simple-whole-nested con-
dition (18.5%) was lower than the comparable condition in experiment one, which
found 38.9% accuracy. This may be due to the repeated-measures nature of exper-
96
Part I Section 4.4
iment one, however, accuracy in the complex-whole-nested condition (15.9%) was
also lower than the comparable condition in Macchi (2000), who found 33.3% and
used a between subjects design. Given that these two studies used ‘integer’ base
rates instead of percentages this may suggest that the provision of these improves
accuracy on Bayesian problems above the nested sets format alone.
Previously, Hoffrage et al (2002) hypothesized that the presence of ‘integer’ base
rates / population figures in previous problems (Macchi, 2000; Fiedler et al., 2000)
may have been a factor in encouraging individuals to create a ‘natural frequency’
version of the problem for themselves, thus providing the increased accuracy seen
in those problems. In partial support of this theory, the results demonstrate that
the majority of successful participants (60%) in this experiment, when presented
with percentage base rates, firstly constructed for themselves a ‘integer’ version
of the problem. This phenomena was also noted by Cosmides and Tooby (1996),
who briefly examined participants’ workings out but did not conduct a systematic
analysis. This conversion process was also highly associated with success. This may
provide valuable insight into solution process given that the majority of participants
who converted the problem did so from a base of 100% to a base of 100 women, mak-
ing no mathematical change to the problem. Further, results also showed that the
relationship between conversion and success was partially mediated by the hypoth-
esis and Data-focused Representations. It is therefore possible that this conversion
made it more likely that participants would follow the nested sets process, ultimately
leading to success on the problem.
However, it must not be ignored that a substantial portion of participants (40%
of correct answers) were content to follow the nested sets process in percentage
form, and without any mention of a population or subsequent creation of a ‘natural
frequency’ version of the problem (Hoffrage et al, 2002). This suggests that this
process does not necessarily require the simulation of a ‘integer’ population, or the
use of integers at all. Therefore, in temperance of Hoffrage et al.’s (2002) conjecture,
the construction of a natural frequency format may not in fact be necessary for all
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participants to solve Bayesian problems, or even to follow the nested sets process,
but instead may simply increase the likelihood that they will do so.
4.4.4 Decimal Values
A further finding of note was that overall, individuals dealt with decimal values in
exactly the same way as whole numbers. Even within those individuals who con-
verted the problem into integers no difference between decimal and whole-number
conditions was seen. This was considered plausible as there may be a psycholog-
ical difference between ‘12.5% of women’ and ‘12.5 women’, with the latter being
a metaphysical impossibility. Indeed the think aloud data indicated that no single
individual attempted to round the real decimals up or down, and participants ap-
peared to deal with the fractional numbers of women in precisely the same way as
their counterparts in the whole-number conditions.
4.4.5 Errors
1-P(D|-H) Error
The analysis of errors also produced information which may be valuable to future
work. The most common error in the non-nested-decimal-complex condition when
presenting with an individual or ‘chance’ framing was 1-P(D|-H). This was also
the second most common error in the complex-decimal-nested sets framing. It was
named the ‘False Alarm Complement’ in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), and was
given by 3.4% of participants in their second experiment. It was also given by
2.9% of participants in experiment one and was also found by Macchi (2000). think
aloud data analysis determined that the most common reasoning process behind this
error was to confuse P(D|-H) with P(-H|D), a finding with fits with previous work
advocating the ’confusion hypothesis (e.g. Hamm, 1987; Hamm & Miller, 1988;
Wolfe, 1995; Macchi, 1995).
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(H&D) Error
The most common error within the complex-decimal-nested sets condition was to
provide the conjunction (H&D). This answer was also the second most common error
in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) first experiment, and even more common than
the correct answer in their second experiment. This answer was reported in com-
bination with other ‘Pseudo-Bayesian’ answers in Macchi (2000) which collectively
totalled the most common error also. The error was not possible in experiment one
as there was no possibility for false negatives.
It proved more difficult to discern a general reasoning error behind this mistake.
However, the most frequent reason identified was a mis-reading of the question,
wherein participants seemed to be searching for ‘the percentage of all women with
a positive result and breast cancer’, rather than ‘the percentage of women with a
positive result who actually have breast cancer’.
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Experiment one produced a null finding for the causal framing. However, there
were some notable differences between that experiment and previous work which
may have contributed to this and which were discussed within that experiment.
Experiment one firstly was within-subjects. It also used real-number base rates, a
think aloud protocol and multiple scenarios some of which previous work had not
examined. Each of these may have contributed to the null finding for the causal
framing.
The aim of present experiment was therefore to test the causal framing effect
without these potentially confounding factors. Four conditions were analysed. Each
had percentage base rates similar to those used by Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007),
which was an ‘outside percentage’ in that experiment, meaning that their original
experiment in fact used a mixed outside / inside percentage format. Further, to test
the theory that a think aloud protocol may have affected the result (as theorised in
experiment one) one causal and one control condition used a think aloud protocol,
while one causal and one control condition did not. Based on experiment one it
was hypothesised that in a logistic regression analysis, a think aloud effect would
be seen but no causal effect would be. It was however also hypothesised that an
interaction between the think aloud and causal effect would be seen, with post-hoc
analysis revealing a difference between causal and control within the non-think aloud
conditions.
Part I Section 5.2
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Twenty seven participants were removed because they stated they had completed
the medical diagnosis problem before. The final sample consisted of 429 partici-
pants, recruited through Amazon MTurk. A breakdown of the demographics for the
experiment can be seen in Table 1.
5.2.2 Design
The experiment comprised a between-subjects 2 (causal vs non-causal) x 2 (think
aloud vs non-think aloud) design.
5.2.3 Materials
The experiment was an online survey which participants accessed through their own
computers. Colour-blind safe colours were used where colour was necessary, which
were sampled from www.colourbrewer.org. The same medical diagnosis problem
used in experiments one and two was again used, and the causal version can be seen
below:
Every year the government advises women to take part in routine mam-
mography screening using an X-ray machine to determine if they have
breast cancer. 20% of women at age forty who participate in this rou-
tine screening have breast cancer. If a woman has breast cancer, she will
always get a positive mammography result. If a woman does not have
breast cancer, there is still a 10% chance that she will also get a positive
mammography result. This can happen if she has a dense but harmless
cyst which causes a positive result because it looks like a cancer to the
X-ray machine.
A woman in this age group had a positive mammography in routine
screening. What is the percentage chance that she actually has breast
cancer?
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5.2.4 Procedure
Participants were shown the consent form for the experiment, then were randomly
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. Each group was then shown
a set of instructions for the experiment which were more extensive for the ‘think
aloud’ group (see Appendix B for think aloud instructions). Participants were then
presented with the problem and given the opportunity to respond. Participants in
the non-think aloud groups were asked simply to provide a numerical response to
the problem, while participants in the think aloud groups were asked to provide a
verbal record of their thoughts while working out the problem before being allowed
to enter their numerical response on the following page.
5.2.5 Data Analysis
Due to the fact that the main analysis of experiment three compared think aloud
conditions to non think aloud conditions, the same dual criteria analysis of ’correct’
answers employed in experiment one and experiment two could not be used. Instead,
in line with previous non-think aloud work (e.g. Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007;




When comparing the think aloud to the non-think aloud conditions, analysis must
rely entirely on the numerical answer to determine which participants were cor-
rect. The percentage of participants giving the correct numerical response for each
condition can be seen below in Figure 5.1.
It is clear that the think aloud conditions produced substantially more numer-
ically correct answers than the non-think aloud conditions. However the causal
103
Part I Section 5.3
Fig. 5.1: Percentage of participants providing the correct numerical response across all
four conditions in Experiment three
conditions also clearly showed either equal, or less accuracy than the control condi-
tion. A logistic regression model, using the binary ‘correct’ variable as criterion and
the ‘TA vs non-TA’ and ‘Causal vs non-Causal’ variables as predictors demonstrated
a significant effect for the TA variable (χ2 = 9.065, p=.003), but no significant effect
for the causal variable (χ2 = 2.774, p =.096) and no interaction effect (χ2 = .114, p
=.735)
Within the TA conditions, think aloud protocols were analysed to ensure that
participants who provided the correct numerical responses had also undertaken an
appropriate method to arrive at the answer provided. Within the control condition,
17 out of 18 participants who provided the correct answer were also classified as
having used an appropriate method. Within the causal condition, all 9 out of 9 par-
ticipants were classified this way. A binary logistic regression using ‘correct method’
as criterion variable and ‘causal vs non-causal’ as predictor variable revealed the dif-
ference in participant accuracy between these two conditions was non-significant (B
= -.707, = 2.583, p=.108).
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5.3.2 Qualitative
In terms of the process model outlined in experiment one, 2.6% of participants
in experiment three completed every step of the model in the causal condition,
and 4.6% in the non-causal condition. Out of those individuals who provided the
normative answer, 36.8% demonstrated all five steps of the nested sets process. All
other participants failed to demonstrate either one or more steps of the process. Only
one approach other than the nested sets process was detected in a single participant:
P379 used Bayes’ formula by plugging the values in the problem into the appropriate
places in the formula and computing the answer. No representation of the problem
in terms of a causal structure was detected in the think aloud protocol of any single
participant.
From the think aloud protocol it was also possible to replicate the analysis from
experiment two of those participants who converted the problem from the original
percentage format to a real-number format. Out of the 168 participants who did
not get the correct method, no single participant made any numerical conversion
of the problem. However, out of the 26 participants in the think aloud conditions
who got the correct method, 14 (50%) converted the problem from percentages to
whole numbers. Twelve of these converted to a sample of ‘100 women’, while one
converted to a sample of 40 and another converted to a sample of 10. An example of
this comes from P5 who began by stating ‘Say that 100 women get a mammogram.
Then 20 will have positive findings because they have BC.’.
5.4 Discussion
The aim of the third experiment was to test the null causal finding of the first ex-
periment in a between-subjects design using a full-percentage scenario and without
think aloud protocol. A further aim was to test whether an interaction effect existed
between the think aloud protocol and the causal framing. An effect for the think
aloud protocol was detected, but no effect for the causal framing and no interaction
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effect. Overall, the causal framing actually produced a non-significant, but lower,
level of accuracy. Therefore the first and second hypotheses, of a think-aloud ef-
fect and a null overall causal effect, were confirmed. However, the hypothesised
interaction effect between think aloud and causal was not detected.
The results of this experiment suggest that the null finding for the causal framing
in experiment one were not due to the within-subjects nature of that experiment,
nor to do with the use of integer base rates or the use of a think aloud protocol.
The results therefore give further evidence against Krynski and Tenenbaum’s the-
ory that, firstly, participants represent simple Bayesian word problems as a causal
mental model, and secondly, that providing the second ’hidden’ cause in the medical




The majority of previous work using the ‘outside view’ percentage format (e.g.
Macchi, 2000; Fiedler et al, 2000; Experiment one) has provided participants with
either a population value or a base rate in ‘integer’ form in the problem text used.
Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss and Martignon (2002) theorised that this may have
encouraged participants to construct a ‘natural frequency’ representation of the
problem, and that this may be the reason for the effect of the nested sets framing.
However, experiment two provided percentage base rates, no real-number figures at
all and still found increased accuracy with the nested sets framing. This suggests
that the provision of the real-number population / base rates cannot account for the
‘nested sets’ effect. However, it is important to note that accuracy in experiment
two was considerably lower than an equivalent condition in experiment one. The
only two differences between these conditions is the use of a population figure and
real-number base rates and the overall study design (within subjects vs between
subjects). This suggests that one or both of these factors may increase accuracy
on Bayesian word problems. Further, experiments two and three found that a large
proportion of participants who were not provided with integer population figures
constructed such a figure for themselves in the early stages of solution of the problem.
This ‘conversion’ of the problem into integers was also highly associated with success
on the problem, with the participants who converted significantly outperforming
those who did not. These two converging pieces of evidence suggest that providing
problem solvers with a population figure may increase accuracy. The first aim of the
Part I Section 6.2
present study is therefore to experimentally compare the provision of a real-number
population figure to no figure to determine if solver accuracy is affected.
Previous work (Experiment one; Experiment two; Experiment three) has also
discovered the importance of the ’nested sets process’ in the successful solution
of Bayesian problems. However, these experiments were confined to correlational
analyses with no attempt to experimentally test this connection. Cosmides and
Tooby (1996), in one experiment in their paper, provided participants with leading
questions which, in the language of the present studies, encouraged individuals to
complete what have here been named computational steps one and two in a ’disease’
problem. They found a 20% greater accuracy with leading questions, but this differ-
ence was not significant in their paper. Their analysis however included a very low
sample size and so is very likely to have lacked the power to detect an effect of this
size or smaller. The second aim of the present experiment is therefore two prompt
participants to make step one and two calculations to determine if this increases
their accuracy on Bayesian word problems.
Based on previous work it was hypothesised that the group provided with the
population value would show a significantly higher accuracy rate than the group
with no population value. It was also hypothesised that each leading question (step
one and step two) would increase accuracy alone and that both questions combined
would increase accuracy further.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
From an original sample of 419 participants, 15 were removed because they stated
they had undertaken the same problem in the past. The 10% of participants with
the fastest completion times were also removed as their completion times (<1.5
minutes) were considered to be unlikely to be conducive to an engaged completion
of the problem. The final sample was 364. Participant demographics can be found
108
Part I Section 6.2
in Table 1.
6.2.2 Design and Materials
The study was a between-subjects 2 (population figure provided vs no figure) x 2
(step one questions vs none) x 2 (step two question vs none) design resulting in eight
conditions: no-population-no-steps; no-population-step-1; no-population-step-2; no-
population-both-steps; population-no-steps; population-step-1;population-step-2;population-
both-steps. The study was an online survey which participants accessed through
their own computers. A version of the classic medical diagnosis problem (Eddy
1982; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) was used in all eight conditions which can
be seen below along with all four questions, and the two phrases inserted for the
population and non-population conditions:
Every year the government advises women to take part in routine mam-
mography screening using an X-ray machine to determine if they have
breast cancer.
[Pop: Out of 1,000 women at age forty] [Non-pop: Among women at age
forty] who participate in this routine screening 10% have breast cancer,
while 90% do not.
However the screening test is not always accurate.
Specifically, out of those women who have breast cancer, only 76% will
actually get a positive mammography.
Furthermore, out of all those women who do not have breast cancer, 15%
will also get a positive mammography.
1. What percentage of women have cancer and a positive result?
2. What percentage of women have no cancer but still received a positive
result?
3. What percentage of women receive a positive result in total?
4. What percentage of women at age forty who get a positive mammog-
raphy in routine screening actually have breast cancer?
Participants in the no-leading questions conditions were only presented with
question 4; those in the step one conditions were presented with questions 1, 2 and
4; those in the step two conditions were presented with question 3 and 4. Finally
participants in the step one and step two combined conditions were presented with
109
Part I Section 6.3
all four questions. Each of these conditions was presented in ’population’ and non-
population versions.
6.2.3 Procedure
Participants were recruited through the Amazon MTurk outsourcing service. Par-
ticipants were presented with the consent form, and then the instructions for the
study. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions. For
each problem they were presented with the problem text and then were presented
with each question on a separate page and were required to click next to access each
subsequent question. They were also provided with a link to an online calculator
wherever a calculation was required. Finally they answered the demographic ques-
tions and a final question regarding whether they had undertaken the problem in
the study before.
6.2.4 Data Analysis
Answers within 1% of the correct answer were accepted as correct. Further, the
answer corresponding to calculation of the wrong conjunction (i.e. giving the rate
of ‘no cancer’ instead of ‘cancer’), which had been identified in experiment one and
two was also accepted as it demonstrates accurate Bayesian reasoning while simply
failing in misreading which conjunction was required. Answers within 1% of this
were also accepted. Three answers of this type were given.
6.3 Results
Firstly, the percentage of solvers providing the normative answer showed no signif-
icant difference ( = .182, p=.670) between those participants who were provided
with a ‘100’ population and those who were not.
In Figure 6.1 below the percentage accuracy can be seen across the four ‘question’
conditions for all four questions asked (the population / non-population condition
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distinction has been collapsed due to the null finding). P(H|D) accuracy is shown
in purple, and is also included for the condition from experiment two which used
an identical scenario to condition one (it did not include any leading questions) but
included a think aloud protocol. 16.7% accuracy was seen in that previous work,
while 5.1% accuracy was seen in condition one in the present study, which is a
significant difference ( = 5.900, p=.015). In further comparison to condition one,
condition two, which included H&D and H&D questions produced 7.6% accuracy (
= .530, p=.467), while condition three produced 6.5% accuracy ( = .174, p=.676).
Neither of these results were significantly different to condition one. Condition
four however, produced 13.4% accuracy, which was significantly higher than the
control condition ( = .4114, p=.043). A further analysis of the step one and step
two question separately across all four conditions demonstrated a trend towards
significance for the step one questions ( = 2.774, p=.096) while the step two questions
did not show a significant result ( = 1.615, p=.204).
Fig. 6.1: Percentage accuracy for all questions asked for all four conditions in the present
study plus equivalent experiment two condition
It is also immediately clear from Figure 6.1 that accuracy on step one and two
111
Part I Section 6.3
questions was substantially higher than the accuracy for the final question, P(H|D).
In condition four, 31.4% of those who answered the step two question correctly
also answered the P(H|D) question correctly. Conversely, no one who failed to
answer the step two question answered the P(H|D) question correctly. This was a
significant difference ( = 16.4, p<.001). This pattern also held in condition three,
where 16.7% of those who answered the step two question correctly also answered
P(H|D) correctly, while only 1.6% of those who failed the step two question answered
P(H|D) correctly. This difference was also found to be significant ( = 7.657, p=.006).
Similarly for the step one H&D and H&D questions, in condition two only 1.9%
of those who got these questions wrong subsequently answered the final question
correctly and in condition four this figure was 2.8%. However out of those who
got these questions correct in condition two, 27.3% got the final answer correct and
in condition four this figure was 33.3%. This difference in final solution accuracy
between those who answered the step one questions correct was significant for both
condition two ( = 15.9, p<.001) and condition four (χ2 = 11.1, p=.001).
Overall, accuracy on the H&D step one question was considerably higher than
accuracy on the H&D question (χ2 = 15.2, p<.001). Accuracy on the H&D question
was predictive of step two accuracy in condition four (χ2 = 12.017, p<.001) but when
H&D accuracy was added to the model, H&D ceased to be a predictive factor (χ2
= 1.428, p=.232), while H&D remained highly significant (χ2 = 15.060, p<.001).
Similarly, the H&D question was predictive of step three accuracy in conditions 2 (χ2
= 4.524, p=.033) and 4 (χ2 = 4.657, p=.031), but again ceased to be a significant
predictor when H&D was added to the model (condition two [χ2 = .414, p=.520];
condition four [χ2 = .683, p=.408]) while H&D remained a significant predictor in
both conditions (condition two [χ2 = 13.016, p<.001]; condition four [χ2 = 4.732,
p=.030]).
Further, in condition four, when H&D, -H&D and step two accuracy were all
included as independent factors in a model predicting step three accuracy, H&D did
not act as a significant predictor (χ2 = .870, p=.351), -H&D did not act a significant
112
Part I Section 6.4




The control condition in the present study produced considerably lower accuracy
than the equivalent condition in experiment two. The two studies used the same
population and exactly the same problem. The only difference between the two was
the inclusion of a think aloud protocol in experiment two. The control condition in
the present study also performed at a similar level to Micallef et al (2012) (around
6%), who used a natural frequency version of the medical diagnosis problem in
the general population (also using MTurk) but with no think aloud protocol. This
suggests that such a protocol increases accuracy (to an equal or greater extent than
the provision of all three leading questions in this study).
6.4.2 Population Prompt
The present work found no relationship between the provision of a ‘100’ popula-
tion sample and accuracy on the problem. This difference was firstly hypothesised
because previous work (Hoffrage et al, 2002) had theorised that the provision of
integer populations and base rates was behind a large proportion of the success of
the nested sets approach. Further however, experiment two found a strong relation-
ship between the construction of a population sample in their ‘think aloud’ data
and success on the problem. Based principally on these correlational results and a
mediation analysis the causal theory was proposed in which individuals who convert
the problem in to integers are more likely to be able to construct the hypothesis and
Data-focused Representations which are themselves highly predictive of success.
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6.4.3 Leading Questions
A non-significant increase in accuracy was seen for the provision of both step one
and step two questions separately. However a significant and substantial increase
was seen for the provision of both together. Overall this suggests that encourag-
ing individuals to undertake the steps identified in the nested sets process model
in experiment one can increase accuracy but only in combination. This is in line
with previous work (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996) who actually found a larger (20%)
increase with the provision of the same leading questions, but may have lacked statis-
tical power due to small sample size. This result suggests that the provision of such
questions can be an efficacious way to increase accuracy on Bayesian problems. Con-
siderably lower accuracy was seen in this experiment on the final question (P[H|D])
compared to the leading questions. Further, successful completion of the leading
questions was, while highly related to success, considerably less so than the compa-
rable computational steps in experiment two. This again appears in contradiction
to the correlational findings of experiment two which found that the successful com-
pletion of step one (Questions one and two) and step two near-guaranteed success
on the P(H|D) question. A notable major difference between these two works is that
the result from experiment two is correlational while the present was experimental.
This may shed further light on the nature of the process being undertaken by par-
ticipants. It has been theorised above, in regards to the finding that the population
figure does not facilitate performance, that participants may therefore have a broad
conception of the two representations of the problem before attempting a mathe-
matical solution to the problem. The present result may suggest that the same is
true for the computational steps also, and by extension, the entire process. In ex-
periment two successful participants may have had a rough or conceptual idea of the
entire process they would go through to solve the problem before making any actual
calculation. Therefore participants who completed the computational steps or the
two representations in experiment two did so in general because they were likely to
have done so because they were working towards a pre-conceived successful solution
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procedure. However in the present study, participants were forced to answer the
computational step questions regardless of whether they had the correct solution
procedure in mind or not. Therefore some participants who did not know how to
solve the problem would still have been able to solve the earlier computational ques-
tions (which were easier, according to the results of the present experiment). This
suggests that the conjecture in experiment two that the successful construction of
the Hypothesis-focused Representation of the problem is not the near-guarantor of
success that it was claimed to be. In fact encouraging individuals to construct this
representation (by forcing them to make the step one calculations) did not increase
accuracy significantly at all. One issue with this conclusion is that participants
were not provided an overview of the steps they needed to undertake to solve the
problem. They were presented with four questions which they may have considered
to be entirely disconnected from each other. They may not have recognised that
they were being intentionally drawn through a single solution process and so when
they arrived at the final question, many participants may not have even attempted
to use the knowledge gained from the previous questions in their answer, and may
not have seen the connection at all. Given the previous conclusion that participants
appear to be broadly conceptualising a solution procedure before attempting any
mathematics (and before writing anything in their think aloud answer), this sug-
gests that leading questions (while beneficial, according to this study) may not be
the best approach to increasing accuracy. Instead of forcing participants to blindly
compute each step in the hope that they will perceive the correct solution process
it may be more beneficial to provide prompts which help individuals perceive the
correct solution procedure in rough form. The findings of the present experiment
in combination with experiment two suggest that it is this rough conceptualisation
of the nested sets process which is the greatest guarantor of success on Bayesian
problems. This may be done through Hypothesis-focused Representation diagrams
(which some previous work e.g. Sloman et al [2003] has found success with) or in
combination with Data-focused Representation diagrams (which no previous work
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has attempted).
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7 Part I Discussion
7.1 The Nested Sets Approach
In two experiments (one and two), altering Bayesian problems to use Macchi’s (2000)
outside-framed percentages instead of inside-framed percentages for the false positive
(both) and true positive (experiment two only) rates, as well as for the question
format (both) has been demonstrated to increase participant accuracy rates for the
normative answer. This effect was consistently produced in both simple and complex
(including false negatives) problems, with whole numbers and with decimals and
with base rate information in both integer and percentage forms. In experiment
one it was also found to be present within both low and high numeracy groups and
across two experiments it has been shown to increase accuracy using both within
and between subjects designs.
7.2 Step One versus Step Two
In a deeper analysis of Macchi’s outside-framed approach, results from experiments
one and two have both demonstrated that Macchi’s approach has a large impact on
the frequency with which individuals produce the Hypothesis-focused Representa-
tion. As the drop-off curves for both experiments demonstrate, the clear difference
between the nested and non-nested conditions is that substantially more individ-
uals in the nested sets condition produce the Hypothesis-focused Representation
and computational step one. However, as the drop-off graphs suggest, and statis-
tical analysis in both experiments further demonstrates, when controlling for the
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presence of the Hypothesis-focused Representation (or computational step one), the
outside-frame approach does not increase the frequency of Data-focused Represen-
tations (or computational step two). This can be seen visually in the flattening
of the drop-off curves after the Hypothesis-focused Representation / computational
step one. This conjecture was given further tentative evidence by the results of
experiment four, which showed higher accuracy on earlier stage leading questions
(e.g. step one) compared to later stage (e.g. step three).
As stated previously, the outside-frame approach makes changes to both the
body text and the question format. The information regarding the Hypothesis-
focused Representation / computational step one is contained within the body of
the text of the problem, while the Data-focused Representation / computational
steps 2 and 3 are contained within the question. Based on the above analysis, Mac-
chi’s approach is successful in improving the frequency of the Hypothesis-focused
Representation and computational step one, but is having no impact on the fre-
quency of the Data-focused Representation or computational step two other than
indirectly via that increase in the Hypothesis-focused Representation and compu-
tational step one, which themselves increase the likelihood of individuals achieving
the later steps. This possibility is given further evidence by the result of experiment
two demonstrating that in the nested sets conditions, the most common error ap-
peared to be, according to the think aloud data, due to a confusion in regards to
the question being asked.
These results fits with Evans et al. (2000) who found no difference between two
question formats very similar to those compared in the present study (‘individual
percentages’ (inside) vs ‘proportionate percentages’ (outside)). It also fits with
results by Fiedler et al (2000) who found a non-significant difference between a
Bayesian problem with an outside-framed text body but inside-framed question and
a natural frequency version of the same problem. It does not as easily fit, however,
with work by Girotto & Gonzalez (2001) who found an effect on accuracy by altering
the question form only. However, the changes made by Girotto and Gonzalez were
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somewhat different: they included two ‘steps’ in their question, asking solvers to
first calculate D separately (i.e. the total number of positive results) and only then
to calculation P(H|D).
In combination these results suggest that a simple flip of the question form
from inside to outside perspective may not be a sufficient intervention to improve
accuracy, and tentatively suggest that the same results would have been seen for
Macchi’s outside-framed approach in the present experiment if the question form
had not been changed at all. However, a more involved change directly requesting
D prior to calculation of the final product, may have impact, as demonstrated by
Girotto and Gonzalez (2001). This therefore suggests that future work may benefit
from further enhancing the question form, with an aim of encouraging individuals
to construct the Data-focused Representation at the correct time in the solution
process in order to convert a greater percentage of those individuals successfully
completing the Hypothesis-focused Representation into individuals providing the
full normative Bayesian answer.
7.3 Process Model
Based upon the think aloud data in experiment one, a five-stage process was pro-
posed and was purported to be used by the vast majority of participants who pro-
vided the normative answer. This process involved two representations of the prob-
lem and 3 computational steps. This model built upon and formalised a large amount
of theoretical work in the previous literature and also introduced novel contributions,
including a distinction between the Hypothesis and Data-focused Representations
of the problem, previously missing from the literature. This process was present in
the data of the vast majority of successful solvers in all four conditions, including
the control and causal conditions, suggesting that it is the preferred solution pro-
cess of successful solvers, regardless of particular framing / prompts. This finding
runs counter to a commonly-held view in the field that the ’default’ problem-solving
perspective in the absence of any specific prompt was the ’inside’ or ’individual’
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perspective (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Sloman et al, 2003). In experiments
one. two and three a large proportion of individuals spontaneously adopted the out-
side perspective and followed the nested sets process in the absence of any specific
prompt to do so (e.g. in the ’inside’ and ’causal’ conditions). These findings con-
tribute to the aim of Johnson and Tubau (2015) to gain a greater understanding of
why leading facilitative approaches to Bayesian problems achieve their success. The
answer, based on this work, is that they do so because they encourage individuals
to follow the same process which successful individuals independently adopt even in
the absence of such approaches.
Experiment two furthered this finding by demonstrating that successful indi-
viduals also follow the nested sets process when presented with decimal numbers,
whole numbers and percentages. Experiment four, cementing the importance of the
nested sets process found that providing individuals with step one and step two
leading questions increases their accuracy on Bayesian problems by 8.3% (previous
work by Cosmides and Tooby (1996) found a 20% increase in accuracy, but lacked
statistical power).
Previous work (e.g. Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001) has also shown that participants
are facilitated by an ‘outside view’ structure with the abstract units of ‘chance’ (al-
though see Brase [2013] for a reinterpretation of that work). Further, work by Sirota,
Juanchich and Hagmayer (2014) has demonstrated that increased accuracy with an
outside-frame approach can be seen when divisible units such as ‘mgs of wheat’ are
used, as opposed to ‘whole’ units such as a ‘bag of wheat’, which was predicted
would not be the case by Brase (2007). While overall this experiment has found
an overall (but far from total) preference for integers as opposed to percentages,
no preference was seen for whole numbers over decimal values. These findings in
combination contradict some previous theorising by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995),
Brase (2007) and Cosmides and Tooby (1996) who theorised that “if there are [men-
tal] mechanisms which represent frequencies in terms of discrete, countable entities,
it should be difficult to think about a tenth of a person, and therefore the level of
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Bayesian performance should decrease.” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996, pp. 55).
In opposition to this view, the present findings combined with previous (Girotto
& Gonzalez, 2003; Sirota, Juanchich & Hagmayer, 2014) suggest that problem
solvers are able to solve Bayesian problems using a vast range of different units
(although there may be some preference for particular values, such as integers) so
long as they are guided to follow the nested sets process model outlined in this paper.
These findings emphasise that it is the process which is most integral to solution,
and not the particular unit of analysis.
Future work may be beneficial in determining the role that individual differences
play in unit preference. The present methodology was not able to determine why
some participants more able to solve the problem by converting to integers and
some participants able to solve with percentages. However, high numeracy levels
and familiarity with percentages are proposed as plausible factors for future work
to consider.
7.4 Drop Off and Problem Difficulty
Experiments one and two both demonstrated that out of those participants who
failed to achieve success on the problem, the majority failed at the representa-
tion one / computational step one phase, while a smaller proportion failed at later
stages. This finding was echoed by data on numeracy levels from experiment one
which showed that the numeracy levels of individuals achieving the later stages of
the process was higher than those who only achieved representation one / computa-
tional step one, which was in turn higher than those who achieved no steps. These
correlational findings were broadly confirmed in experiment four which showed that
participants found the earlier questions (e.g. step one) easier than the later ques-
tions (e.g. step three). Overall these findings suggest that the later steps in the
nested sets process may be more difficult, and require greater numerical ability to
undertake than earlier steps. These findings go some way towards providing the un-
derstanding of the stages at which problem solvers err (Johnson and Tubau, 2015).
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It also again suggests that future work should focus more on altering the question
form (which contains the information for the later steps) than the body of the text.
7.5 Nested Sets versus Natural Frequencies
While a direct contrast was not possible, a comparison between experiment one and
Macchi (2000), which both used integer base rates, and experiment two, which used
percentage, suggests there may be a further increase in accuracy when integers are
used. Further evidence for this comes from the fact that 60% of successful indi-
viduals in experiment two, and 50% in experiment three, converted the problem
from percentage form to integer form. This gives some support to Hoffrage et al.’s
(2002) conjecture that the nested sets outside-percentage format may work via en-
couraging individuals to construct a natural frequency version of the problem for
themselves. However, while the tendency for people to prefer to work with integers
appears clear, it is important to recognise that a large proportion of individuals in
both experiments correctly solved the problem using the same process, but entirely
using percentages. This may not sit well with some evolutionary explanations for
the benefits of natural frequency formats that assume such formats should be ben-
eficial for everyone (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996). However, it is not as obviously
contradictory to theoretical work by Brase (2008) who labelled natural frequencies
as a ’privileged’ format, and stated that, while the brain systems designed to process
natural frequencies will always prefer that format, they can be persuaded to work
on other formats, albeit with lesser efficiency. The present finding, that some indi-
viduals were able to work through the problem using percentages, while others felt
the need to convert to natural frequencies to solve the problem, fits with this view.
However, it should be noted that it is difficult to distinguish between participants’
preference for integers due to a greater familiarity with them, and the frequentist
proposal that our evolutionary history has designed our brain to deal with them
more effectively.
This finding fits well with some previous work. Brase (2013) showed participants
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ambiguous ‘chance’ wording Bayesian problems (adapted from Girotto and Gonza-
lez, 2001) and found that individuals who interpreted the problems as frequencies
(i.e. integers) were more successful than those who interpreted the problem as prob-
abilities. The present work suggests that these frequency-interpreting individuals
may have constructed a ‘integer’ sample for themselves, and that this may have led
to their greater increase in accuracy in that study by encouraging them to follow
the nested sets process.
In temperance of this view however, an experimental attempt to increase accu-
racy by providing participants with a integer population rate failed in experiment
four. This finding casts doubt on the causal account developed above in which con-
version of the problem leads to participants following the nested sets process and
ultimately, to the normative answer. Instead, the results of experiment four ten-
tatively suggest the possibility that the direction of the causal relationship may be
the opposite: it may be that those participants who perceive the hypothesis and
Data-focused Representations are subsequently more likely to construct a integer
sample. Since conversion of the problem tends to come ’before’ the presentation of
either of these representations in the think aloud data, for this theory to be true, we
must make the further assumption that successful participants, when faced with the
problem, firstly construct a rough mental solution procedure (in terms of the steps
of the nested sets process) and may then use their preferred unit to work through
the problem (with the majority preferring integers).
This theory, if accurate, would suggest that the use of integers is not causally
linked to success on the problem at all, in contrast to Hoffrage et al’s (2002) con-
jecture, and much previous theorising by frequentist theorists (e.g. Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Brase, 2007). It suggests that correct
application of the nested sets process are the main determinants of success and
that the construction of a integer population merely helps some individuals (60% in
experiment two) work through the subsequent mathematics.
One final assumption of this theory required to account for the relationship be-
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tween conversion to integers and success in experiment two is that participants who
approach the problem in erroneous ways are less likely to convert to integers to solve
the problem. This may be a reasonable assumption as the vast majority of incorrect
answers (such as the two most common P(D|H) and 1-(P[D|-H) errors) are mathe-
matically simpler than the correct answer and so may be more achievable with out
conversion, if the function of conversion, as theorised above, is to allow individuals
to work through difficult mathematical steps. This assumption is given some evi-
dence by the fact that integer conversion was not significantly related to success on
the problem after controlling for the hypothesis and Data-focused Representations
in experiment two.
7.6 Causal Framing
No effect was found across two experiments (one and three) for Krynski and Tenen-
baum’s (2007) causal framing. The null finding was found for the medical diagnosis
problem and three other novel problems with integer base rates in experiment one
for high and low numerates within the general population in a within subjects de-
sign. It was also found with a between subjects design with and without a think
aloud protocol and with percentage base rates in experiment three.
Several things should be noted about this null finding. Firstly, all of the repli-
cations of Krynski and Tenenbaum’s (2007) findings, including the present, have
focused on the medical diagnosis problem. While it appears, given the mixed re-
sults of previous work, and the present, that this effect does not reliably replicate,
it is quite possible that a causal framing would be assistive in other problems, in-
cluding the other problems included in that original paper. Secondly it should also
be strongly noted that the author does not consider that the null finding and sub-
sequent theorising in this paper discredits Krynski and Tenenbaum’s (2007) causal
account of Bayesian reasoning in general. The present experiments examined rel-
atively simple Bayesian problems which may be very different from the Bayesian
situations that people deal with in everyday life, (from which Krynski and Tenen-
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baum’s theory was derived). If it is, in fact, the case that the proposed process
model is the best description of human reasoning in the simple Bayesian problems
in the present study it does not necessarily follow that this will hold in more complex
situations. In fact, given that the process that humans take in these simple problems
appears to be non-intuitive (Lesage, Navarrete, & De Neys, 2013; Sirota, Juanchich,
& Hagmayer, 2014) it seems likely that as the variables increase and the quality of
information decreases (such as in the real life situations discussed by Krynski and
Tenenbaum), such a reasoned approach will become impossible and a different ap-
proach entirely (e.g. intuitive estimates) will become the dominant approach. It is
perfectly plausible that in these more realistic situations a causal model will predict
and describe human decision making more accurately. More work in these complex
situations would therefore be valuable to provide a more thorough understanding of
human Bayesian reasoning.
7.7 Think Aloud Protocol
Several strands of evidence from experiments one to four suggest that the use of
a think aloud protocol increases accuracy on Bayesian word problems. This was
demonstrated firstly in a comparison of the control condition in experiment four to
the equivalent condition in experiment two and who used the same participant pool
(mTurk workers with the same requirements). In the non-think-aloud experiment
four condition, 5.1% accuracy was seen, while in the think-aloud condition in ex-
periment two 16.7% accuracy was seen. This compares closely to the more direct
comparison made in experiment three: here large differences between non-think-
aloud and think aloud conditions were seen both for the non-causal (5.8% vs 18.4%)
and causal (3.5% vs 9.4%) conditions. Combining these three comparisons, the ad-
dition of a think aloud protocol appears to provide a 9.8% increase in individuals
providing the correct answer, from 4.8% (16 / 333) to 14.6% (37 / 254).
Despite many theoretical suggestions to this effect previously (e.g. Wilson, 1994)
and similar findings in related situations (Kim, 2002), this is the first time to the
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authors’ knowledge that this has been demonstrated empirically on a Bayesian word
problem. While it is not possible to directly test whether the think aloud protocol
changes the nature of the cognitive processes individuals follow, as Ericsson and
Simon (1998) have maintained, it does appear to change outcome in this case.
The think aloud protocol requires individuals to work through the problem before
providing their numerical answer. The fact that this process increases accuracy so
substantially therefore may suggest that some part of inaccuracy on these problems
may be due to a lack of sufficient engagement on the part of participants in non-
write-aloud experiments. This fits with some findings from experiment two who
found that the two most common errors made by individuals who do not provide
the normative answer were due to a misunderstanding of either the false positive
rate, or the meaning of the question. The forced contemplation provided by the
think aloud protocol may provide the opportunity to avoid such confusion. It also
fits with previous work by Sirota, Juanchich & Hagmayer (2014) who found that
accuracy on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), designed to test the capacity
to ignore incorrect intuitive responses and inspect more deeply into the problem
showed greater predictive power for accuracy on Bayesian problems than any other
measure including cognitive ability. This analysis leads to two conclusions. The
first is that understanding of simple Bayesian problems in real situations, such as
where a patient is attempting to understand their chance of having a disease after
routine screening, is likely to be higher than the rates found in experiments such
as the present due to the presumed greater engagement such a patient would have
for understanding their risk. The second is that overall engagement is a promising
target for future interventions to increase Bayesian accuracy.
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7.8 The Confusion Hypothesis and Base Rate Ne-
glect
In experiment two, think aloud data revealed the 1-P(D|-H) error as the most fre-
quently observed among incorrect answers in the inside-frame conditions. This an-
swer, along with P(D|H), has been the most frequent answer labelled ‘base rate
neglect’ by previous work, as it only utilises the ‘new data’ and does not incorporate
the ‘prior’ or base-rate in its calculation. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; Casscells
et al, 1978; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Evans et al, 2000; Barbey
& Sloman, 2007). Barbey and Sloman (2007) theorized that this type of error was
caused by an over-reliance on ‘associative’ processing systems (e.g. Sloman et al,
2003) as opposed to ‘rule-based’ processing systems. However, the analysis of the
most prominent identified reason for this error does not fit well with this view. The
predominant identified error in reasoning in the process was a misunderstanding
of the meaning of the false positive rate. Participants committing this error took
this rate to mean ‘the total number of positive results which were in fact false’, a
confusion of P(D|-H) with P(-H|D). This error in reasoning is also known as the
‘transposed conditional’ fallacy (Foreman et al, 2005), or the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’,
in law (e.g. Fenton & Neil, 2011; Nance & Morris, 2005). Importantly, the partic-
ipants’ reasoning following this misunderstanding was in fact sound: 100% minus
this rate, as interpreted and in a problem with only two possible causes of positive
results, would indeed give the percentage of positive results which were true, which
is the answer to the question. There is no evidence therefore that this approach to
the problem was less ‘rule-based’ (Barbey & Sloman, 2007) than the correct answer.
Allowing for the single misunderstanding of the false positive rate, the reasoning
process was sound. This also does not fit well with Bar-Hillel’s (1980) dominance
view of base rate neglect. Bar-Hillel theorised that the less ‘relevant’ piece of data in
a Bayesian problem was ‘dominated’ by the more relevant piece, and was ‘discarded’
entirely. Conversely this finding suggests that the ‘base rate neglect’ answer is ar-
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rived at through an erroneous reasoning process, rather than a simple discarding of
one piece of data. It further suggests that that title is not an appropriate description
of the error, as others have previously noted (e.g. Hamm, 1987; Hamm & Miller,
1988; Wolfe, 1995).
The finding fits more closely with previous authors who have theorized that
semantic misunderstanding of problem texts lies behind many errors on Bayesian
problems (e.g. Hamm, 1988; Hamm and Miller, 1990; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995;
Macchi, 2000; Wolfe, 1995; Macchi and Mosconi, 1998; Macchi, 2000; Fiedler et al.,
2000; Welsh and Navarro, 2012). The finding also fits with previous work which
has theorised a similar ‘confusion’ hypothesis (Braine and Connell, 1990; Cohen,
1981; Dawes, 1986; Eddy, 1982; Hamm and Miller, 1990; Fiedler et al., 2000) for
the other major answer labelled as base rate neglect: providing the variable P(D|H)
(the true positive rate). The confusion hypothesis has theorised that this is due
to a complete misunderstanding of the difference between P(D|H) and the correct
answer, P(H|D). In the present paper a similar confusion was seen, but in this case
the confusion was between P(D|-H) and P(-H|D). Evans et al. (2000) did not use a
think aloud protocol to analyse errors but also theorised that this error was because
“participants misinterpret the false positive rate (5%) as the overall error rate of the
test and therefore assume that it is correct 95% of the time.” (Evans et al. 2000,
pp. 199). The present finding confirms this conjecture.
Confusion of an element of the text was also the most prominent reasoning error
uncovered in the outside-framed conditions in experiment two. The most common
error in those conditions was to provide the conjunction (H&D), the number of
women with cancer and a positive result. It proved more difficult to discern a general
reasoning error behind this mistake. However, the most frequent reason identified
was a mis-reading of the question, wherein participants seemed to be searching for
‘the percentage of all women with a positive result and breast cancer’, rather than
‘the percentage of women with a positive result who actually have breast cancer’.
This perspective again fits closely with previous authors who have theorized that
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semantic misunderstanding lies behind many errors on Bayesian word problems (e.g.
Gigerenzer, 1996; Macchi, 1995; Macchi & Mosconi, 1998; Macchi, 2000; Welsh and
Navarro, 2012). This suggests that future work looking to reduce this error should
focus on making the question clearer, perhaps using Girotto and Gonzalez’s (2001)
two-step method.
7.9 Conclusion, Impact and Future Work
The present section has demonstrated the efficacy of Macchi’s (2000) outside-framed
approach to improving accuracy on Bayesian word problems across two experiments
with within and between subjects designs, with and without the possibility for false
negatives, with percentage and integer base rates and with whole number and deci-
mal values. It was also found to be efficacious within high and low numeracy groups.
Macchi’s approach can therefore be recommended for improving the presentation of
Bayesian problems to the general public in a wide range of situations, including in
medical contexts.
The present section has also demonstrated that Macchi’s (2000) outside-framed
approach could be improved further. Analysis over two experiments suggest that
the improvement in accuracy seen as a result of using Macchi’s framing is due to the
changes to the body of the text, and that the changes to the question form may be
superfluous. Further however, drawing on other previous work such as Girotto and
Gonzalez (2001), it appears that more-extensive alterations to the question form
can improve accuracy. Future work is therefore recommended either in combining
Macchi’s text body with Girotto and Gonzalez’s question form, or attempting to
improving Macchi’s question form to further increase accuracy. Such work should
also focus on improving the clarity of that question form to reduce the chance of
individuals misinterpreting it to mean the percentage of women with cancer and a
positive result (the most common error in the nested sets condition in experiment
two).
The present section has also demonstrated that, regardless of specific problem
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framing (either inside-frame, outside-frame or causal framing), successful individ-
uals overwhelmingly follow a single solution process. This process was defined in
experiment one and comprised five stages. An intervention experiment encourag-
ing individuals to follow these steps prior to giving their final answer also found
an increase in accuracy. Given the ubiquity of this process across framing types,
it is suggested that this process may be the preferred approach of the majority of
individuals, and therefore future attempts to improve accuracy on Bayesian prob-
lems should use it as a framework to guide their design of interventions. Future
interventions should be designed to make it as easy as possible for solvers to follow
this five-stage process, rather than attempt to encourage them to solve the problem
in some entirely different manner. Further, these interventions should be focused
principally on encouraging the later steps in this process, as these appear to be more
difficult and require greater numerical ability, to achieve.
In the longstanding debate over the relative distinctiveness of the nested sets
and natural frequency approaches to increasing accuracy on Bayesian problems, the
present section also contributes valuable findings and theoretical developments. In
both the nested sets and natural frequency literature, the same underlying process
has been hinted at, which has here been formally outlined for the first time as the
’nested sets process’. It has been named this, rather than the ’natural frequency
process’ because evidence from experiment two and three, while indeed suggesting
a slim majority preference for integers (60% in experiment two, 50% in experiment
three), has shown that many individuals are fully capable of undertaking the same
basic process with non-integers. Combined with previous findings (e.g. Girotto and
Gonzalez, 2011; Sirota, Juanchich & Hagmayer, 2014) there is converging evidence
that individuals can solve Bayesian problems using a range of ’units’ other than
whole integers, or even integers at all. This suggests that while there may be some
preference for particular units of analysis, this is considerably less important than
the process itself, which has been the central message of the nested sets approach for
several decades (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Macchi, 1995; Macchi and Mosconi,
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1998; Lewis and Keren, 1999; Mellers and McGraw, 1999; Macchi, 2000; Evans et al.,
2000; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001; Sloman et al., 2003). Further, in the debate over
the cause of error on Bayesian problems, experiment two has contributed several
valuable findings. It was determined through analysis of the think aloud data that
the two of the most common causes of error were due to misunderstanding of, firstly,
the meaning of the false positive rate and secondly, the figure that the questions was
requesting. This finding provides evidence towards the ’Confusion Hypothesis’ view
of error on Bayesian problems (Cohen, 1981; Eddy, 1982; Dawes, 1986; Hamm, 1988;
Hamm and Miller, 1990; Braine and Connell, 1990; Gigerenzer, 1996; Macchi, 1995;
Wolfe, 1995; Macchi and Mosconi, 1998; Macchi, 2000; Fiedler et al., 2000; Welsh
and Navarro, 2012) and against the base rate neglect view of error(Kahneman and
Tversky, 1972; Ajzen, 1977; Casscells et al., 1978; Bar-Hillel, 1980). In addition,
the present section has found that the mere addition of a think aloud protocol can
increase accuracy considerably. This process forces individually to engage with the
problem before they can provide a numerical answer. This finding may therefore
suggest that engagement is a major factor in inaccuracy on Bayesian problems,
and that this may be a sensible target for accuracy improvement interventions.
Further, while a think aloud protocol has here been advocated, it has also been noted
that the approach can under-detect certain mental processes e.g. when participants
only provide mathematical notation and do not explain their thoughts in words.
Future work therefore may be valuable in devising methods for extracting the mental
processes of solvers with greater fidelity.
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BAYESIAN REASONING IN LEGAL CASES
8 Literature Review
8.1 Bayes and Law
With the unceasing rise in technological sophistication available to modern forensic
science, the frequency with which jurors, lawyers and judges in legal trials are en-
countering evidence presented in a probabilistic format is rapidly increasing (Walsh
et al., 2004; Saks and Koehler, 2005). Unfortunately, this has not been met with
the necessary countervailing increase in education in how to incorporate this type of
evidence into legal assessments (Gigerenzer and Edwards, 2003). This discrepancy
has already lead to disastrous outcomes, with incorrect presentation assessment of
probabilistic evidence leading to many miscarriages of justice (e.g. Forrest, 2003;
Mehlum, 2009; Donnelly, 2005).
Typically, when forensic evidence of a match between a defendant and some
aspect of the crime scene (such as a DNA sample, or a foot or finger print) is
presented in court it will be in the form of a statement of the ‘random match
probability’ (RMP) of the match (Koehler et al., 1995). This is the probability
of picking a random member of the population and finding that they match the
sample, typically presented either as a percentage / probability (e.g. .0000005%)
or as a frequency (e.g. 1 in 200 million). It can also be viewed as the conditional
probability of the match occurring if the defendant was not actually the source of
the sample (often denoted as P[M|-S]).
While the RMP is most often provided in a match scenario, the necessary figure
for a jury member to assess the impact of the evidence is the probability that the
defendant is the source of the sample. Calculating this figure from the RMP is
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another instance of a situation often classed as a ’Bayesian’ problem (Bayes and
Price, 1763). Taking the legal example above, with just the single piece of ‘match’
evidence, Bayes’ rule states that the probability of the defendant being the source
of a sample found at a crime scene given that a match has been found between them
and that sample is:
Fig. 8.1: Bayes rule (Bayes and Price, 1763), developed by Laplace and Simon (1951)
There are several key terms to elucidate upon here (the following makes the
simplistic assumption that the testing of sources and suspects by the forensic teams
is error-free). P(S|M), also known as the ‘posterior’ is the probability that the
defendant is the source of the tested sample (e.g. the hair fibre / fingerprint /
footprint etc.) P(S), also known as the ‘prior’ is the probability that the defendant
is the source without considering, or ‘before’ the match evidence. While this is
in practise often highly difficult to calculate, in theory, given that we presume the
innocence of the defendant before any evidence is presented against them, they are
considered in the eyes of law equally likely to have committed the crime as all other
people who could feasibly have committed the crime (sometimes considered to be
the number (X) of people in a given area such as a city), or 1/X. Assuming only two
hypotheses, P(-S), the probability that the defendant is not the source of the sample,
is the negative of this figure or 1-(1/X). The probability of the match assumingthat
the defendant is the source (P[M|S]) is equal to 1. The probability of the match if
the defendant is not the source (P[M|-S]) is equal to the RMP, discussed above.
8.2 Cognitive Science and Legal Literatures
Unfortunately, outside of the legal realm and within the cognitive science litera-
ture, a large body of experimental research accrued over the previous 40 years has
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demonstrated that non-statisticians, when faced with even the most simple Bayesian
problems, typically make large errors in their estimates (Phillips and Edwards, 1966;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Lyon and Slovic, 1976; Ajzen, 1977; Casscells et al.,
1978; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Eddy, 1982; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Evans et al.,
2000; Macchi, 2000; Fiedler et al., 2000; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2001; Sloman et al.,
2003; Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007; Hill and Brase, 2012; Welsh and Navarro,
2012; Johnson and Tubau, 2013; McNair and Feeney, 2014a). One of the most
common errors routinely reported throughout this literature, in the language of the
legal problem above, is to substitute the probability of a match if the defendant was
not the source (P[M|-S]) with the probability of not being the source, given that a
match has occurred (P[-S|M]). This is known as the transposed conditional fallacy
within that literature, but this same error in reasoning has become notorious within
the legal literature under another name, the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’ (Thompson and
Schumann, 1987). This error has been instrumental in many miscarriages of justice,
including the infamous case of Sally Clark (see Forrest, 2003), and has also been
widely documented within the literature studying legal reasoning of match evidence,
which has developed in the previous 20 years following the rise of the routine use of
DNA evidence in legal trials and the statistical presentations which it has brought
with it (Koehler et al., 1995).
Within the cognitive science literature, developments have been made in terms
of the best method for presenting Bayesian problems to elicit accurate reasoning and
reducing errors such as the prosecutor’s fallacy. Accuracy has been increased from
as low as 18% (Casscells et al., 1978) to around 40% with the natural frequency
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) and nested sets (e.g. Macchi, 2000) approaches. In
the first part of this thesis, evidence was provided over a series of experiments
that this nested sets approach using Macchi’s outside-framed percentage format
could improve accuracy on Bayesian problems, and the underlying reasons for this
change were elucidated. Such an approach to presenting statistics in court has
never been tested within the legal literature and so may appear to be a fruitful
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avenue for reducing instances of the prosecutor’s fallacy in court rooms. However,
unfortunately the inherent structure of a typical legal situation does not lend itself to
this approach. This is because Macchi’s approach relies on changing the perspective
of the problem from a single individual (e.g. a medical patient) to a reference
group of highly similar individuals (e.g. other medical patients of the same age, etc)
and thus harnessing the problem solver’s greater capacity for thinking in terms of
groups and sets. The same process in law (the use of a reference class to infer the
probability that a defendant committed a crime) has long been considered prejudicial
and unacceptable and therefore cannot be considered a fruitful avenue for change.
For this situation therefore, new methods will need to be devised.
While the cognitive science and legal literatures studying Bayesian reasoning
have coexisted for several decades, there has been little overlap in authorship. Per-
haps partly due to this lack of overlap, there are substantial differences in the exper-
imental paradigms employed. One important difference is that the cognitive science
studies cited above have typically presented participants with Bayesian problems
which are ‘fully quantified’. By this it is meant that every variable in the Bayesian
formula above is presented to the participant in numerical format, or is derivable
from other numerical statistics presented. Within the legal literature however, every
experiment to date has presented problem solvers with a mixture of both quanti-
fied and non-quantified evidence (Thompson and Schumann, 1987; Faigman and
Baglioni, 1988; Koehler et al., 1995; Smith, 1996; Taroni and Aitken, 1998; Schklar
and Diamond, 1999; Nance and Morris, 2002, 2005; Kaye et al., 2007; Pozzulo et al.,
2009; Dartnall and Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Mnookin et al., 2011; Thompson
et al., 2013). There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. The
fully-quantified method has frequently been criticised as lacking ecological validity
(e.g. Welsh and Navarro, 2012), as Bayesian problems outside the laboratory are
rarely fully quantified. There are few better examples of this than legal cases, where
jurors are frequently asked to synthesise quantified evidence (such as a DNA match
with an RMP) with non-quantified evidence (such as an alibi, eye-witness testimony,
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etc.). However, the fully-quantified method employed in cognitive science does allow
the researcher, ideally, to assign a ‘normative standard’ to the problem, according
to Bayes’ rule, and compare solvers’ answers to this standard to determine accuracy
with greater precision. The legal literature on the other hand, has typically only been
able to demonstrate whether changes in presentation format increase or decrease es-
timates of guilt / conviction rates relative to each other, with no ability to compare
to a normative standard. Furthermore, the simplicity of the fully-quantified format
lends itself to a methodology known within that literature as a ‘think aloud’ protocol
(e.g. Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Macchi, 2000). With
this methodology the problem solver is requested to record their thought processes
during solution. It has not to date been employed within the legal literature, which
may be because the number and complexity of interpretations of mixed-evidence
formats is much higher than fully-quantified formats, making for greater variety in
data and lower ease of interpretation through qualitative analysis. Overall, the fully
quantified paradigm with think aloud protocol, while possibly less ecologically valid,
does provide a more concrete answer to the simple question of whether the solver is
able to properly undertake Bayesian inference.
8.3 The Need for Errors
A further area which urgently requires investigation is the effect of testing errors dur-
ing forensic analysis on legal Bayesian reasoning. Typically in legal trials, while the
RMP is given during forensic reporting of a match, far less frequently, the probabil-
ity of there being an error in the analysis is reported (Schklar and Diamond, 1999).
While some forensic scientists have argued in court that it is impossible to obtain a
false match using current DNA technology (Koehler, 1993) the few published profi-
ciency tests present a very different picture, showing that error probabilities ranging
between one in several hundred to one in several thousand are likely (Koehler et al.,
1995). Both error rates and the RMP each represent ways in which the match be-
tween the defendant and the source could have occurred if the defendant was in fact
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not the source: due to coincidence (the RMP) or due to a mistake (the error rate),
respectively. While both types of match errors are important to a court case, in
practice, the probative value of forensic error (which is more common with a typical
error rate of 1 in 1000) will eclipse the value of a random match (which is very
uncommon with a typical random match probability of 1 in 2,000,000). Thus foren-
sic scientists are currently frequently presenting the coincidental match probability
(the RMP) only and conveying this as highly improbable, while failing to reveal that
there is a far more probable way in which such a match may have occurred with-
out the defendant being the source (through a false positive: see Thompson et al.,
2003). This is very troubling, and has even been called ‘prejudicial’ by Koehler et al.
(1995).
It is clear therefore that any test of people’s ability to undertake a legal Bayesian
assessment must also include testing errors in the problem. Unfortunately while
some previous work has included testing errors in the problem they presented to
participants (e.g. Dartnall and Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Koehler et al., 1995;
Schklar and Diamond, 1999), some major and important simplifications of the pre-
sentations of those errors have been made. Firstly, all three of the above studies
simply presented a ’labaratory error rate’, without making it clear that there are
two types of error that can be made: a false positive, and a false negative. It may
not have been clear to participants which type of error the problem was referring
to. Secondly, especially in work such as Schklar and Diamond (1999), the analysis
of participant responses has made the implicit assumption that the RMP and foren-
sic testing errors can be dealt with in an identical mathematical way. This would
be the case if errors were only possible when testing the forensic sample from the
defendant, however, error is equally possible when testing the sample obtained from
the crime scene. This dual-role of the error rate adds a great deal of additional
complexity to the problem, and precludes a simple use of the error rate as assumed
by the above work. If error rates are to be presented in legal cases, false positives
and false negatives must be separated (they cannot be presented as a single figure),
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and the impact of that error rate must be taken into account on all tests made,
not only those on the suspect. Finally, none of these studies used a fully-quantified
approach, and were therefore unable to observe the impact of each on the entirety
of an individual’s Bayesian reasoning process. Therefore the extent to which sta-
tistically untrained individuals are capable of undertaking a Bayesian analysis of a
match case when errors are included is currently largely unknown. Successful analy-
sis may seem unlikely given the above outline of the true complexity of the addition
of forensic error (Fenton and Neil, 2011).
8.4 A New Approach
Due to this increase in complexity and the clear necessity of including testing errors,
Fenton and Neil (2011) have claimed that any approach which attempts to get jurors
or legal professionals to understand the Bayesian calculations behind a legal trial
is fruitless and should be abandoned. Instead, while the quantification of evidence
should always be undertaken by humans, the actual Bayesian calculations should be
performed by validated computer programmes such as Bayesian Network packages
(Edwards, 1991; Kadane and Schum, 1998; Aitken, 1995; Taroni and Aitken, 2006)
and trusted as mathematical fact in the same way that a calculator would be, and
has been, trusted to produce the correct answer for a large multiplication or division
(e.g. Donnelly, 2005).
The necessity of this new approach to presenting statistical formulations of legal
cases suggested by Fenton and Neil (2011) explicitly rests on the assumption that
jurors are incapable of understanding the calculations themselves. There are ex-
amples of previous legal cases where attempts to explain complex calculations have
been made, (such as R v Denis: Donnelly, 2005). However this was not considered
successful by the statistician recruited to provide the explanation.
While several strands of evidence therefore suggest it unlikely that untrained
statisticians will be able to undertake accurate Bayesian reasoning of a legal match
case with forensic errors, it remains an open empirical question. Further, if jurors are
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incapable of this, a greater understanding of the reasoning processes they undertake
are necessary to understand why they struggle, in order to inform the design of
assistive interventions. For this purpose, a think aloud protocol will be a valuable
tool (Ericsson and Simon, 1998). Finally, if jurors are not capable of undertaking
these calculations themselves, the best method for presenting the results of these




To answer the question of whether statistically untrained individuals are able to un-
dertake Bayesian reasoning of a legal match case including forensic testing errors, the
present study firstly aimed to provide participants with a fully quantified Bayesian
match problem. To further understanding of the processes individuals undertake
when attempting to reason in these situations, and the reasons those who fail to
produce the normative answer do so, the present study firstly requested participants
to provide estimates of guilt after each new piece of evidence was presented. For
this reason a ‘think aloud’ protocol (Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Gigerenzer and Hof-
frage, 1995) was also employed, which required participants to record their thought
processes while attempting to solve the problem. The combination of these two
features allows precise mapping of the change in estimates participants undertake in
response to each new piece of information as well as the cognitive processes involved
in bringing about these changes.
9.1.1 Research Question 1a
Will participants over-weight, under-weight, or appropriately-weight the random
match probability in their estimates in comparison to the Bayesian norm?
The present work is exploratory in nature, aiming to provide a first impression
of the capacity of the general public to reason through a quantified legal Bayesian
problem including forensic testing errors. When asking participants to reason about
quantified pieces of ‘match’ evidence previous work has found a range of responses,
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including over-, under- and appropriate-weighting, with under-weighting being re-
ported as most common (Faigman and Baglioni, 1988; Smith, 1996; Taroni and
Aitken, 1998; Schklar and Diamond, 1999).
9.1.2 Research Question 1b
What reasoning processes lead to this weighting of the random match probability?
Further, following the detailing of the accuracy of participants in the simple
version of the problem (without errors), the think aloud data will be explored and
analysed in order to determine the reasoning process behind participants’ numerical
answers.
9.1.3 Research Question 2a
Will participants over-weight, under-weight, or appropriately-weight the false
positive and false negative error rates in their estimates in comparison to the
Bayesian norm, and will they do this to a greater or lesser extent than for the
RMP?
While the weighting of the error rate has never been previously compared to a
fully quantified normative standard, expectation for the relative weighting of the
error rates compared tothe RMP can be drawn from three papers: Koehler et al.
(1995); Schklar and Diamond (1999); Dartnall and Goodman-Delahunty (2006).
Koehler et al. (1995) and Dartnall and Goodman-Delahunty (2006) both found that
the inclusion of the RMP in forensic testimony increased conviction rates. However,
the inclusion of the possibility for error rates, while, as discussed previously, was
many magnitudes more quantitatively important than the RMP, made no signifi-
cant difference to conviction rates. Further, Schklar and Diamond’s (1999) work
suggested this may be due to an inherent greater importance attached to the RMP.
They presented participants in one condition with an RMP of ‘1 in a billion’ and an
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error rate of ‘1 in 200’, and in a second condition, with the values reversed. Com-
paring these two conditions, participants in fact convicted more frequently when the
RMP was presented with the greater ‘1 in 200’ value, than when the error rate was
presented with that value, suggesting that participants were in fact more affected in
their judgements by the RMP than error rates when controlling for numerical value.
In the present study, the RMP is in fact more quantitatively valuable (1 in 20) than
the error rates (1 in 100, or 2 in 100). It is therefore expected that greater weight
will be given to the RMP than to the error rates. This is also expected to be the
case when numerical differences are accounted for (i.e. the proportional weighting
of the RMP relative to its true value will be greater than that for error rates).
9.1.4 Research Question 2b
What reasoning processes lead to this weighting of the error rates?
The reasoning processes individuals undertake when attempting to incorporate
forensic error is not known. The present study therefore aims to contribute to this
through analysis of participants’ ‘think aloud’ data.
9.2 Method
9.2.1 Participants
Eighty six participants comprised the final sample of the experiment. Two partic-
ipants were removed from an original 88 due to a clear lack of engagement with
the experiment. Participants were recruited from the Amazon MTurk outsourcing
service and were required to be in the United States of America and have a 95%
HIT approval rating. The demographics for experiments five and six can be seen in
Table 2 below.
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Tab. 9.1: Demographics for experiments five and six.
Experiment Five Experiment Six
Numerical Percentage Numerical Percentage
Total Sample 88 100% 364 100%
Gender
Male 44 51.2% 193 53.0%
Female 42 48.8% 171 47.0%
Other - - 0 0.0%
Age
Minimum 20 - 20 -
Maximum 76 - 71 -
Mean 37.1 - 36.9 -
Std Dev 12.4 - 10.7 -
Education
High School - - 114 31.3%
Bachelor’s Degree - - 175 48.1%
Master’s Degree - - 50 13.7%
Doctoral Degree - - 6 1.6%
Other - - 19 5.2%
Occupation
Professional / Managerial - - 161 44.2%
Labour / Service - - 101 27.7%
Student - - 16 4.4%
Unemployed - - 40 11.0%
Other - - 46 12.6%
First
Language
English 86 100.0% 358 98.4%
Other 0 0.0% 6 1.6%
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9.2.2 Design and Materials
The experiment comprised three ’conditions’. However, these were designed to coun-
terbalance presentations / rule out confounding factors, rather than for direct exper-
imental comparison. The first two conditions contained four ‘sections’ in the main
body of the experiment, corresponding to the four pieces of information participants
were required to integrate: the prior, the random match probability, the false pos-
itive rate and the false negative rate. In each section, participants were presented
with the information, then requested to record their thought process regarding how
to use that information before being able to record their numerical answer on the
subsequent page. The scenario detailed an attack on a man by a gang. A member
of that gang had been arrested and had been found to match a footprint on the
body of the victim. The participant’s task was to combine all four pieces of numer-
ical information to calculate the probability that the defendant was the person who
stamped on the man. The full text provided can be seen below:
The introduction and prior:
A mob of 100 hoody-wearing gang members walking through a city centre
pass an elderly man. One of the gang members in an unprovoked attack
punches the man and then stamps on him after he falls to the floor.
Upon realising the man is seriously injured (he later dies), all of the
gang members run off in different directions. A policeman in a nearby
street who hears the commotion randomly grabs one of the fleeing gang
members (the defendant) and arrests him on suspicion of being involved
in a criminal act. The police are unable to find any of the remaining
gang members.
The random match probability section:
Forensic evidence from the crime scene has been able to identify the size
of the footprint left on the victims body, which was left by the person who
stamped on him. The footprint was determined to be a size 12. Forensic
databases of the shoe sizes of youths in gangs show that out of a group
of 20 gang members, 1 gang member would be expected, on average, to
have a size 12 shoe. Finally, the forensic team also determined that the
defendant was wearing a size 12 shoe when arrested.
The false positive section:
Studies show that during both of the tests that the forensics team con-
duct (measuring the foot size of the print on the victims body as well as
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the shoe size of the defendant), the forensics team will sometimes make
a mistake. Sometimes they will record that the size of the footprint or
shoe is size 12 but actually they have made a mistake and it really is a
different size. This type of mistake is called a false positive. The forensic
team make a false positive mistake 2 out of every 100 times they make
a measurement.
The false negative section:
Studies show that there is another type of error that the forensics team
sometimes makes. Sometimes they will record that the size of the foot-
print or shoe is size 12 but actually they have made a mistake and it
really is a different size. This type of mistake is called a false positive.
The forensic team make a false positive mistake 2 out of every 100 times
they make a measurement.
The presentation of the two error rates was counterbalanced such that partici-
pants in condition one were presented with the false positive rate as the third piece
of information and the false negative rate as the fourth piece of information. Par-
ticipants in condition two received the opposite order. Due to the fact that each
estimate participants gave was based on combining all previous pieces of informa-
tion, this separation allowed independent comparison of the impact of false positive
and false negative rates on participant estimates, as well as the comparison of order
on final integration of both rates. However, this format also meant that for the non-
error portion of the experiment (sections one and two), participants in conditions
one and two experienced an identical presentation.
To ensure that any findings of the present experiment weren’t due to the seg-
mented presentation of information, condition three was presented with all four
pieces of information and only then asked to record their thought processes and
provide a numerical estimate. Participants in conditions one and two therefore
made four sequential estimates over the course of the experiment, while participants
in condition three only made one estimate.
9.2.3 Procedure
Participants completed the experiment in their own homes via an internet survey
program. They were presented with the consent form followed by the instructions
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for the experiment. In conditions one and two, participants were then presented
with each successive piece of information from the problem each on a separate web
page (requiring the participant to press ’Next’ to receive each subsequent piece of
information). Each piece of information was followed by the think aloud (an open
ended text box requesting the participant to record their thought process while they
solve the problem) and numerical question (’Please record the percentage chance
of the defendant being the individual who stamped on the man below’) after each
new piece of information. In condition three participants were shown all pieces
of information first without being asked any questions. Only once they had seen
the final piece of information they were presented with both the think aloud and
numerical questions. Finally they were presented with the below question which
acted as a manipulation check on the random match probability statistics and finally
they were shown the demographic questions.
Please indicate below the extent to which, when initially presented with
this evidence, you believed that 1 out of 20 was the correct figure for the
amount of members of this particular gang who wore shoe size 12.
I believed that, in regards to how many wore shoe size 12, for this par-
ticular gang:
1. It was far less than 1 out of 20
2. It was considerably less than 1 out of 20
3. It was slightly less than 1 out of 20
4. 1 out of 20 was correct
5. It was slightly more than 1 out of 20
6. It was considerably more than 1 out of 20
7. It was far more than 1 out of 20
8. Don’t feel able to answer
9.3 Results
9.3.1 Manipulation Checks and Condition Comparisons
Manipulation checks were placed into the experiment to ensure that participants
processed and accepted the prior and the RMP in the way that they were intended
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to. Following the presentation of the prior (the fact that there were 100 gang
members at the scene) participants were asked the chance of the defendant being
the one who stamped on the man, and the vast majority of individuals (87.5%)
responded ‘1 in 100’. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked whether
they believed the RMP figure of ‘1 in 20’ was correct for ‘this particular gang’.
Again the majority (65.1%) responded that it was correct.
Further, in regards to the comparison between conditions one, two and three,
little difference was seen. Participants in condition one gave a mean chance that
the suspect was the source of 1 in 24.53, condition two gave a mean chance of 1 in
24.49 and condition three, 1 in 24.40. A one-way analysis of variance confirmed no
difference between these three groups on this variable, (F = .000 [2, 83], p=1.000).
9.3.2 Research Question 1a
In the basic problem, will participants overweight, appropriately weight, or
underweight the Random Match Probability?
In conditions one and two, the second question asked participants to compute
the chance of the defendant being guilty in the light of both the prior information
(‘100 gang members were present’) and the footprint evidence (‘1 out of 20 gang
members have size 12’).
The Bayesian normative answer after receiving only the prior information was ‘1
in 100’ (0.01). The mean answer given by participants after the prior information
was ‘1 in 89.75’ (0.011) while the modal answer was ‘1 in 100’, with 86.0% (49 out
of 57) of participants providing this.
When incorporating both the prior (1 in 100) and the RMP (1 in 20), the
Bayesian normative answer for the chance of the defendant being the source of
the footprint is 1 in 5.95. This is calculated by dividing the 99 gang members (100 -
the 1 defendant) by the random match probability (1/20) to arrive at 4.95 probable
matches. This is then added to the defendant to arrive at a most-probable 5.95 total
matches. The defendant is one of these 5.95, and no more likely to be the source
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than any of them. Therefore the chance of him being the source of the footprint is
1 in 5.95.
However, participants mean prior (1 in 89.75) was deviant from the normative
prior (1 in 100), and their answers to question two build upon this prior. Therefore,
in order to construct a normative answer following the presentation of the RMP,
this prior must be incorporated into the calculations. Given this prior, the Bayesian
normative posterior after the RMP would be ‘1 in 5.45’ (18.3%). With the ’1 in 100’
prior, the normative posterior would be ’1 in 5.95’ (16.8%).
The mean figure provided by participants was in fact ‘1 in 14’ (7.1%), consider-
ably higher than either normative answer. Proportional changes for the normative
and actual mean figures for estimates following the RMP compared to the prior
can be seen in Figure 9.1 below. We can see that, using the participants’ prior,
the Bayesian normative answer represents a 15.45 fold increase in probability that
the defendant was the source, while the actual change made by participants repre-
sents only a 5.41 fold increase in guilt. This suggests that participants on average
under-weighted the RMP in comparison to the Bayesian norm.
Fig. 9.1: Proportion change figures for the normative and mean values from ’Prior-only’
estimates to ’Prior plus RMP’ estimates
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9.3.3 Research Question 1b
To explore why this under-weighting occurred, an analysis of both the numerical
and think aloud data was undertaken to categorise and understand the reason for
various response types. The percentage of response types given to the basic problem
across all three conditions can be seen below in Figure 9.2.
’1 in 6’
As explained above, the Bayesian-normative answer for question two assuming the
correct prior of ‘1 in 100’ was in fact 1 in 5.95 or 1 in 6. No participant gave this
answer.
‘1 in 5’
Thirty two out of the 56 participants (37.2%) in conditions 1 and 2 gave the answer
of ‘1 in 5’, which was accepted as correct under the ‘lenient’ criteria of ignoring the
independent samples rule. These individuals divided all 100 gang members by the ’1
/ 20’ RMP to arrive at 5 individuals with size 12, and determined that this was the
correct answer. This answer uses the correct process but ignores the ’Independent
Samples’ rule: the observation of the defendant being size 12 should is independent
from the most likely number of size 12’s in the remaining 99 gang members, who’s
shoe size is still in a probabilistic state (unknown). These individuals therefore
needed to divide 99 instead of 100, by 1/20, and then needed to add the defendant
on to arrive at the final answer.
Out of the 32 individuals providing this answer, six in fact did not demonstrate
appropriate reasoning in their think aloud protocol e.g. P42 who stated ‘There are
a lot of people who wear a size 12 shoe but since he was caught at the scene and
wears the size 12 shoe then it could be him’. The remaining 26 participants (46.4%)
demonstrated the (lenient) correct reasoning that 5 gang members (100/20) would
have size 12 shoes, and the defendant was one of these 5. For example, P2 stated
that ‘If 1 in 20 gang members have a size twelve shoe, then 5 of the 100 have that
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size shoe. Therefore he is one of the five.’ and P9 who stated that ‘If 1 in 20 gang
members wears a size 12 shoes out of 100 gang members most likely only 5 or so of
them have a size 12 making it a 1 in 5 chance he is the right guy.’
’1 in 20’
In response to this second question, 16/56 participants (28.6%) answered ‘1 in 20’.
During qualitative analysis of the justifications given in the ‘think aloud’ protocol
for this answer, three clearly distinct approaches were found which all led to the
same numerical answer of ‘1 in 20’ but for very different reasons.
Fig. 9.2: Percentage of response types given to the basic problem in all three conditions.
Reversers Six participants have been classified as ‘Reversers’. This name was
chosen because these participants began the calculation correctly to arrive at a
figure of 1 in 5, but then ‘reverse’ their work at the end with an extra unnecessary
step in their calculation to finally end up back with an answer of 1 in 20. Firstly,
each of these participants managed to use both the prior and the RMP to determine
that 5 out of the 100 gang members would have this size shoe. The correct next
step his now to recognise that the defendant is one of these 5 and so the answer
is 1 in 5 (or 1 in 6, ideally). However, what these participants instead did was to
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state that 5 out of 100 is the same as 1 in 20, and conclude that this is therefore the
answer. They therefore first convert 1 in 20 into 5 in 100, then convert it straight
back into 1 in 20. There is little else in the qualitative data to explain exactly why
participants do this. Below are their transcripts.
‘1 in 20 gang members have a size 12 shoe. There are 100 gang members,
so 5 of them probably have a size 12 shoe. 100 / = 20. 1 in 20 chance.’
‘1 in 20 hoodie members have a size 12 according to the stats. Out of
100 hoodie member this would mean 1/5 of the hoodie members would
have a size 12. 5/100 is equivalent to 1 in 20.’
‘1:20 = 5:100’
‘There were 100 so 5 in 100 have size 12 shoe. Brings it back to 1/20’
‘Out of a group of 20, 1 is expected to have size 12. 5 out of 100 reduces
to 1 out of 20.’
‘Based on the stat of 1 in 20 wear size 12, then 5 of 100 or 1 in 20
would be the chance given the numbers, would check for blood spatter
consistent with the kind of attack on the shoes worn by the suspect.
Since he was apprehended relatively quickly according to the scenario.’
Misreader Two participants were classified as ‘Misreaders’: these participants
seem to have misread the information ‘out of a group of 20 gang members, 1 would
have size 12.’ Their answers seem to indicate that they believed that the information
given was that 20 gang members total had shoe size 12. They therefore computed
that the defendant was 1 out of these 20 and thus came to the answer of 1 in 20.
‘If there are only 20 gang members who wear a size 12, then the chance
of the suspect being guilty is 1/20’
‘Twenty members of the gang wear a size 12, and he is one of them’
Base Rate Neglecter Seven participants presented a simple conviction that the
RMP was the answer to the question, in line with previous work on Base rate neglect
(Bar-Hillel, 1980).
‘The odds of a gang member having a size 12 shoe is 1 in 20. Since the
defendant had that size, the same odds apply.’
‘Only 20 members were wearing size 12 shoe and the defendant was
wearing size 12 shoes. hence one in 20 was the defendant.’
‘1 in 20 wear a size 12 this guy wears a 12.’
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‘Statistically there is a one in 20 chance the suspect would be guilty due
to his size 12 shoe. The footprint on the victim was a size 12.’
‘Earlier it was 1 in 100 among the whole crowd of 100, but the new
evidence says than among the whole 100 member whoever has the size
12 and among all member of 12 size the probability is 1 out of 20.’
‘Size 12= 1/20 expected’
‘The suspect had a size 12 shoe and the probability is 1 in 20 so that
means that this is the same probability that he did it.’
Others
Acceptors and Rejectors At either ends of the spectrum of guilt, 2 partici-
pants gave an answer of 1 in 1 while 2 other participants gave an answer of 1 in 100.
Both of the first two participants seemed to suggest that they thought the evidence
compelling enough to be convinced of the defendant’s guilt.
‘The forensic evidence is totally convincing.’
‘According to statistics, this man was most likely involved in the killing
of the man.’
However, the two ‘1 in 100’ participants on the other hand, seemed to find the
shoe size evidence unconvincing / unimportant:
‘The shoe size evidence is too speculative for my tastes so I kept to the
original percentage’
‘Although there were findings regarding the shoe size and that 1 in every
20 members is size 12, chances are is that still there is only one in a
hundred.’
Unknown One further participant was classified as ‘unknown’ as they gave
little information as to how they formed their conclusion, stating that ‘I figure that
its lowered to 1 in 20 now.’ Four further participants gave the answers of 10, 12,
30 and 50 but their qualitative responses gave little insight into their reasoning or
suggested that they were simply guessing.
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Condition Three
In condition three, participants were presented with the prior, RMP and two errors
before giving their reasoning in a single text box. While this makes it more difficult
to pick out the impact of individual pieces of information on participants’ reasoning,
analysis of the think aloud protocol was still possible, and the exact same patterns
of reasoning in regards to the prior and RMP were seen as those in conditions one
and two and also in similar proportions (see Figure 9.2 above). Thirty percent
demonstrated correct integration of these two variables, while 13.3% demonstrated
the BRN response, 10% the Reverser response and 3.3% the Misreader response.
9.3.4 Research Question 2a
Will people under-weight, appropriately weight, or over-weight the false positive
and false negative error rates?
In question three, participants in condition one and two were presented with
evidence regarding one type of error that the forensic team can make (false positives
for condition one; false negatives for condition two). Bayesian normative answers
were calculated using the event tree process presented in Fenton et al. (2014) (see
9.3 below). In experiment five the prior (s) was 0.01, the RMP (m) was 0.05, the
false positive rate (u) was 0.02 and the false negative rate (v) was 0.01. To calculate
the Bayesian posterior the two uppermost branches reflecting scenarios wherein the
defendant was the source of the footprint were divided by total of those 2 branches
plus the 4 lower branches wherein the defendant was not the source of the footprint.
By changing the false positive rate, or false negative rate to zero, answers for question
3 (where only one of these error rates was given) could be calculated in the same
manner.
According to this, the Bayesian normative answer for question three, condition
one (false positive rate only) was 1 in 10.36, which represents a substantial decrease
in the probability that the defendant was the source of the footprint. The false
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Fig. 9.3: An event tree for a legal match case with errors taken from Fenton et al. (2014).
Here s is the prior probability that defendant is source; m is the random match
probability for Type X; u is the false positive probability for X and v is the false
negative probability for X (so 1- v is the true positive probability that we are
interested in). The bold branch is that consistent with the prosecution hypothesis
and the dotted branch is that consistent with the defence hypothesis. Cases of
E1 and E2 false are not considered.
negative rate alone, (question three, condition two) produced a posterior chance of
1 in 5.95 (no change). Both error rates combined (question four for conditions one
and two, and the single question for condition three) produced a Bayesian posterior
of 10.41, a small change from the false positive rate only. We can see here therefore
that the false negative rate only impacts on the posterior when combined with the
false positive rate, and in that case, reduces the chance of the defendant being the
source a small amount.
However, similar to in the previous section, we were also able to create Bayesian
normative posteriors for the error rates taking into account participants’ responses to
the previous question. As the error incorporation built upon these previous answers,
accurate comparison of participant responses to errors required a comparison to
a normative standard which allowed for any inaccuracy in previous calculations.
Participants’ mean answer in the previous question (combining prior and RMP was)
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‘1 in 14’ (0.0714). Inputting this value into the Bayesian calculation, the normative
answer following the incorporation of the false positive rate only (condition one)
should have been ‘1 in 17.2’ (0.058) which is a proportional change of probability of
-0.19. However, participants’ actual mean response to this question was ‘1 in 21.8’
(0.046), a proportional probability change of -0.36.
Similarly for condition two, the introduction of the false negative rate alone
should have made no change, retaining the same chance of the suspect being the
source of ‘1 in 14’ (0.0714), making no proportional probability change. Partici-
pants’ actual mean response to this question was ‘1 in 21.9’ (4.6%), a proportional
probability change of -0.36.
The incorporation of both errors (question four for conditions one and two)
should have yielded a posterior value of ‘1 in 17.2’ (5.8%), a proportional change
of zero for condition one, and a proportional change of -0.19 for condition two.
Participants’ actual mean response was ‘1 in 24.5’ (4.1%), a proportional change of
-0.11 for both conditions one and condition two. The proportional changes for both
the normative and actual mean responses for conditions one and two can be seen
below. The normative change represents a decrease in the chance of the suspect
being the source when the false positive rates are incorporated, and a near-zero
change when the false negatives are incorporated. However, as can be seen in Figure
9.4, and was demonstrated by an analysis of variance, participants responses in both
conditions were identical, regardless of the order of error type presentation.
9.3.5 Research Question 2b
To explore why this erroneous integration of errors occurred, an analysis of the
numerical think aloud data was undertaken to categorise and understand the reason
for various response types. The percentage of participants corresponding to each
categorical type identified can be seen below in Figure 9.5.
In response to the presentation of this first error type , two modal approaches
to incorporating the new evidence were seen, here named ‘Negligible’ and ‘Nudge’.
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For the ‘Negligible’ classification, participants needed to demonstrate in their think
aloud protocol that they believed the margin of error presented was too small to
impact on the problem. For example, P35 said ‘I still believe that at least 5 gang
members out of 100 had a size 12 shoe. Furthermore, the forensics team is very
unlikely at 1 in 100 to have made a mistake.’ and P7 said ‘2 in 100 is a really small
chance not enough to change my estimate’. This was uniformly accompanied by a
complete absence of change of the solver’s numerical response in comparison to the
previous question.
The classification of ‘Nudge’ was given to any participant who, either non-
mathematically, or using simple addition or subtraction, ‘nudged’ their answer from
the previous question a small amount in response to the new evidence regarding
the error rates. A non-mathematical example comes from P21 (condition one) who
altered their answer of ‘1 in 20’ from the previous question (with only prior and
RMP) to ‘1 in 21’ and justified this by saying ‘The odds of a ‘false positive’ slightly
mitigate the odds of the attacker having a size 12 shoe, but not much.’ and P42
(condition two), who raised their previous answer of ‘1 in 5’ to ‘1 in 10’, stating
that ‘I just figured maybe I ought to give it a little less chance now.’ Addition /
Subtraction approaches to nudging can be seen in P4 (condition one), who nudged
their previous ‘1 in 5’ answer to ‘1 in 7’ and stated that ‘The odds of a false positive
adds 2 out of 100 to the 5 out of 100 that have a size 12 shoe. Therefore the odds
are now 1 in 7.’ and P47 (condition two) who nudged their previous answer of ‘1 in
12’ to ‘1 in 13’, stating that ‘A 1% error would only increase the possible amount of
100 members by one extra person. So it goes from 1 in 12 to 1 in 13.’ Combining
both conditions, addition-nudges made up 46.5% of all nudges, subtraction-nudges
made up 7% and non-mathematical nudges made up 46.5%.
False Positive Rate
In terms of the Bayesian normative standard for incorporating error rates in this
problem, the introduction of false positives has a far larger impact on the proba-
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bility that the defendant was the source than the false negative information. The
introduction of the false positives decreases this chance from 1 in 5.95, with only the
prior and RMP information, to 1 in 10.36. The introduction of the false negative
alone makes no change to the chance of guilt. When the false negative is introduced
on top of the false positive rate it makes a very small change from 1 in 10.36 to
10.41.
Following the presentation of the false positive rate, only four participants gave
an answer within even 3 points of this standard, and in each case their think aloud
protocol indicated they had arrived at this figure through the combination of error
and coincidence, as opposed to appropriate Bayesian reasoning:
P18 (1 in 10): ‘I guessed randomly.’
P36 (1 in 10): ‘There is a 2% chance that they got the wrong shoe size
or a false positive. So There is a 2% chance that the person is not it
because of a false positive. and since there is a 20% chance he is the
right person I did 20% divided by 2% which means there is a 10 percent
chance now that the person is correct instead of a 20 percent. so 1 in 10
chance.’
P40 (1 in 10): ‘I simply doubled the previous chance to account for an
incompetent forensics team.’
P41 (1 in 10): ‘I just figured maybe I ought to give it a little less chance
now.’
False Negative Rate
For question three in condition two the correct response to the presentation of the
false negative error was to make no substantial change to the chance of guilt. This is
because the problem deals with a positive result (the ‘match’ of the defendant) and
so although false negatives do have some impact on the chance of guilt, it is minimal.
Ten out of 28 individuals (37.5%) made no change to their answer. However the
think aloud protocol showed that six of these chose not to change their answer on
the basis that the error rate was very small (e.g. P29 who stated ‘The error rate is
small and the evidence is overwhelming.’), and from one individual it could not be
determined if they had this understanding of the false negative rate or not. However
three individuals did correctly state that they had not changed their answer because
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the problem dealt with a positive result e.g. P53 who stated ‘False negatives would
not apply to this case because the test was positive.’
Participants in condition one also faced the need to integrate the false negative
rate in question four (after having integrated the false positive rate in question
three). The correct response again was to make no substantial change to the chances
of guilt. Seven out of 28 individuals made no change to their answer, however all of
these were classified as giving the ‘negligible’ response, suggesting the errors were
too small to make a difference. None of these referenced the fact that the test was
positive as the reason for not changing their answer.
Condition Three
In the first two conditions, the fourth question provided the second piece of error ev-
idence (false negatives for condition one, false positives for condition two). However
in the third condition, participants were only asked when question in total - they
were presented with all the evidence sequentially and then asked the chance of guilt.
‘Negligible’ and ‘Nudge’ were again the most common response types seen. How-
ever, in this condition only, a large proportion of participants were also classified as
‘ignoring’ the errors. This classification was given to individuals who responded to
the problem as if only the prior and RMP data were given, and made no mention of
the errors at all, and did not include them in their calculations. This classification
is distinct from the ‘Negligible’ classification where participants explicitly state that
the errors are too small to be worth considering. For example, P57, omitting any
mention of the error information at all, and providing a ‘1 in 5’ answer, stated that
‘One in twenty people would wear a size 12 shoe. Since there were 100 gang mem-
bers, it is reasonable to assume 5 of them would wear a size 12.’ The percentage
of the sample providing the categorical responses identified can be seen below in
Figure 9.6.
Finally, in comparing the three experimental conditions, mean estimates between
the three conditions were highly similar. Condition one showed a mean of 1 in 24.5
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(SE = 6.1), condition two showed a mean of 1 in 24.5 (SE = 5.4) and condition
three showed a mean of 1 in 24.4 (SE = 5.0). These were all considerably higher
than the normative Bayesian answer of 1 in 10.4.
9.4 Discussion
9.4.1 Manipulation Checks and Condition Comparisons
The figures from the two manipulation checks (of the prior, and the RMP) suggest
that on the whole, participants accepted and dealt with these figures in the manner
that was intended and that, instead of bringing a large amount of their own world-
knowledge to bear on the problem, they dealt with it abstractly, using the numbers
given. This result runs in contrast to some previous work (e.g. Welsh & Navarro,
2012) who suggested that failure on these problems may be due to ‘distrust’ and
lack of acceptance of figures such as these.
Further, neither the order of presentation of the false positive or false negative
rates, nor the repeat-questioning format of conditions one and two seemed to change
final estimates. The first of these points can be seen in the fact that no difference in
mean final estimates was seen between condition one (1 in 24.53) and condition two
(1 in 24.49). The second point can be seen in the fact that no further difference was
seen in comparison to condition three (1 in 24.40), which only asked for an estimate
once, after all pieces of information were shown.
9.4.2 Research Questions 1a and 1b
In terms of the basic match problem without errors, the average changes made by
participants in response to the RMP statistic were in the same direction as the nor-
mative answer (increasing the probability of guilt), suggesting accurate conceptual
understanding that this evidence increases the likelihood of the defendant being the
source of the footprint. This finding is in keeping with previous work (e.g. Koehler
et al., 1995; Schklar and Diamond, 1999; Dartnall and Goodman-Delahunty, 2006)
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who all found that the introduction of the RMP increased conviction rates on aver-
age.
However, the strength of this change was small relative to the normative stan-
dard, suggesting that participants under-weighted this variable, also in line with
previous work comparing to a normative standard (Thompson and Schumann, 1987;
Faigman and Baglioni, 1988; Goodman, 1992; Smith, 1996; Taroni and Aitken, 1998;
Thompson and Newman, 2015).
The reason for this under-weighting in the present study was explored by examin-
ing numerical and think aloud responses. No participants were able to incorporate
the independent samples rule into their reasoning in order to arrive at the strict
Bayesian normative answer of ‘1 in 5.95’ or ‘1 in 6’. While this does not distort
the posterior belief level to a great extent with the present RMP, which is relatively
large, the smaller the RMP (such as with DNA evidence, typically several orders of
magnitude lower), this could become a larger problem. However this may not be
an issue in practise. This is because, at lower RMP levels, the incorrectness of this
mistake becomes much clearer. For example, if we had an RMP of 1 in 500 with
the present 100 gang members, we would only expect 0.2 matches on average. If the
independent samples rule were ignored here the solver would end up with a posterior
chance of ‘1 in 0.2’ of guilt, which is a clear impossibility: the correct value is ‘1 in
1.2’.
Therefore, it may be of greater importance to overlook the failure to apply the
independent observations rule, and assess the degree to which participants were able
to combine the RMP and the prior to determine the number of matches expected,
a key skill in correct Bayesian reasoning for match cases. Out of conditions 1 and
2, 46.4% of participants undertook this process successfully, providing the ‘1 in 5’
answer.
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The ‘Inversion Fallacy’, Base Rate Neglect and the Confusion Hypothesis
In contrast, 28.6% of participants in these two conditions provided the ‘1 in 20’
answer as the chance that the defendant was the one who stamped on the man.
Interestingly, this answer has a lot in common with the commonly observed pros-
ecutor’s fallacy (Thompson and Schumann, 1987; Smith, 1996; Nance and Morris,
2002, 2005), but is also importantly different. This fallacy was first documented
by Nance and Morris (2002) and was named there the ‘Inversion Fallacy’. It does
not involve confusing the RMP with the chance of ’not being a match’ (as in the
prosecutor’s fallacy), but instead with the chance of ’being a match’.
In previous work, the answer of ‘1 in 20’, or its equivalent, which relies entirely
on the ‘diagnostic information’ (here, the RMP), and ignores the base rate data
(here, the population size), has typically been classified as ‘base rate neglect’ (Bar-
Hillel, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Welsh and Navarro, 2012; Obrecht and
Chesney, 2013; Pennycook and Thompson, 2012). Typically, however, previous work
which has classified these responses in this way has relied entirely on the numerical
response from participants. In contrast to this, the present study, by examining the
think aloud protocol of solvers, found three distinct processes all of which led to the
same numerical value, but only one of which actually involved ignoring the base rate.
The first classification which led to the ‘1 in 20’ numerical value was named ‘Re-
verser’ as these participants actually integrated the RMP and the base rate together
correctly, then added an additional unnecessary and incorrect step to get back to ‘1
in 20’. The second classification, ‘Misreader’, interpreted the statement as ‘20 gang
members have size 12’, which, if accurate, would legitimately allow the ignoring of
the prior. Only the final group, representing 12.5% of the sample actually commit-
ted the base rate neglect fallacy, by entirely ignoring the prior and stating that the
RMP was the correct value to the problem. This analysis suggests that, behind
the numerical values, a large amount of previous work may have overestimated the
amount of base rate neglect in their samples by mis-classifying different cognitive
processes which coincidentally produce the same numerical value.
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Across a range of studies participants have been shown to confuse the Bayesian
posterior with the true positive rate (e.g. Eddy, 1982), the false positive rate (e.g.
Casscells et al., 1978) and now the random match probability (e.g. Nance and Morris,
2002, and the present study). This provides further evidence for the ‘confusion
hypothesis’ developed within the cognitive science literature mentioned previously
(e.g. Braine and Connell, 1990; Cohen, 1981; Dawes, 1986; Eddy, 1982; Hamm and
Miller, 1990; Fiedler et al., 2000). It also supports views expressed throughout this
paper that participants lack of engagement or lack of deep processing of the problem
may contribute to the types of errors being seen. It also provides further evidence
for the conjecture also put forward here that problem solvers may interpret the task
as one in which one of the figures in the problem text need to be ’picked’ to provide
the correct answer, rather than interpreting the problem as one in which several
figures need to be integrated. If this former interpretation is adopted, participants
may then simply look for the figure in the problem which superficially sounds the
most like what they are being asked for, and ’pick’ that as the answer.
9.4.3 Research Questions 2a and 2b
Participants’ mean responses following the presentation of false positive and false
negative rates was highly deviant from the Bayesian normative standard. Comparing
to the normative standard for change at each stage, the false positive error rate when
provided alone was over-weighted in participants’ analyses by a factor of 1.89, while
the false negative weight when presented alone was over-weighted by an indefinable
factor, as it’s impact on the outcome probability when presented alone was nil
(Figure 9.4. However, in terms of the modal response types, the ’negligible’ and
’ignore’ response clearly under-weighted both (particularly the false positive rate)
and the ’nudge’ response under-weighted the false positive rate but over-weighted
the false negative rate.
In comparison the RMP on average was under-weighted by a factor of 2.87 (Fig-
ure 9.1), demonstrating a greater proportional mis-weighting of the RMP than the
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false positive error rate, but with the greatest mis-weighting being of the false neg-
ative error rate. This is not fully in line with previous work (e.g. Koehler et al.,
1995; Schklar and Diamond, 1999; Dartnall and Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) who
found an overall under-weighting of the error rate. However, as stated before two
major simplifications of the use of error rates in those works (no distinction between
false positive and negative rates, and the ignoring of the impact of forensic error on
testing of the source) make comparison difficult.
In regards to why this mis-weighting of the error rates occurred, information can
be gathered from both the quantitative and qualitative data. Firstly, Figure 9.4
shows that participants responded on average to both false positive and false nega-
tive rates in a remarkably identical manner (a proportional reduction in estimates of
0.19 in each case), suggesting a gross misunderstanding of the nature and meaning
of the two error types. Further, the think aloud data suggested that no single partic-
ipant undertook an appropriate calculation to incorporate the error rates into their
calculations. Instead, three categories of responses were record as most common.
These were named ’Negligible’, ’Nudge’ and ’Ignore’. Those participants classified
as ’Negligible’ typically stated that the error rates were so small that they did not
need to be incorporated into their calculations. This was most notably incorrect in
regards to the false positive rate, which in fact almost halved the chance that the
suspect was the source of the footprint. These participants therefore under-weighted
the false positive rate, and appropriately-weighted the false negative rate (but not
for a legitimate reason). Another common classification was that of ’Nudge’. The
reasoning process of these individuals was highly reminiscent of the ’anchor and
adjustment’ heuristic first proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Individuals
classified this way typically used the value they had previously calculated combining
the prior and the RMP as an anchor and from this ’nudged’ their answer, typically
towards a lower chance of guilt (the normative direction, if not with the normative
magnitude required). This was one of the most common responses for both the false
positive and false negative error types. In some cases this involved mathematical
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addition / subtraction of the error rate directly from their anchor, while in other
cases think aloud data suggested a non-mathematical nudge based upon intuition.
In the third condition only, a further common response was seen, which was to sim-
ply ignore, or not mention the error rates, and respond to the problem as if only the
prior and RMP had been given. This was less possible in conditions one and two as
they were directly asked for their revised estimate based on each piece of informa-
tion. This ’ignore’ classification in the third condition again suggests a dismissal of
the importance of the error rates similar to the ’negligible’ classification.
The combination of these quantitative and qualitative findings suggest that while
many statistically untrained individuals can successfully analyse a legal match case
when only a prior and RMP are presented, once errors are introduced, the complex-
ity of the problem appears too great and a fundamental misunderstanding of the
function of forensic error in a Bayesian calculation is seen. No single individual in
our sample approached the analysis of errors in the appropriate Bayesian manner,
and all mis-estimated the chance of the suspect being the source of the sample in
comparison to the normative Bayesian standard. Finally, the nature of the heuristics
participants used to solve the problem in fact suggests that the above quantitative
findings in regards to over-weighting and under-weighting would not be stable across
different values: the same heuristic might over-weight with some values, and under-
weight with others. In general, regardless of the direction of the mistake, it must
be strongly concluded that statistically untrained individuals should not be relied
upon to make accurate Bayesian inference of legal match cases when forensic testing
errors are taken into account.
165
Part II Section 9.4
Fig. 9.4: The proportional change in condition three estimates that the defendant is the
source from ’Prior plus RMP’ to including the false positive rate (top) and false
negative rates (bottom) and then to including both false positives and false neg-
atives (both).
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Fig. 9.5: The Percentage of participants coded as providing ’Nudge’ and ’Negligible’ re-
sponses to question three for condition one (false positive) and condition two
(false negative).
Fig. 9.6: Percentage of sample providing ‘Negligible’, ‘Nudge’ and ‘Ignored’ responses to




Experiment five demonstrated that the capacity of the general public to undertake
the calculations required for even the simplest legal match case, when the vital error
margins of forensic testing are taken into account is extremely limited. Given that
the statistical presentation of DNA in the form of the random match probability
is likely to remain a common occurrence within the legal system (Koehler et al.,
1995; Schklar and Diamond, 1999), the best approach to presenting the output of
Bayesian calculations, removing the need for untrained individuals to undertake the
calculations themselves, needs to be determined.
A group of authors (Fenton and Neil, 2011; Fenton et al., 2012, 2014) have re-
cently argued forcefully that any such approach other than a presentation of the
Bayesian posterior (i.e. the removal of any need to undertake a calculation by un-
trained individuals) to these individuals is untenable. This belief was given evidence
by the results of experiment five. Fenton and Neil (2011) argue that these calcu-
lations should instead be undertaken by Bayesian Network computer programs, a
view echoed by many experts in the statistical community (e.g. Dawid et al., 2007;
Taroni and Aitken, 2006). However, Fenton et al. (2014) go further and argue that
the causally-linked Bayesian network diagram may also make a valuable intuitive
tool for presenting those statistics visually to untrained individuals. Fenton et al.
(2014) argue that in comparison to event trees (the most common visual form of
presentation of such statistics and advocated for legal cases by some authors e.g.
Hoffrage et al. (2002)), a Bayesian Network diagram may scale more effectively with
Part II Section 10.1
increased complexity. They also stress that even the simplest legal case, when foren-
sic errors are taken into account, presents a level of complexity too great for effective
comprehension of any event-tree type depiction.
Fig. 10.1: An event-tree diagram depicting the scenario in the experiment with no testing
errors: a suspect matches a footprint found at a crime scene.
In Figures 10.1 and 10.2 above the event tree comprises a series of branches
each depicting a possible hypothetical scenario that could have led to the available
facts in the case , along with the calculated probability of that scenario. The left
diagram depicts the simple case, with no testing errors. Here only two scenarios are
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Fig. 10.2: An event-tree diagram depicting the scenario in the experiment with testing
errors: a suspect matches a footprint found at a crime scene.
possible (’the defendant committed the crime’ or ’the defendant did not commit the
crime but coincidentally has the same footprint size’). In the right diagram, when
testing errors are taken into account, far more potential scenarios are possible (e.g.
the defendant did not commit the crime, does not have the shoe size on the body,
and the footprint test on the defendant was a false positive). While the event tree
diagram is concise and clear in the simple case (the left diagram), visual complexity
is greatly increased when testing errors are included (the right diagram).
Bayesian network diagrams do not suffer from this issue. For example, the Bayes
nets in Figures 10.3 and 10.4 depict the scenario used in the present experiment
both without forensic errors (left) and with them (right). In the scenario a suspect
is found to match a footprint found at a crime scene and the task is to infer the
probability that the suspect is actually the source of that footprint. Each ’box’
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in the diagram represents a conjecture in the scenario, and denotes the percentage
likelihood that that particular conjecture is true. An arrow indicates that a given
conjecture (the source of the arrow) has a causal effect on the likelihood of another
(the terminus of the arrow) being true. In the left diagram (no errors) we can see
that a forensic test showing that the defendant is a size 10 (stated in the scenario)
entirely (100%) implies that the defendant really is a size 10. In the scenario with
the potential for forensic errors (right), the test still depicts the same factor, but
we see that we can no longer be 100% certain that this means the suspect really is
size 10 (the forensic team may have made a mistake). The calculations undertaken
by a Bayesian Network program utilise these causal relationships between factors
to infer the probability of a given conjecture being true (e.g. that the defendant
is the source of a footprint) given other facts (e.g. that the defendant is found to
match the footprint and that 1/20 individuals in the population also match that
footprint). Unlike the event tree diagrams (Figures 10.1 and 10.2), the Bayes net
diagrams (see Figures 10.3 and 10.4 below) do not substantially change when errors
rates are introduced into the problem. With errors included (right), it remains a
5-node diagram and instead the percentage values in the boxes change to reflect the
new information.
The present experiment will seek to test the prediction made by Fenton et al.
(2014) that a Bayesian network presentation will result in greater trust and under-
standing compared to an event tree presentation when errors are taken into account.
This will be achieved through direct comparison of the event tree and Bayesian Net-
work presentation methods in both basic and error versions of a legal match case. A
further control condition will be added in which a simple statement that ‘Computer
analysis has calculated the value of the defendant being the source of the footprint
to be X%’ will also be included. The principal function of this control condition is to
ensure that trust in computational analysis is not the reason for any beneficial effect
of a Bayesian network presentation. Participants’ levels of trust and understanding
of each explanation given to them will be measured as the outcome measure. It
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Fig. 10.3: A Bayesian Network diagram depicting the scenario in the experiment with no
testing errors: a suspect matches a footprint found at a crime scene.
is hypothesised that the event tree condition will produce equal or greater trust
and understanding than the Bayesian condition with the basic, no-errors scenario,
however it is further hypothesised that the Bayesian Network condition will produce
greater trust and understanding than the event tree condition when forensic error
rates are included. No hypothesis is made regarding the control condition in the
basic scenario, however it is hypothesised that the Bayesian Network condition will
produce greater trust and understanding compared to the control condition in the
scenario with errors. Finally, the Berlin numeracy measure (Cokely et al., 2012)
will be employed to ensure that any effects found are appropriate for presentation
to individuals across the numerical ability spectrum.
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Fig. 10.4: A Bayesian Network diagram depicting the scenario in the experiment with
testing errors: a suspect matches a footprint found at a crime scene.
10.2 Method
10.2.1 Participants
Three hundred and sixty four participants took part in the experiment. No par-
ticipants were removed. Participants were recruited from the Amazon MTurk out-
sourcing service and were required to be in the United States of America and have
a 95% HIT approval rating. The demographics for experiments five and six can be
seen in Table 2.
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10.2.2 Design
The experiment comprised three conditions to which participants were randomly
assigned: the control condition, the event-tree condition and the Bayesian network
condition. Each condition comprised two distinct sections, both of which all par-
ticipants undertook: the basic scenario, with prior and random match probability
statistics, and the errors scenario, which extended this by adding false positive and
false negative error rates.
10.2.3 Materials
The full visual diagrams used in the experiment can be seen in Appendices C and
D. Presentation materials were created through an iterative process involving the
production of a series of refinements by the author and feedback from expert statis-
ticians. The scenario used in the problem and presented to participants can be seen
below:
Imagine a remote Island with 1,000 inhabitants. No one ever comes or
goes. One day, a man is found dead a couple of miles outside the main
village.
The resident law enforcer examines the crime scene and concludes that
the man has been murdered. He finds two sets of footprints: the victims
and a second set, leading away from the body which must have come
from the murderer. He measures these footprints and finds that they
are size 10. The law enforcer heads back to his office at the village and
checks records from the last 50 years on shoe sizes on the island. He finds
that on average only 1 in 30 Islanders have that shoe size. Word gets
around the island about the footprints and as the law enforcer leaves
his office, he sees a group of Islanders pushing a man in front of them.
When they reach the law enforcer, they push the man onto the ground
and explain that he has size 10 shoes and so he must be the one who
left the footprints. The law enforcer measures the mans feet and agrees
they are indeed size 10. He arrests the man as a suspect in the murder,
and puts him in a cell pending a public trial.
Now imagine you are a juror at the trial of this man. Given that the shoe
size is the only evidence against him, what do you think is the chance
that he is the source of the footprints leading away from the body?
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10.2.4 Procedure
Participants accessed the survey from their own computers. They were presented
with the consent form followed by the instructions for the experiment. They were
then randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Following this they were
presented with the basic scenario, including the backstory, prior and random match
probability values. Participants were then shown an explanation of the ’correct’
answer to the problem. This explanation, but not the scenario itself, varied between
the three conditions.
Following this explanation, participants were asked to provide a rating for two
questions (with the following rating scales):
1. To what extent do you trust that the result just given is correct? [Distrust
Completely; Distrust Moderately; Distrust Slightly’ Neutral; Trust Slightly;
Trust Moderately; Trust Completely]
2. To what extent do you understand how the result was calculated? [Don’t
Understand Completely; Don’t Understand Moderately; Don’t Understand
Slightly; Neutral; Understand Slightly; Understand Moderately; Understand
Completely]
Following the first explanation, participants were presented with further explana-
tory dialogue and the false positive and false negative statistics. They were then
again showed a condition-dependent explanation of the correct answer to the prob-
lem, taking into account these new values and were again asked the same trust and
understanding questions. Following this, participants were presented with the Berlin
numeracy scale (Cokely et al., 2012). Finally, participants were presented with the
demographic questions and thanked for taking part in the study.
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10.3 Results
In Figure 10.5 below, average responses to the trust and understanding questions can
be seen for both the basic scenario and including the information about errors. We
can see that for average trust levels, the control (4.8) and tree (5.0) conditions are
both similar but larger than the Bayes net condition (4.3) in the basic scenario. In
the errors scenario however, both control and trees show similar trust levels (control:
4.7; tree: 4.5), while the Bayes net condition shows substantially higher levels (5.2).
Fig. 10.5: Average level of trust for the basic and ’with errors’ scenario across all three
conditions and combined
This effect was confirmed with a mixed-effects ANOVA using trust as the depen-
dent variable, scenario as the within subjects variable with 2 levels (Basic vs Errors)
and in both ANOVA’s Condition as a between subjects factor with 3 levels (Control,
Trees, Bayesian Networks) and further, Berlin Numeracy Score as a between sub-
jects factor with 8 levels (each of the possible total scores in the test: 0-7).No linear
effect of scenario on trust was found (p=.286), but an interaction between scenario
and condition was found (F = 13.229 (2, 340), p<.001). No interaction between
scenario and Berlin score was found (p=.354) or between scenario, Berlin score and
condition (p=.548). The average trust scores for individuals high on numeracy (4+)
and low(<4) and across all three conditions and both scenarios can be seen below
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in Figure 10.6
Paired-samples tests were used as post-hoc tests to analyse change in trust levels
for each condition from before the errors were introduced to afterwards. No signif-
icant change in trust was seen in the control group (t [1, 126] = 1.016, p=.311), a
significant decrease was seen in the event-tree group (t [1, 115] = -2.905, p=.004) and
a significant increase was seen in the Bayes’ net group (t [1, 120] = 4.357, p<.001).
Fig. 10.6: Average level of trust for high and low numerates across all three conditions
and both scenarios
Below we can also see that for average understanding levels, all three conditions
show very similar understanding levels in the basic scenario (control: 4.7; tree: 4.6;
Bayes net: 4.5), however in the scenario including errors, the control (4.1) and tree
conditions (3.7) showed a substantial decrease in understanding while the Bayes net
condition (4.6) showed a mild increase.
This effect was confirmed with a mixed-effects ANOVA’s using understanding
as the dependent variable, scenario as the within subjects variable with 2 levels
(Basic vs Errors) and in both ANOVA’s Condition as a between subjects factor
with 3 levels (Control, Trees, Bayesian Networks) and further, Berlin Numeracy
Score as a between subjects factor with 8 levels (each of the possible total scores
in the test: 0-7). A negative linear effect of scenario on understanding was found
(F=10.203 (1, 340), p=.002), and an interaction between scenario and condition (F
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Fig. 10.7: Average level of understanding for the basic and ’with errors’ scenario across
all three conditions and combined
= 5.018 (2, 340), p=.007). No interaction between scenario and Berlin score was
found (p=.841) or between understanding, Berlin score and condition (p=.648). The
average understanding scores for individuals high on numeracy (4+) and low(<4)
and across all three conditions and both scenarios can be seen below in Figure 10.8.
Paired-samples tests were used as post-hoc tests to analyse change in under-
standing levels for each condition. A significant decrease in understanding was seen
in the control group (t [1, 126] = -3.352, p=.001), a significant decrease was seen
in the event-tree group (t [1, 115] = -4.721, p<.001) and no significant change was
seen in the Bayes’ net group (t [1, 120] = .835, p=.405).
Based on this graph, an exploratory analysis was conducted which separated the
sample into high (4+) and low (<4) numeracy levels. In the low numeracy group,
a mixed-effects ANOVA revealed an effect of scenario (F = 8.227 (1, 194), p=.004)
and an interaction between scenario and condition (F = 3.976 (2, 194), p=0.20).
In the high numeracy condition, a mixed-effects ANOVA also revealed an effect
of scenario (F = 12.271 (1, 164), p=.001) and an interaction between scenario and
condition (F = 5.633 (2, 164), p=.004).
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Fig. 10.8: Average level of trust for high and low numerates across all three conditions
and both scenarios
10.4 Discussion
The principle aim of the present experiment was to compare the Bayesian network
and event tree methods of presenting the statistics involved in a legal match cases to
untrained individuals both with and without testing errors, to determine which en-
gendered the greatest trust and understanding. In the basic scenario, both the event
tree and control conditions outperformed the Bayes’ net condition on trust, while
all conditions showed similar values on understanding. However, this trend reversed
for the scenario with errors, wherein the Bayes’ net condition showed greater trust
and understanding than either the event-tree or control conditions. The reversal
occurred for trust due to a slight drop in trust for the tree condition, little change
in the control condition and a substantial increase for the Bayes’ net condition. The
reversal occurred for understanding due to a substantial decrease in understanding
for the event-tree and control conditions but no change for the Bayes’ net condition.
This confirms the main hypotheses of this experiment. While without errors the
event tree diagram produces greater trust and equal understanding to Bayes nets,
when these are included, as they must be in any legal analysis (Fenton et al., 2014),
the Bayes net diagram engenders greater understanding and trust in a general au-
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dience. Further, the effect of the Bayes net presentation is unlikely to be merely
due to trust in computer analyses, as the Bayes’ net condition also outperformed
the control condition on both trust and understanding in the errors scenario. An
analysis of Berlin numeracy scores showed no effect on trust and understanding and
no interaction with condition or scenario. Confirming this, a pair of graphs showed
remarkable consistency of the main findings within the high and low numeracy sub-
groups. Within both groups the control and event-tree conditions showed little
change in trust from basic to errors, while the Bayes net condition increased in trust
from basic to errors in both numeracy sub-groups. On the understanding measure,
a decrease was seen between basic and errors scenarios in the control and event-tree
groups in both sub-groups and again no substantial change was seen in the Bayes
net condition in either sub-group. This suggests that the findings above in regards
to the superiority of the Bayes net presentation for trust and understanding when
including errors is not confined to any particular numeracy sub-group but should in-
stead be recommended for all individuals over the event-tree format. When looking
at the diagrams presented to participants (see Figures 10.3, 10.4, 10.1 and 10.4) the
pattern of understanding and trust levels seen is clearly coherent with the changes
in the complexity of the two diagrams from the basic to the errors scenario. The
event-tree diagram clearly increases in complexity from the basic (two important
branches) to the errors scenario (six important branches). This correlates with the
significant decrease in understanding and trust seen in this condition from basic to
errors scenarios. Unfortunately this increase in complexity is an inherent feature
of the format, and the version used in the present experiment is actually the most
minimal version possible with as many unnecessary branches as possible removed
for visual simplicity. When looking at the Bayes net presentation, it is clear that
no substantial change in complexity to the overall diagram occurs between scenar-
ios. The Bayes net diagram comprises five boxes in both scenarios, and it is only
the numbers within those boxes which change. The fact that understanding of the
Bayes net explanation did not change between scenarios is therefore perhaps not
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surprising. More mysterious however is that trust in the Bayes’ net condition in
fact significantly increased. The fact that the Bayes’ net condition showed lower
trust levels even than the control condition may shed some light on this. The Bayes’
net presentation included two largely ’superfluous’ boxes in the basic scenario (see
Appendix D): as there were no testing errors two boxes were redundant and could
have been removed. The rationale behind this retention was to create greater co-
herence between the basic and errors scenario, and so that participants could see
that these two boxes ’change’ when errors were included. It is theorised therefore
that the presence of these boxes may have reduced trust in the basic scenario, and
the revelation of their use may have increased trust in the errors scenario. This
retention of complexity was not possible with the event-tree format.
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Experiment five demonstrated that the general public are not capable of undertaking
accurate statistical reasoning in legal scenarios when vital forensic testing errors are
included. Instead, participants use a set of heuristics which mis-estimate the impact
of the error rates. Analysis of the think aloud data suggest that no single individual
incorporated the error rates into their calculations in a mathematically appropriate
manner. This suggests, in line with Fenton et al. (2014), that jurors and legal
professionals should not attempt to undertake such calculations themselves, and
that this may be best left to trained statisticians employing statistical computer
programs such as Bayesian networks.
Building upon these findings in experiment five, experiment six sought to test
two methods for presenting the output of such calculations to the general public:
the popular event tree format and the Bayesian network diagram approach recom-
mended by Fenton et al. (2014). As hypothesised, in the simple match scenario,
without errors, the event tree was either equal or superior to the Bayesian network
diagram in terms of the level of trust and understanding in the calculations that
it engendered in participants. However, also as hypothesised, when the necessary
forensic errors were included in the problem, a complete reversal of this pattern
was seen, with the Bayesian network producing higher levels of both trust and un-
derstanding than the event tree diagram. This was theorised to be because of the
increased visual complexity of the event tree diagram when testing errors are added.
The Bayesian network diagram does not suffer from any such increase in complex-
ity, and results demonstrated that participants in fact trusted the Bayesian network
diagram significantly more when testing errors were added than when they were
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absent.
In line with Fenton and Neil (2011); Fenton et al. (2012, 2014) it is argued that
these findings demonstrate that, firstly, jurors should not be asked to undertake
Bayesian calculations by hand. This echoes the message of an account of a disastrous
attempt to do exactly that by Donnelly (2005) which may have led to a serious
miscarriage of justice. Secondly, they suggest that if such calculations must be
completed on behalf of the jury then the Bayesian network diagram is recommended
for this purpose instead of the currently more-commonly-used event-tree diagram.
As well as providing higher levels of both trust and understanding in comparison to
the event-tree diagram, this approach has an additional benefit which was not in fact
mentioned by Fenton et al. (2014). This is the coherence between the calculations
being undertaken on behalf of the jury and the presentation of those calculations
to that jury (the presentation is a true representation of the calculations being
undertaken). This may reduce issues surrounding the jury being ’misled’ by the
statistician, a concern which has motivated previous disastrous attempts to have the




This thesis has aimed to determine the most effective methods of presenting the
statistics involved in Bayesian problems to a general audience. It has done this
within a general framework in part one, and with a more specific focus on presen-
tation in legal trials in part two.
12.1 Part I
In the first experiment in part one, two leading theories from the field focused on pre-
senting Bayesian word problems were, for the first time, compared and combined in
a single experiment using a within subjects design. Out of these two approaches, the
outside-framed percentage approach of Macchi (2000: used to represent the many
different ’natural frequency’ and ’nested sets’ approaches) was shown to signifi-
cantly improve accuracy over and above an inside-framed percentage or probability
approach. However, the causal approach of Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) showed
no significant increase over the control condition. In a second between-subjects ex-
periment (experiment three) this null finding was replicated when removing several
possible confounding factors and with a closer design to Krynski and Tenenbaum’s
original.
In the first experiment, the design was supplemented with a think aloud pro-
tocol, which asked participants to record their thought processes while they solved
the Bayesian problem. Analysing this data using qualitative techniques, a five-stage
process was discovered to be highly modal among successful participants. While
this process was modal amongst successful solvers in all conditions, including the
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control and causal conditions, it was found in higher frequency in the nested sets
condition. In experiment two, Macchi’s (2000) approach, and the presence of the
newly-discovered nested sets process were tested in a between subjects design using
a full percentage format (experiment one used real-number base rates) and which
further crossed problem difficulty (simple versus complex) with the use of decimal
numbers (whole number vs decimal). In all conditions, Macchi’s approach outper-
formed the control condition, and this effect again coincided with a greater increase
in individuals following the ’nested sets’ process. A mediation analysis demonstrated
that the nested sets framing effect on accuracy was mediated by the increase in fre-
quency of individuals following the ’nested sets’ process. This experiment also found
that many successful (but very few unsuccessful) individuals converted the problem
from percentages to integers, most often converting from a base of 100% to a base
of 100 women, making no mathematical change to the problem. This gave some
evidence for a conjecture put forward by previous work (e.g. Hoffrage et al., 2002)
that the nested sets approaches (e.g. Evans et al., 2000; Fiedler et al., 2000; Macchi,
2000; Sloman et al., 2003) work only because they encourage more people to convert
to ’natural frequencies’, and that this is the true reason for the increase in accuracy
seen using these formats. However, it is important to note that 40% of successful
participants followed the nested sets process without converting from percentages,
suggesting that it is by no means an absolute necessity for individuals to do this in
order to solve Bayesian problems. While this finding could be interpreted in line
with an evolutionary ’frequentist’ perspective (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Brase,
2007) it may also merely demonstrated a greater familiarity on the part of many in-
dividuals with integers. Future work may be valuable in testing whether familiarity
with percentages or integers moderates this relationship.
Experiments one and two also demonstrated that the majority of individuals who
failed were doing so at the first stage of the nested sets process, with a substantial but
smaller number failing in the middle stages, and very few failing in the final stages.
They also demonstrated that the benefit from Macchi’s outside-framed approach
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may be entirely due to the changes made to the body of the problem, which was
thought to be assistive at this earlier stage, and that the further changes to question
form (which were assistive at later stages) may be superfluous. Further, qualitative
analysis of the think aloud data in experiment two demonstrated that the most
common error made was due to a confusion of the question being asked, again
suggesting that this part of the problem in Macchi’s approach could be further
refined.
In a fourth experiment the correlational nested sets process and conversion-to-
real-number findings of experiments one and two were tested experimentally in a
crossed design. The provision of a real-number population, designed to encourage
individuals to ’convert’ the problem to integers, showed no increase in accuracy. This
suggested that the causal story developed following the results of experiment two
may be false: instead of conversion leading to success, individuals who are already
destined to be successful may subsequently be more likely to convert the problem,
possible to aid their working through of the mathematics. The provision of two
sets of leading questions designed to encourage individuals to follow the nested sets
process did show a significant increase in accuracy. Finally, this experiment as well
as experiment three demonstrated that the mere presence of a write aloud protocol
also substantially increases accuracy on Bayesian problems.
12.2 Part II
While the ’outside-framed’ nested sets approach was widely advocated in Part one
of the thesis, in Part two, a situation (the presentation of evidence in law) where
the nested sets approach is not possible was analysed. Two factors contribute to
the inappropriateness of the approach here. Firstly, the legal trial is inherently
focused on a single individual and by design, a reference class cannot be used and
is considered prejudicial. Secondly, the legal situation, when properly analysed, has
a level of complexity too great for statistically untrained individuals to work with,
regardless of framing.
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In the first experiment in part two, the question of whether a general population
sample could accurately undertake Bayesian inference of a legal match case includ-
ing necessary forensic errors (see Fenton et al., 2014, for a discussion) was tested.
The clear conclusion was that this was not possible, with no single participant mak-
ing an accurate Bayesian inference when errors were included. Instead, participants
were found to use a set of heuristics in response to errors. The first set of these
involved stating that the error margins were so negligible that they could be ignored
or ignoring them entirely (omitting to mention them). When the error rates were
incorporated, the most common approach individuals took was to ’nudge’ their
answer from their previous calculation by several percentage points. While over-
all, participants’ responses represented an over-weighting of the error statistics, the
’negligible’ and ’ignore’ response clearly under-weighted both (particularly the false
positive rate) and the ’nudge’ response under-weighted the false positive rate but
over-weighted the false negative rate.
Given the findings of experiment one, experiment two sought to compare two
methods of presenting the outcome of a Bayesian analysis of a legal match case
with testing errors, precluding the need for individuals to make the calculations
themselves. The two methods compared were the popular event-tree diagram and
the Bayesian network diagram proposed by Fenton et al. (2014). A further control
condition was used to rule out trust in ’computer analysis’ as a factor in any success
seen for the Bayesian network diagram. When participants were shown the ’simple’
case with no forensic testing errors, the Bayesian network diagram was rated as ei-
ther equal to or less than both the control and event-tree diagram presentations for
both subjective trust and understanding ratings. However, when the testing errors
were added, the Bayesian network diagram resulted in higher trust and understand-
ing than either control or event-tree diagrams. This suggested that when a legal
Bayesian problem takes into account the necessary levels of complexity, a Bayesian
network diagram will engender greater trust in the result and subjective feeling of
understanding in how it was calculated, than an event tree diagram presentation.
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12.3 Overall Conclusion
The present thesis has tested a range of presentation methods across a range of do-
mains where the general public frequently have to solve Bayesian problems. Among
the numerous ’nested sets’ approaches available, including the use of ’natural fre-
quencies’ (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), the presentation of the necessary statis-
tics in a Bayesian problem as percentages framed from the point of view of a group
(Macchi, 2000), and sub-divisions of that group, has been extensively tested and
validated. In part one, this nested sets approach has been advocated as the most
reliable method to improve accuracy wherever possible. In Part two, a situation
(the presentation of evidence in law) where the nested sets approach is not possible
was analysed. Here, particularly due to the complexity of an appropriately-analysed
legal case, the approach advocated was to engender trust and understanding in the
output from a Bayesian network analysis of the case as manual calculation was
demonstrated to not be plausible, with no participants able to achieve a normative
result.
Across both parts one and two, through qualitative analysis of think aloud data,
the thesis has provided a deeper understanding of the processes individuals go
through across a range of problems, and the reasons they both succeed and fail,
than has previously been possible. These analyses give strong suggestions for the
direction of future work and provide a framework on which improvements to cur-
rent approaches can be made. Where individuals can undertake Bayesian reasoning
with reasonable success, this thesis has demonstrated that the nested sets or nat-
ural frequency method is most efficacious. In the legal realm, where the Bayesian
problems that individuals undertake are too complex, the thesis has demonstrated
that a Bayesian network presentation of the outcome of the Bayesian analysis engen-
ders the greatest trust and understanding in statistically untrained individuals. In
experiment five, a similar, but importantly different ’base rate neglect’ (Bar-Hillel,
1980) phenomenon was found to that in experiment two. While in experiment two,
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participants appeared to ’confuse’ P(D|H) with P(H|D), participants in experiment
six appeared to confuse the inverse value, P(D|-H) with P(H|D). While at first a
surprising result, this may provide insight into participant process, and the base
rate neglect phenomenon in general. This is because participants in experiments
one, two and three were provided with the figure P(D|H) in the text of the prob-
lem while participants in experiment six were provided with the figure P(D|-H).
This may therefore be explained by participants simply ’picking’ the figure from the
problem that appears most like the figure being requested in the question. Accord-
ing to fuzzy processing theory (Wolfe, 1995), statistics like these are represented
in the mind in a variety of levels of coarseness, and, the less engagement / time
to process the figures, the greater the coarseness of representation. At it’s most
coarse, participants may represent all of these figures as ’D’s and H’s go together’
(Reyna and Brainerd, 1991). At this level of processing, the value P(D|H) and the
value P(D|-H) may be indistinguishable from P(H|D). This explanation fits with
the overwhelming finding from part one that the mere implementation of a think
aloud protocol (which encouraged individuals to process the problem more deeply
and consciously by forcing them to write down their thought process) produced a
large increase in accuracy, and reduction of the base rate neglect error. In general
therefore, qualitative data from both parts of the thesis give evidence against the
traditional base rate neglect view that individuals ignore base rates as they do not
believe them important (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Welsh and
Navarro, 2012; Obrecht and Chesney, 2013; Pennycook and Thompson, 2012) and
in favour of the ’confusion hypothesis’ (e.g. Braine and Connell, 1990; Cohen, 1981;
Dawes, 1986; Eddy, 1982; Hamm and Miller, 1990; Fiedler et al., 2000).
In terms of individuals’ preferred mode of solution, the findings of experiment
six echoed and extended two core proposals from part one. Firstly that, when using
a simple problem, a ’nested’ method of presentation is preferred. Secondly that,
while in the simple case a causal approach will not be effective (and will be inferior
to a nested sets approach), this pattern may reverse in the complex case. The
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first of these was demonstrated in the fact that higher levels of trust were seen for
the ’event tree’ presentation method than the Bayesian network presentation in the
simple case. The second proposal was demonstrated in the fact that, when the full
complexity of the legal case was taken into account, this method was found to be
less trusted and less understood than a Bayesian network presentation, which is an
inherently causal method of presentation.
In general therefore, where a reference class is possible, and where complexity is
not too great for manual calculation, a nested sets approach (either with outside-
framed percentages or natural frequencies) is advocated by this thesis. The situation
in which an individual is faced with understanding their risk of having a disease after
routine screening, which the vast majority of people will face at some point in their
lives, is a good example of this type of situation. Where complexity is too great
for individuals to perform manual calculations, such as when analysing a legal case,
the output of computations from a Bayesian network presented in a causal, nodal
construction has been shown to engender high levels of trust and understanding in
experiment six, and is therefore advocated.
Future work should focus on developing Macchi’s (2000) outside-framed approach
to presenting ’simple’ Bayesian problems. A particular focus should be made on im-
proving the format of the question asked, possibly in line with Girotto and Gonzalez’s
(2001) approach. Further improvements should be informed by the fact that indi-
viduals appear to follow the here-outlined nested sets process when solving Bayesian
problems. It may therefore be most sensible to design further presentation methods
with an aim to encouraging problem solvers to more easily follow this process, par-
ticularly by encouraging them to perceive the Hypothesis-focused representation of
the problem, which seems to be the greatest predictor of success: once individuals
perceive this representation of the problem, their chance of successful solution is
considerably higher.
When presenting highly complex Bayesian problems, future work should focus
on extending the Bayesian network diagram approach and taking more detailed
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mixed methods quantitative-qualitative data to determine why the Bayesian network
diagram is so effective when false positives and false negatives are included, and
further, how it can be improved. Visual complexity is proposed as a key possible
factor, as the event-tree diagram increases visual complexity substantially when
error rates are incorporated, while the Bayesian network diagram does not.
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APPENDIX
A The Basic-Mammogram, Nested-College,
Causal-Library and Nested-Causal-Gotham
Word Problems from Experiment One
Fig. A.1: The Basic-Mammogram problem from Experiment One
Fig. A.2: The Nested-College problem from Experiment One
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Fig. A.3: The Causal-Library problem from Experiment One
Fig. A.4: The Nested-Causal-Gotham problem from Experiment One
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B The Think Aloud Instructions used in
Experiments One, Two, Three and Five
Fig. B.1:
C The Simple Event Tree and Bayesian Network
Diagrams Presented to Participants in
Experiment Six
Fig. C.1: The Simple Scenario Presented to Participants in Experiment Six
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Fig. C.2: The Simple Event Tree Diagram Presented to Participants in Experiment Six
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Fig. C.3: The Simple Bayesian Network Diagram Presented to Participants in Experiment
Six
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D The Additional Errors Information plus Event
Tree and Bayesian Network Diagrams with
Errors Presented to Participants in
Experiment Six
Fig. D.1: The Additional Errors Information Presented to Participants in Experiment Six
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Fig. D.2: The Event Tree Diagram Including Errors Presented to Participants in Experi-
ment Six
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Fig. D.3: The Bayesian Network Diagram Including Errors Presented to Participants in
Experiment Six
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